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Search Results: 1 - 10 of 7346 matches for " Przeworski Adam "
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A última instancia: as institui??es s?o a causa primordial do desenvolvimento econ?mico?
Przeworski, Adam;
Novos Estudos - CEBRAP , 2005, DOI: 10.1590/S0101-33002005000200004
Abstract: following douglas north, neo-institutionalists claim that institutions are the "primary" cause of economic development, "deeper" than the factors identified by marxism as "forces of production". yet while the conclusions are different, the historical narratives differ little across these perspectives. the article discusses how such conclusions are derived and argues that is improper the claim for a "causal primacy": institutions and development are mutually endogenous and the most one can hope for is to identify their reciprocal impacts.
The Mechanics of Regime Instability in Latin America Mecanismos de inestabilidad de régimen en América Latina
Adam Przeworski
Journal of Politics in Latin America , 2009,
Abstract: The paper is narrowly addressed to a single puzzle: How did it happen that countries that attempted to install democracy earlier enjoyed it less frequently? Regime dynamics are driven by two mechanisms: (1) Democracies become more durable as per capita income increases, and (2) Past experiences with democracy destabilize both democracies and autocracies. As a result, countries that experiment with democracy at lower income levels experience more regime instability. Moreover, until they reach some income threshold, at any time such countries are less likely to be democratic than countries that first enter democracy when they have higher incomes. Hence, paradoxically, the resistance of European monarchies against democracy resulted in democracies that were more stable than those following postindependence attempts in Latin America. Este trabajo tiene como propósito dilucidar la siguiente cuestión: Cómo puede ser que aquellos países que intentaron adoptar un régimen democrático en forma más temprana fueron los menos proclives a conservar dicha forma de gobierno? Mi argumento es que existen dos mecanismos que gobiernan la dinámica de los regímenes: (1) Las democracias se vuelven más duraderas a medida que los países incrementan su ingreso per capita; y (2) Las experiencias democráticas anteriores desestabilizan tanto a los futuros intentos democráticos como autoritarios. En consecuencia, los países que experimentan con la adopción de un régimen democrático cuando su nivel de riqueza es bajo tienden a sufrir una mayor inestabilidad. Más aún, hasta que no alcancen un nivel de ingresos determinado, dichos países son menos propensos a ser democráticos en comparación con aquellos países que adoptaron la democracia a mayores niveles de ingresos. Por lo tanto, paradójicamente, la resistencia de las Monarquías Europeas en contra de la adopción de instituciones democráticas produjo regímenes democráticos más estables que aquellos surgidos de los movimientos post-independentistas en América Latina.
Guillermo: uma nota pessoal
Adam Przeworski,Toledo Jr. Joaquim
Novos Estudos - CEBRAP , 2012, DOI: 10.1590/s0101-33002012000100001
Abstract:
Elei??es e representa??o
Manin, Bernard;Przeworski, Adam;Stokes, Susan C.;
Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política , 2006, DOI: 10.1590/S0102-64452006000200005
Abstract: the issue of this article is how much the electoral mechanism can effectively make the institutions of democracy more representative. the authors single out some critical limitations for the constituents to enhance controlling mechanisms over their representatives.
Governos de Coaliz?o nas Democracias Presidencialistas e Parlamentaristas
Cheibub, José Antonio;Przeworski, Adam;Saiegh, Sebastian;
Dados , 2002, DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582002000200001
Abstract: are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? the only difference be w e the two systems is that unscheduled elections are held under parliamentarism in those situations in which under presidentialism a majority legislative coalition opposes the executive. in both systems, portfolio coalitions are formed only when the formateur party and the one closest to it are relatively distant in policy terms. otherwise, the formateur party governs alone, satisfied with the legislative outcomes. hence, portfolio minority governments need not be less effective legislatively than coalition governments. whatever is wrong with presidentialism, is not due to the difficulty of forming coalitions.
