%0 Journal Article
%T Utilitarian Moral Judgments Are Cognitively Too Demanding
%A Sergio Da Silva
%A Raul Matsushita
%A Maicon De Sousa
%J Open Access Library Journal
%V 3
%N 2
%P 1-9
%@ 2333-9721
%D 2016
%I Open Access Library
%R 10.4236/oalib.1102380
%X We evaluate utilitarian judgments under the dual-system approach of the
mind. In the study, participants respond to a cognitive reflection test and
five (sacrificial and greater good) dilemmas that pit utilitarian and
non-utilitarian options against each other. There is judgment reversal across
the dilemmas, a result that casts doubt in considering utilitarianism as a
stable, ethical standard to evaluate the quality of moral judgments. In all the
dilemmas, participants find the utilitarian judgment too demanding in terms of
cognitive currency because it requires non-automatic, deliberative thinking. In
turn, their moral intuitions related to the automatic mind are frame dependent,
and thus can be either utilitarian or non-utilitarian. This suggests that automatic
moral judgments are about descriptions, not about substance.
%K Cognitive Reflection
%K Utilitarianism
%K Moral Judgment
%U http://www.oalib.com/paper/4653991