Abstract:
We study the critical properties of a non-equilibrium statistical model, the majority-vote model, on heptagonal and dual heptagonal lattices. Such lattices have the special feature that they only can be embedded in negatively curved surfaces. We find, by using Monte Carlo simulations and finite-size analysis, that the critical exponents $1/\nu$, $\beta/\nu$ and $\gamma/\nu$ are different from those of the majority-vote model on regular lattices with periodic boundary condition, which belongs to the same universality class as the equilibrium Ising model. The exponents are also from those of the Ising model on a hyperbolic lattice. We argue that the disagreement is caused by the effective dimensionality of the hyperbolic lattices. By comparative studies, we find that the critical exponents of the majority-vote model on hyperbolic lattices satisfy the hyperscaling relation $2\beta/\nu+\gamma/\nu=D_{\mathrm{eff}}$, where $D_{\mathrm{eff}}$ is an effective dimension of the lattice. We also investigate the effect of boundary nodes on the ordering process of the model.

Abstract:
Spatial games are crucial for understanding patterns of cooperation in nature (and to some extent society). They are known to be more sensitive to local symmetries than e.g. spin models. This paper concerns the evolution of the prisoner's dilemma game on regular lattices with three different types of neighborhoods -- the von Neumann-, Moore-, and kagome types. We investigate two kinds of dynamics for the players to update their strategies (that can be unconditional cooperator or defector). Depending on the payoff difference, an individual can adopt the strategy of a random neighbor (a voter-model-like dynamics, VMLD), or impose its strategy on a random neighbor, i.e., invasion-like dynamics (IPLD). In particular, we focus on the effects of noise, in combination with the strategy dynamics, on the evolution of cooperation. We find that VMLD, compared to IPLD, better supports the spreading and sustaining of cooperation. We see that noise has nontrivial effects on the evolution of cooperation: maximum cooperation density can be realized either at a medium noise level, in the limit of zero noise, or in both these regions. The temptation to defect and the local interaction structure determine the outcome. Especially, in the low noise limit, the local interaction plays a crucial role in determining the fate of cooperators. We elucidate these both by numerical simulations and mean-field cluster approximation methods.

Abstract:
We study a model of opinion formation where the collective decision of group is said to happen if the fraction of agents having the most common opinion exceeds a threshold value, a \textit{critical mass}. We find that there exists a unique, non-trivial critical mass giving the most efficient convergence to consensus. In addition, we observe that for small critical masses, the characteristic time scale for the relaxation to consensus splits into two. The shorter time scale corresponds to a direct relaxation and the longer can be explained by the existence of intermediate, metastable states similar to those found in [P.\ Chen and S.\ Redner, Phys.\ Rev.\ E \textbf{71}, 036101 (2005)]. This longer time-scale is dependent on the precise condition for consensus---with a modification of the condition it can go away.

Abstract:
We study the effects of free will and massive opinion of multi-agents in a majority rule model wherein the competition of the two types of opinions is taken into account. To address this issue, we consider two specific models (model I and model II) involving different opinion-updating dynamics. During the opinion-updating process, the agents either interact with their neighbors under a majority rule with probability $1-q$, or make their own decisions with free will (model I) or according to the massive opinion (model II) with probability $q$. We investigate the difference of the average numbers of the two opinions as a function of $q$ in the steady state. We find that the location of the order-disorder phase transition point may be shifted according to the involved dynamics, giving rise to either smooth or harsh conditions to achieve an ordered state. For the practical case with a finite population size, we conclude that there always exists a threshold for $q$ below which a full consensus phase emerges. Our analytical estimations are in good agreement with simulation results.

Abstract:
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoner's dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or asynchronous) and also the introduction of extortion strategy affect the collective outcome of the games. By means of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations as well as dynamical cluster techniques, we find that the involvement of extortioners facilitates the boom of cooperators in the population (and whom can always dominate the population if the temptation to defect is not too large) for both synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating, in stark contrast to the otherwise case, where cooperation is promoted for intermediate aspiration level with synchronous strategy updating, but is remarkably inhibited if the strategy updating is implemented asynchronously. We explain the results by configurational analysis and find that the presence of extortion leads to the checkerboard-like ordering of cooperators and extortioners, which enable cooperators to prevail in the population with both strategy updating manners. Moreover, extortion itself is evolutionary stable, and therefore acts as the incubator for the evolution of cooperation.

Abstract:
Punishment, especially selfish punishment, has recently been identified as a potent promoter in sustaining or even enhancing the cooperation among unrelated individuals. However, without other key mechanisms, the first-order social dilemma and second-order social dilemma are still two enduring conundrums in biology and the social sciences even with the presence of punishment. In the present study, we investigate a spatial evolutionary four-strategy prisoner's dilemma game model with avoiding mechanism, where the four strategies are cooperation, defection, altruistic and selfish punishment. By introducing the low level of random mutation of strategies, we demonstrate that the presence of selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate the two kinds of social dilemmas for various parametrizations. In addition, we propose an extended pair approximation method, whose solutions can essentially estimate the dynamical behaviors and final evolutionary frequencies of the four strategies. At last, considering the analogy between our model and the classical Lotka-Volterra system, we introduce interaction webs based on the spatial replicator dynamics and the transformed payoff matrix to qualitatively characterize the emergent co-exist strategy phases, and its validity are supported by extensive simulations.

Abstract:
In a recent work [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 3838 (2011)], Schneider et al. proposed a new measure for network robustness and investigated optimal networks with respect to this quantity. For networks with a power-law degree distribution, the optimized networks have an onion structure-high-degree vertices forming a core with radially decreasing degrees and an over-representation of edges within the same radial layer. In this paper we relate the onion structure to graphs with good expander properties (another characterization of robust network) and argue that networks of skewed degree distributions with large spectral gaps (and thus good expander properties) are typically onion structured. Furthermore, we propose a generative algorithm producing synthetic scale-free networks with onion structure, circumventing the optimization procedure of Schneider et al. We validate the robustness of our generated networks against malicious attacks and random removals.

Abstract:
We propose a model of the evolution of the networks of scientific citations. The model takes an out-degree distribution (distribution of number of citations) and two parameters as input. The parameters capture the two main ingredients of the model, the aging of the relevance of papers and the formation of triangles when new papers cite old. We compare our model with three network structural quantities of an empirical citation network. We find that an unique point in parameter space optimizing the match between the real and model data for all quantities. The optimal parameter values suggest that the impact of scientific papers, at least in the empirical data set we model is proportional to the inverse of the number of papers since they were published.

Abstract:
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower than the interaction timescale. This is done by implementing probabilistic reproduction on an individual level. We observe that both too fast and too slow reproduction rates hamper the emergence of cooperation. In other words, there exists an intermediate selection timescale that maximizes cooperation. Another factor we find to promote cooperation is a diversity of reproduction timescales.

Abstract:
We investigate a Hamiltonian model of networks. The model is a mirror formulation of the XY model (hence the name) -- instead letting the XY spins vary, keeping the coupling topology static, we keep the spins conserved and sample different underlying networks. Our numerical simulations show complex scaling behaviors, but no finite-temperature critical behavior. The ground state and low-order excitations for sparse, finite graphs is a fragmented set of isolated network clusters. Configurations of higher energy are typically more connected. The connected networks of lowest energy are stretched out giving the network large average distances. For the finite sizes we investigate there are three regions -- a low-energy regime of fragmented networks, and intermediate regime of stretched-out networks, and a high-energy regime of compact, disordered topologies. Scaling up the system size, the borders between these regimes approach zero temperature algebraically, but different network structural quantities approach their T=0-values with different exponents.