%0 Journal Article
%T Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions
%A Kyung Hwan Baik
%J Theoretical Economics Letters
%P 1-4
%@ 2162-2086
%D 2013
%I Scientific Research Publishing
%R 10.4236/tel.2013.35A2001
%X <p class=\"MsoNormal\">
	<span lang=\"EN-US\">I study contests in which two asymmetric
players compete with each other by expending irreversible efforts to win a
prize. I consider three types of games, which are distinguished by their
different timing assumptions: the simultaneous-move game, the sequential-move game,
and the game with endogenous timing. I compare the outcomes obtained under the
different timing assumptions.</span>
</p>
%K Contest
%K Rent Seeking
%K Timing Assumptions
%K Underdog
%K Favorite
%U http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=36454