%0 Journal Article
%T Crusius et la certitude m¨¦taphysique en 1762 Crusius and metaphysical certainty in 1762
%A Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet
%J Ast¨¦rion
%D 2011
%I ?cole Normale Sup¨¦rieure de Lyon
%X L¡¯article se propose d¡¯analyser le r le jou¨¦ par la pens¨¦e de Christian August Crusius dans la gen¨¨se et l¡¯articulation de la Preisschrift kantienne de 1762. D¨¦cid¨¦ment anti-wolffien, Kant opte pour la m¨¦thode analytique comme seule capable d¡¯assurer la scientificit¨¦ de la philosophie. Dans un double mouvement de rapprochement et de prise de distance par rapport ¨¤ certaines th¨¨ses crusiennes centrales, il entend d¨¦montrer que la certitude atteignable en m¨¦taphysique est suffisante pour la conviction, qu¡¯elle est toute aussi   s re   et   compl¨¨te   que la certitude math¨¦matique. Ne pouvant fonder cette certitude sur une simple conviction subjective, selon le principe de Crusius, Kant s¡¯¨¦loignera d¨¦finitivement de ce dernier, non sans avoir int¨¦gr¨¦ dans sa propre doctrine des ¨¦l¨¦ments crusiens fondamentaux. This article aims to discuss the role played by Crusius¡¯ thought in the genesis and the structure of Kant¡¯s Preisschrift of 1762. Definitely opposed to Wolffian philosophy, Kant argues for the analythical method as the only method capable of ensuring a scientific status for philosophy. Simultaneously embracing and criticizing some central Crusian principles, he intends to demonstrate the possibility of a ¡°sure¡± and ¡°complete¡± metaphysical certainty, which would be as sufficient for conviction as the mathematical certainty. Kant refuses, however, to base metaphysical certainty on a simply subjective conviction, as Crusius suggests. That is why he ultimately rejects his predecessor¡¯s philosophy, although not without making some fundamental Crusian elements part of his own doctrine.
%K certainty
%K metaphysics
%K analysis
%K method
%K principle
%K m¨¦thode
%K m¨¦taphysique
%K principe
%K certitude
%K analyse
%U http://asterion.revues.org/2137