%0 Journal Article
%T Como seria ver como um ser humano?
%A Etienne Bimbenet
%J DoisPontos
%D 2012
%I Universidade Federal do Paran¨¢, Universidade Federal de S?o Carlos
%X We will ask here ¡°what is it like to see as a human¡±. Such a question is difficult, for in taking a step back from perception and in considering that it might not be what it is, this question goes against what is commonly called the ¡°natural attitude¡±. Merleau-Ponty will have orchestrated this relativization of human seeing and its spontaneous realism in two different ways. First, there is what might be called the ¡°way of finitude.¡± This consists in taking the point of view from nowhere on perception, the point of view of a mind without worldly attachments. We would then say, as Merleau-Ponty never stopped saying, that perceiving is not seeing from nowhere, and that we always perceive from somewhere, in a finite body, and not from the point of view of god.Our animal origin, however, offers a second, quite different way of frustrating the dogmatism of the perceptual faith. This is the way that Merleau-Ponty adopts in The Structure of Behavior, where he is, in a very natural manner, brought to interrogate that which distinguishes animal perception from human perception. His answer here is valuable: to see as a human is to be capable of ¡°perspectival multiplicity.¡± To catch sight of such a concept, to see human seeing as plural and excessive, is only possible for someone who has abandoned the point of view of nowhere and who has decided to philosophize starting from the animal.
%K Perception
%K Animal origin
%K Human being
%K Natural attitude
%K Perspectival multiplicity
%U http://ojs.c3sl.ufpr.br/ojs2/index.php/doispontos/article/view/29100/18945