%0 Journal Article
%T Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Results of a Structural Econometric Approach
%A SARA CASTELLANOS
%A MARCO OVIEDO
%J Cuadernos de Econom¨ªa
%D 2008
%I 
%X This analysis of the Mexican Treasury securities primary auctions suggests that the uniform format yields higher revenues than the discriminatory format. It applies the structural econometric model proposed by F¨¦vrier, Pr¨¦get, and Visser (2004). This model's main advantage is that it allows us to (i) estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution function of the securities'marginal value and the conditional distribution of the signals given the securities'value; (ii) derive optimal bids and equilibrium prices of alternative auction mechanisms; and (Hi) compare revenues. The uniform format's revenue superiority seems to be due to market uncertainty, defined as an environment with noisier value signals. El an¨¢lisis de las subastas primarias de t¨ªtulos de deuda p¨²blica del Gobierno Federal en M¨¦xico muestra la superioridad del formato de subasta uniforme respecto al discriminatorio, en t¨¦rminos de ingreso. El documento aplica el modelo econom¨¦trico estructural de Fevrier, Preget y Visser (2002). La principal ventaja del modelo es que permite construir posturas ¨®ptimas y precios de equilibrio en mecanismos de subasta alternativos y comparar los ingresos provenientes de cada uno. La superioridad del formato de subasta uniforme parece explicarse por el nivel de incertidumbre del mercado, definido como un ambiente donde la se al del valor es m¨¢s ruidosa.
%K Mexico
%K Treasury Securities
%K Share Auction
%U http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212008000100001