%0 Journal Article
%T All but one free ride when wealth effects are small
%A Joaquim Silvestre
%J SERIEs
%@ 1869-4195
%D 2012
%I 
%R 10.1007/s13209-011-0057-4
%X Quasilinear preferences on a public good and a numeraire good are limits of preferences where both goods are normal. The set of equilibria of the voluntary contribution (or private provision) game is easily characterized under quasilinearity by: top valuators aggregately contribute their common stand-alone contribution, whereas non-top valuators contribute nothing. Because, as long as preferences are randomly selected, there will typically be a single top valuator, it follows that, typically, the equilibrium is unique, with all players but one contributing nothing, hence ˇ°free ridingˇ± in the sense of the ordinary English usage of the expression. The upper-hemicontinuity of the Nash equilibrium correspondence implies that this is also the case when both goods are strictly normal, but the wealth effects on the public good are small.
%K Free riding
%K Public goods
%K Voluntary contributions
%K Private provision
%K Normal goods
%K Quasilinear preferences
%K Wealth effects
%K H41
%K C72
%K D70
%U http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13209-011-0057-4