%0 Journal Article
%T Endogenous Leadership in a Labor-Managed Duopoly
%J Journal of Game Theory
%@ 2325-0054
%D 2012
%I 
%R 10.5923/j.jgt.20120104.02
%X This paper examines a quantity-setting model in which two labor-managed firms compete against each other. The paper considers the following situation. Each labor-managed firm must choose output either in period one or in period two. If the labor-managed firms decide to choose output in the same period, a simultaneously move game occurs, whereas if the labor-managed firms decide to choose output in different periods, a sequential move game arises. The paper demonstrates that there is no equilibrium where the labor-managed firms choose output in the same period.
%K Quantity-Setting Model
%K Labor-Managed Duopoly
%K Endogenous Leadership
%U http://article.sapub.org/10.5923.j.jgt.20120104.02.html