%0 Journal Article
%T M¨¢QUINAS SIN ENGRANAJES Y CUERPOS SIN MENTES: £¿CU¨¢N DUALISTA ES EL FUNCIONALISMO DE M¨¢QUINA DE TURING?
%A Gonz¨¢lez
%A Rodrigo
%J Revista de filosof¨ªa
%D 2011
%I Scientific Electronic Library Online
%R 10.4067/S0718-43602011000100012
%X this article deals with how turing machine functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of dualism, which involves that strong ai is not close to the original materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. to support this thesis, i argue that there is a compelling coincidence between descartes 'philosophy and this version of functionalism, since the former holds that it is conceivable/possible to separate mind and body, while the latter holds that it is not strictly necessary that mental states are realized by the physical properties of real cogs and machines.
%K mind-body problem
%K dualism
%K turing machine functionalism
%K materialism.
%U http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0718-43602011000100012&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en