Policy reforms in education have considerable
potential to correct social inequities and assist in the building of more
inclusive societies either through improved efficiencies and/or equity in education
service provision. Primary education is a public service whose consumption has
huge positive externalities—social and economic benefits. In many developing
countries, girls are usually excluded from
the consumption of this service for a variety of reasons—some of which are
social, cultural or economic. The article describes and justifies a reform
initiative conceived to increase female access to primary education in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and sketches an incentive scheme, whose
purpose is to improve teacher commitment and improve learning outcomes,
for its implementation. The reform measure being proposed, specific
egalitarianism (a progenitor of modern-day social transfer schemes) is argued
to be robust enough to ensure that girls who are usually the most excluded ones
from primary education in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are enable to
access this service as a way of addressing gender equity issues. This type of
social transfer (social benefit) strategy when coupled with an incentive scheme
that rewards teachers for productivity would yield the socially
desirable/beneficial outcome of more girls’ enrolling and completing primary
education.
Cite this paper
Ihebuzor, N. A. (2014). An Incentive Scheme to Increase Female Access to and Completion of Basic Education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Open Access Library Journal, 1, e1023. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1101023.
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