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Search Results: 1 - 5 of 5 matches for " Saiegh "
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?Jugadores activos o apéndices del ejecutivo? Una evaluación del papel de los legisladores latinoamericanos en la toma de decisiones
Saiegh, Sebastian M.;
Política y gobierno , 2010,
Abstract: legislatures are critical institutions for the effective functioning of a democratic system and in the policymaking process. they are expected to represent the needs and wishes of citizens, identify problems and adopt statutes to address them, and oversee the implementation of policies. however, the extents to which latin american legislatures fulfill these roles vary greatly from country to country. despite the recent proliferation of research on executive-legislative relations in latin america, comparative knowledge of how legislative institutions operate in these countries is still quite limited. in an effort to improve understanding in this area, i evaluate the extent and nature of the policy-making role played by 18 latin american legislatures. specifically, i use multidimensional scaling (mds) techniques to test if and how the dimensions by which these legislatures have been previously distinguished correspond to observed similarities among them. the analysis reveals that four types of legislatures can be identified. the findings also confirm that those legislatures with greater capabilities are the ones that play more active roles in the policy making process.
Governos de Coaliz?o nas Democracias Presidencialistas e Parlamentaristas
Cheibub, José Antonio;Przeworski, Adam;Saiegh, Sebastian;
Dados , 2002, DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582002000200001
Abstract: are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? the only difference be w e the two systems is that unscheduled elections are held under parliamentarism in those situations in which under presidentialism a majority legislative coalition opposes the executive. in both systems, portfolio coalitions are formed only when the formateur party and the one closest to it are relatively distant in policy terms. otherwise, the formateur party governs alone, satisfied with the legislative outcomes. hence, portfolio minority governments need not be less effective legislatively than coalition governments. whatever is wrong with presidentialism, is not due to the difficulty of forming coalitions.
Governos de Coaliz o nas Democracias Presidencialistas e Parlamentaristas
Cheibub José Antonio,Przeworski Adam,Saiegh Sebastian
Dados , 2002,
Abstract: Are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? The only difference be w e the two systems is that unscheduled elections are held under parliamentarism in those situations in which under presidentialism a majority legislative coalition opposes the executive. In both systems, portfolio coalitions are formed only when the formateur party and the one closest to it are relatively distant in policy terms. Otherwise, the formateur party governs alone, satisfied with the legislative outcomes. Hence, portfolio minority governments need not be less effective legislatively than coalition governments. Whatever is wrong with presidentialism, is not due to the difficulty of forming coalitions.
Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Paraguay, 1954-2003
Molinas,José; Pérez Li?án,Aníbal; Saiegh,Sebastián;
Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) , 2004, DOI: 10.4067/S0718-090X2004000200004
Abstract: this paper characterizes the evolution of paraguay's policymaking process (pmp) between 1954 and 2003. we present an overview of the pmp under the rule of alfredo stroessner (1954-89) and explore the institutional setting emerging after 1989. we discuss how the colorado party progressively broke up into several factions and characterize the distinctive patterns of policymaking that emerged after the adoption of the 1992 constitution. we hypothesize that the presence of a large number of veto players has made policy change more difficult and that legislators are inclined to pursue particularistic policies. in order to test those hypotheses we rely on a database containing virtually every bill introduced in congress since april of 1992. our conclusions suggest that the current paraguayan pmp may be flexible for the provision of particularistic benefits, but rigid for the approval of broad regulatory or redistributive policies.
Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Paraguay, 1954-2003
José Molinas,Aníbal Pérez Li?án,Sebastián Saiegh
Revista de Ciencia Política , 2004,
Abstract: This paper characterizes the evolution of Paraguay's policymaking process (PMP) between 1954 and 2003. We present an overview of the PMP under the rule of Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89) and explore the institutional setting emerging after 1989. We discuss how the Colorado Party progressively broke up into several factions and characterize the distinctive patterns of policymaking that emerged after the adoption of the 1992 Constitution. We hypothesize that the presence of a large number of veto players has made policy change more difficult and that legislators are inclined to pursue particularistic policies. In order to test those hypotheses we rely on a database containing virtually every bill introduced in Congress since April of 1992. Our conclusions suggest that the current Paraguayan PMP may be flexible for the provision of particularistic benefits, but rigid for the approval of broad regulatory or redistributive policies. Este artículo caracteriza la evolución del proceso de elaboración de políticas (PMP) en Paraguay durante el período 1954-2003. El siguiente trabajo ofrece una perspectiva general del PMP durante la dictadura de Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89) y explora el contexto institucional resultante a partir de 1989. Tras analizar la fragmentación del partido Colorado, se describen los patrones característicos de la elaboración de políticas surgidas con la Constitución de 1992. Se sostiene como hipótesis que la presencia de un amplio número de jugadores con capacidad de veto ha dificultado el cambio y que los legisladores tienden a promover políticas particularistas. Para poner a prueba tal supuesto, utiliza una base de datos que contiene los proyectos de ley ingresados al Congreso desde abril de 1992. Las conclusiones sugieren que el proceso político paraguayo puede ser flexible para generar beneficios particularistas y rígido a la hora de realizar amplias transformaciones de tipo regulatorio o redistributivo.
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