%0 Journal Article
%T Revisit of McCullagh-Barreto Two-party ID-based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols
%A Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
%J International Journal of Network Security
%D 2005
%I Femto Technique
%X We revisit the two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol (2P-IDAKA) and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation due to McCullagh & Barreto (2005). Protocol 2P-IDAKA carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, we demonstrated why both the protocol and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key (i.e., termed key-replicating attack} in recent work of Krawczyk (2005)). We also demonstrate that both protocols do not achieve the key integrity property, first discussed by Janson & Tsudik (1995).
%K Cryptographic protocols
%K identity-based cryptography
%K authenticated key agreement
%K provable security
%U http://ijns.femto.com.tw/download_paper.jsp?PaperID=IJNS-2005-06-29-3&PaperName=ijns-v1-n3/ijns-2005-v1-n3-p154-160.pdf