%0 Journal Article
%T Repeated Time Allocation of National and Private Sector by Real Estate Agent
%J Journal of Game Theory
%@ 2325-0054
%D 2012
%I 
%R 10.5923/j.jgt.20120105.04
%X This paper presents the time (real estate agent (broker)¡¯s service hours) - allocation of two types of firms¡¯ product (national (leader)-firm and private (follower)-firm) repeatedly. Where the strategy of the national (leader) firm is to decide the product whole sale price and the private developer plays a role of the follower with respect to maximize its payoff. We characterize the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium in terms of time allocation to these developers as well as price with the parameters. A real estate agent controls the service hours which is taken in the normal form. In this game theoretic model, quality of the product is measured by baseline sales, brand substitution degree and price positioning. Future research through simulating this model can show many more application results.
%K Stackelberg Model
%K Repeated Game Theory
%K Nash Equilibrium
%U http://article.sapub.org/10.5923.j.jgt.20120105.04.html