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Search Results: 1 - 10 of 2117 matches for " Naoki Masuda "
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Clustering in Large Networks Does Not Promote Upstream Reciprocity
Naoki Masuda
PLOS ONE , 2011, DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0025190
Abstract: Upstream reciprocity (also called generalized reciprocity) is a putative mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations with which players help others when they are helped by somebody else. It is a type of indirect reciprocity. Although upstream reciprocity is often observed in experiments, most theories suggest that it is operative only when players form short cycles such as triangles, implying a small population size, or when it is combined with other mechanisms that promote cooperation on their own. An expectation is that real social networks, which are known to be full of triangles and other short cycles, may accommodate upstream reciprocity. In this study, I extend the upstream reciprocity game proposed for a directed cycle by Boyd and Richerson to the case of general networks. The model is not evolutionary and concerns the conditions under which the unanimity of cooperative players is a Nash equilibrium. I show that an abundance of triangles or other short cycles in a network does little to promote upstream reciprocity. Cooperation is less likely for a larger population size even if triangles are abundant in the network. In addition, in contrast to the results for evolutionary social dilemma games on networks, scale-free networks lead to less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous degree distribution.
Effects of diffusion rates on epidemic spreads in metapopulation networks
Naoki Masuda
Physics , 2010, DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/12/9/093009
Abstract: It is often useful to represent the infectious dynamics of mobile agents by metapopulation models. In such a model, metapopulations form a static network, and individuals migrate from one metapopulation to another. It is known that heterogeneous degree distributions of metapopulation networks decrease the epidemic threshold above which epidemic spreads can occur. We investigate the combined effect of heterogeneous degree distributions and diffusion on epidemics in metapopulation networks. We show that for arbitrary heterogeneous networks, diffusion suppresses epidemics in the sense of an increase in the epidemic threshold. On the other hand, some diffusion rates are needed to elicit epidemic spreads on a global scale. As a result of these opposing effects of diffusion, epidemic spreading near the epidemic threshold is the most pronounced at an intermediate diffusion rate. The result that diffusion can suppress epidemics contrasts with that for diffusive SIS dynamics and its variants when individuals are fixed at nodes on static networks.
Directionality of contact networks suppresses selection pressure in evolutionary dynamics
Naoki Masuda
Physics , 2008,
Abstract: Individuals of different types, may it be genetic, cultural, or else, with different levels of fitness often compete for reproduction and survival. A fitter type generally has higher chances of disseminating their copies to other individuals. The fixation probability of a single mutant type introduced in a population of wild-type individuals quantifies how likely the mutant type spreads. How much the excess fitness of the mutant type increases its fixation probability, namely, the selection pressure, is important in assessing the impact of the introduced mutant. Previous studies mostly based on undirected and unweighted contact networks of individuals showed that the selection pressure depends on the structure of networks and the rule of reproduction. Real networks underlying ecological and social interactions are usually directed or weighted. Here we examine how the selection pressure is modulated by directionality of interactions under several update rules. Our conclusions are twofold. First, directionality discounts the selection pressure for different networks and update rules. Second, given a network, the update rules in which death events precede reproduction events significantly decrease the selection pressure than the other rules.
Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation
Naoki Masuda
Physics , 2007,
Abstract: Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is connected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games with a fixed population size, heterogeneity in the number of contacts per player is known to promote evolution of cooperation. Under a common assumption of positively biased payoff structure, well-connected players earn much by playing frequently, and cooperation once adopted by well-connected players is unbeatable and spreads to others. However, maintaining a social contact can be costly, which would prevent local payoffs from being positively biased. In replicator-type evolutionary dynamics, it is shown that even a relatively small participation cost extinguishes the merit of heterogeneous networks in terms of cooperation. In this situation, more connected players earn less so that they are no longer spreaders of cooperation. Instead, those with fewer contacts win and guide the evolution. The participation cost, or the baseline payoff, is irrelevant in homogeneous populations but is essential for evolutionary games on heterogeneous networks.
Voter model on the two-clique graph
Naoki Masuda
Physics , 2014, DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.90.012802
Abstract: I examine the mean consensus time (i.e., exit time) of the voter model in the so-called two-clique graph. The two-clique graph is composed of two cliques interconnected by some links and considered as a toy model of networks with community structure or multilayer networks. I analytically show that, as the number of interclique links per node is varied, the mean consensus time experiences a crossover between a fast consensus regime [i.e., O(N)] and a slow consensus regime [i.e., O(N^2)], where N is the number of nodes. The fast regime is consistent with the result for homogeneous well-mixed graphs such as the complete graph. The slow regime appears only when the entire network has O(1) interclique links. The present results suggest that the effect of community structure on the consensus time of the voter model is fairly limited.
Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation
Naoki Masuda
Computer Science , 2012, DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.07.002
Abstract: Indirect reciprocity in which players cooperate with unacquainted other players having good reputations is a mechanism for cooperation in relatively large populations subjected to social dilemma situations. When the population has group structure, as is often found in social networks, players in experiments are considered to show behavior that deviates from existing theoretical models of indirect reciprocity. First, players often show ingroup favoritism (i.e., cooperation only within the group) rather than full cooperation (i.e., cooperation within and across groups), even though the latter is Pareto efficient. Second, in general, humans approximate outgroup members' personal characteristics, presumably including the reputation used for indirect reciprocity, by a single value attached to the group. Humans use such a stereotypic approximation, a phenomenon known as outgroup homogeneity in social psychology. I propose a model of indirect reciprocity in populations with group structure to examine the possibility of ingroup favoritism and full cooperation. In accordance with outgroup homogeneity, I assume that players approximate outgroup members' personal reputations by a single reputation value attached to the group. I show that ingroup favoritism and full cooperation are stable under different social norms (i.e., rules for assigning reputations) such that they do not coexist in a single model. If players are forced to consistently use the same social norm for assessing different types of interactions (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup interactions), only full cooperation survives. The discovered mechanism is distinct from any form of group selection. The results also suggest potential methods for reducing ingroup bias to shift the equilibrium from ingroup favoritism to full cooperation.
Accelerating coordination in temporal networks by engineering the link order
Naoki Masuda
Computer Science , 2015,
Abstract: Social dynamics on a network may be accelerated or decelerated depending on which pairs of individuals in the network communicate early and which pairs do later. The order with which the links in a given network are sequentially used, which we call the link order, may be a strong determinant of dynamical behaviour on networks, potentially adding a new dimension to effects of temporal networks relative to static networks. Here we study the effect of the link order on linear synchronisation dynamics. We show that the synchronisation speed considerably depends on specific orders of links. In addition, applying each single link for a long time to ensure strong pairwise synchronisation before moving to a next pair of individuals does not often enhance synchronisation of the entire network. We also implement a simple greedy algorithm to optimise the link order in favour of fast synchronisation.
Voter models with contrarian agents
Naoki Masuda
Computer Science , 2013, DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.88.052803
Abstract: In the voter and many other opinion formation models, agents are assumed to behave as congregators (also called the conformists); they are attracted to the opinions of others. In this study, I investigate linear extensions of the voter model with contrarian agents. An agent is either congregator or contrarian and assumes a binary opinion. I investigate three models that differ in the behavior of the contrarian toward other agents. In model 1, contrarians mimic the opinions of other contrarians and oppose (i.e., try to select the opinion opposite to) those of congregators. In model 2, contrarians mimic the opinions of congregators and oppose those of other contrarians. In model 3, contrarians oppose anybody. In all models, congregators are assumed to like anybody. I show that even a small number of contrarians prohibits the consensus in the entire population to be reached in all three models. I also obtain the equilibrium distributions using the van Kampen small-fluctuation approximation and the Fokker-Planck equation for the case of many contrarians and a single contrarian, respectively. I show that the fluctuation around the symmetric coexistence equilibrium is much larger in model 2 than in models 1 and 3 when contrarians are rare.
Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots
Naoki Masuda
Computer Science , 2012, DOI: 10.1038/srep00646
Abstract: Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics.
Opinion control in complex networks
Naoki Masuda
Computer Science , 2014, DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/17/3/033031
Abstract: In many instances of election, the electorate appears to be a composite of partisan and independent voters. Given that partisans are not likely to convert to a different party, a main goal for a party could be to mobilize independent voters toward the party with the help of strong leadership, mass media, partisans, and effects of peer-to-peer influence. Based on the exact solution of the classical voter model dynamics in the presence of perfectly partisan voters (i.e., zealots), we propose a computational method to maximize the share of the party in a social network of independent voters by pinning control strategy. The party, corresponding to the controller or zealots, optimizes the nodes to be controlled given the information about the connectivity of independent voters and the set of nodes that the opponent party controls. We show that controlling hubs is generally a good strategy, whereas the optimized strategy is even better. The superiority of the optimized strategy is particularly eminent when the independent voters are connected as directed rather than undirected networks.
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