%0 Journal Article
%T Scepticism about reflexive intentions refuted
%A Maciej Witek
%J Lodz Papers in Pragmatics
%@ 1898-4436
%D 2009
%I 
%R 10.2478/v10016-009-0005-y
%X The aim of this paper is to resist four arguments, originally developed by Mark Siebel, that seem to support scepticism about reflexive communicative intentions. I argue, first, that despite their complexity reflexive intentions are thinkable mental representations. To justify this claim, I offer an account of the cognitive mechanism that is capable of producing an intention whose content refers to the intention itself. Second, I claim that reflexive intentions can be individuated in terms of their contents. Third, I argue that the explanatory power of the theory of illocutionary reflexive intentions is not as limited as it would initially seem. Finally, I reject the suggestion that the conception of reflexive communicative intentions ascribes to a language user more cognitive abilities than he or she really has.
%K Speech act theory
%K illocution
%K communicative intentions
%U http://versita.metapress.com/content/h3u04736403037n3/?p=7663cfb048a74a7db68ce8f16d692fb7&pi=4