%0 Journal Article
%T Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
%A Motta
%A Daniel Augusto
%J Revista de Economia Pol¨ªtica
%D 2007
%I Editora 34
%R 10.1590/S0101-31572007000200003
%X the purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage; and the stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines the free trade agreement format in the second stage. finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. the political economy model is applied to ftaa case.
%K ftaa
%K political economy
%K bargaining
%K non-cooperative games.
%U http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0101-31572007000200003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en