%0 Journal Article
%T Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism
%A Naoki Kojima
%J Theoretical Economics Letters
%P 187-192
%@ 2162-2086
%D 2017
%I Scientific Research Publishing
%R 10.4236/tel.2017.72016
%X The present paper investigates
the multi-dimensional mechanism design in</span><span style=\"font-family:&quot;\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\"> which
buyers have taste and budget as their private information. The paper </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\">shows an easy proof of a two-dimensional optimal
direct mechanism by a</span> <span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\">one-dimensional
indirect mechanism: A canonical mechanism in the tradi</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\">tional
one-dimensional setting, </span><i><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\">i.e.</span></i><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\">, function
of one variable, the buyer</span></span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\">¡¯</span><span style=\"font-family:&quot;\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\">s
taste. </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\">It also sheds light on where the
difficulty</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\"> lies implementability of a general direct mechanism</span></span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana;\">¡ªnot optimal¡ªby a canonical mechanism.
%K Multi-Dimensional Mechanism
%K Indirect Mechanism
%K Budget Constraint
%K Revelation Principle
%U http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=74398