%0 Journal Article %T The Gap between Mind and World in Mind and World Remains %A Chung-I. Lin %J Open Journal of Philosophy %P 278-284 %@ 2163-9442 %D 2013 %I Scientific Research Publishing %R 10.4236/ojpp.2013.32044 %X In Mind and World, McDowell endorses: empirical thoughts should be justified, ultimately, by things they are about; and, that empirical thoughts are immediately about their ultimate justifiers. But, it also holds two other views: first, as we relate our empirical judgments to their credentials, we ultimately rely on experience, despite its fallibility; second, our empirical judgments are about things in the external world. These views appear inconsistent with one another. McDowell¡¯s way of accommodating the seeming inconsistency appeals to the idea of conceptuality of experience and the holism of the conceptual. Mainly by an argument from false experience, I demonstrate that the conceptual resources relevant to McDowell¡¯s idea of the conceptuality of experience fall short of delivering the accommodation he promises. %K McDowell %K Objectivity %K Conceptuality of Experience %K False Experience %U http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=32148