%0 Journal Article
%T Carnap and the Tractatus' Philosophy of Logic
%A Oskari Kuusela
%J Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy
%D 2012
%I McMaster University
%R 10.4148/jhap.v1i3.1334
%X This article discusses the relation between the early Wittgenstein¡¯s and Carnap¡¯s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap¡¯s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. In Carnapian terms, the Tractatus¡¯ goal is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, syntactical principles and concepts to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore already part of the Tractatus¡¯ view, and its method for introducing syntactical concepts and principles should be entirely acceptable for Carnap by his own criteria. Moreover, despite the Tractatus¡¯ rejection of syntactical statements, there is an important correspondence between Wittgenstein¡¯s saying-showing distinction and Carnap¡¯s object-language-syntax-language distinction: both constitute a distinction between logico-syntactical determinations concerning language and language as determined or described by those determinations. Wittgenstein¡¯s distinction therefore constitutes a precursor of the object-language syntax-language distinction which the latter in a certain sense affirms, rather than simply contradicting it. The saying-showing distinction agrees with Carnap¡¯s position also in marking logic as something that isn¡¯t true/false about either language or reality, which is a conception that underlies Carnap¡¯s principle of tolerance.
%U http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/jhap.v1i3.1334