%0 Journal Article
%T O seguro dep¨®sito induz ao risco moral nas cooperativas de cr¨¦dito brasileiras?: um estudo com dados em painel
%A Bressan
%A Val¨¦ria Gama Fully
%A Braga
%A Marcelo Jos¨¦
%A Bressan
%A Aureliano Angel
%A Resende-Filho
%A Mois¨¦s de Andrade
%J Revista Brasileira de Economia
%D 2012
%I Funda??o Get¨²lio Vargas
%R 10.1590/S0034-71402012000200002
%X conflicting interests and imperfect monitoring can induce financial institutions covered by the deposit insurance to run into more risk than the level aimed by its fund administrator. we test if the establishment of the deposit insurance (fgs) of the brazilian cooperative credit system (sicoob) did not induce moral hazard. we use a panel composed of monthly data for 180 credit unions (61.43% of cooperatives affiliated to sicoob). panel data models' estimates using the basel index as proxy for the risk exposure of cooperatives indicate that the fgs induced the moral hazard problem.
%K risco moral
%K seguro dep¨®sito
%K cooperativas de cr¨¦dito
%K ¨ªndice de basileia
%K dados em painel.
%U http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0034-71402012000200002&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en