Democracia, Elei??es e Responsabilidade Política
Cheibub, José Ant?nio;Przeworski, Adam;
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais , 1997, DOI: 10.1590/S0102-69091997000300004
Abstract: the purpose of this article is to examine the empirical validity of two propositions, which are related by the definition of democracy as a regime in which rulers are selected by elections: first, that democracy is a political regime distinguished by the accountability of rulers to the ruled, and, second, that elections are the mechanism through which this accountability is enforced. the authors consider that rulers are accountable if the probability that they survive in office is sensitive to government performance. on the basis of data for 135 countries observed, with a few exceptions, between 1950 and 1990, the authors estimated the probability that a head of government in democracies and dictatorships survives a particular year in office given the length of tenure and economic outcomes. on the basis of this analysis, they conclude that the assertion that democracy induces accountability is at least too broad; that elections do not enforce economic accountability in democratic regimes; and that the link between democracy and elections appears to be less than definitional. the authors conclude the article by suggesting a number of plausible explanations for these results.
Democracia, Elei es e Responsabilidade Política
Cheibub José Ant?nio,Przeworski Adam
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais , 1997,
Abstract: O objetivo do artigo é examinar a validade empírica de duas proposi es, que se relacionam em virtude da defini o da democracia como regimes nos quais os governantes s o selecionados por meio de elei es regulares e competitivas: primeiro, que os regimes democráticos se caracterizam pela responsabilidade dos governantes perante os governados e, segundo, que as elei es funcionam como o mecanismo que produz esta responsabilidade. Para efeitos da análise, os autores consideram que os governantes s o politicamente responsáveis quando sua sobrevivência no poder depende do desempenho econ mico. Utilizando dados para 135 países observados, com algumas exce es, entre 1950 e 1990, estimam, ent o, a probabilidade de sobrevivência no poder de líderes democráticos e autoritários dada a dura o de seus governos e os resultados econ micos produzidos. Com base nesta análise os autores concluem que a afirma o de que a democracia induz à responsabilidade política é, no mínimo, ampla demais; que as elei es n o geram resultados econ micos nos regimes democráticos; e que a rela o entre democracia e elei es é menos do que definicional. Concluímos o artigo com considera es mais gerais que sugerem explica es plausíveis para os resultados encontrados e suas implica es para a teoria democrática.
Governos de Coaliz o nas Democracias Presidencialistas e Parlamentaristas
Cheibub José Antonio,Przeworski Adam,Saiegh Sebastian
Dados , 2002,
Abstract: Are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? The only difference be w e the two systems is that unscheduled elections are held under parliamentarism in those situations in which under presidentialism a majority legislative coalition opposes the executive. In both systems, portfolio coalitions are formed only when the formateur party and the one closest to it are relatively distant in policy terms. Otherwise, the formateur party governs alone, satisfied with the legislative outcomes. Hence, portfolio minority governments need not be less effective legislatively than coalition governments. Whatever is wrong with presidentialism, is not due to the difficulty of forming coalitions.
Democracia e cultura: uma vis?o n?o culturalista
Przeworski, Adam;Cheibub, José Ant?nio;Limongi, Fernando;
Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política , 2003, DOI: 10.1590/S0102-64452003000100003
Abstract: the authors hold that economic and institutional factors are sufficient to generate a convincing explanation of the dynamic of democracies without any resource to culture. their conclusion is that, while there may be good reasons to expect that culture matters, the available empirical evidence provides little support for the view that democracy requires a democratic culture.
O que mantém as democracias?
Przeworski, Adam;Alvarez, Michael;Cheibub, José Antonio;Limongi, Fernando;
Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política , 1997, DOI: 10.1590/S0102-64451997000200006
Abstract: on the basis of the key finding that economic factors are strongly related to the endurance of democratic regimes, the authors argue that affluence, growth with moderate inflation, declining income inequality, favorable international climate , and - concerning institutional design - a parliamentary system, are the requisitive conditions for the durability of democracies. they also reject as false the commonly held view according to which ditactorships promote economic development in poor countries and that these, having become developed, would have their dictatorships replaced by democratic regimes.
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