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Barrel Pseudotilings
Undine Leopold
Symmetry , 2012, DOI: 10.3390/sym4030545
Abstract: This paper describes 4-valent tiling-like structures, called pseudotilings, composed of barrel tiles and apeirogonal pseudotiles in Euclidean 3-space. These (frequently face-to-face) pseudotilings naturally rise in columns above 3-valent plane tilings by?convex polygons, such that each column is occupied by stacked congruent barrel tiles or congruent apeirogonal pseudotiles. No physical space is occupied by the apeirogonal pseudotiles. Many interesting pseudotilings arise from plane tilings with high symmetry. As combinatorial structures, these are abstract polytopes of rank 4 with both finite and infinite 2-faces and facets.
The Namibian Border War: An Appraisal of the South African Strategy
Leopold Scholtz
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies , 2006,
Abstract:
Vibration of the Euler-Bernoulli Beam with Allowance for Dampings
Leopold Herrmann
Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science , 2008,
Abstract:
Dor mental e pesquisa
Nosek Leopold
Revista Brasileira de Psiquiatria , 2006,
Abstract:
Editorial : Investigación e inclusión social.
Luis Leopold
Psicología, Conocimiento y Sociedad , 2010,
Abstract: Con el lanzamiento del primer volumen de la Revista Psicología, Conocimiento y Sociedad, la Facultad de Psicología de la Universidad de la República concreta un nuevo instrumento para su proceso de mejora y transformación. Junto con la condición democratizadora que constituye el ser una publicación de libre acceso, queremos destacar tres lineamientos que entendemos orientan la tarea emprendida: a) El proceso de producción, distribución y acceso de los conocimientos producidos en el ámbito académico; b) Una publicación como la que construimos requiere de un arbitraje riguroso, que haga de la revista una propuesta confiable; c) Siendo herramienta para la comunicación y el intercambio, Psicología, Conocimiento y Sociedad debe aportar a apuestas académicas fuertes, incisivas, que promuevan el estudio y el debate de áreas de conocimientos relegados o postergados.
Obituaries and memories: Trud istnienia – wspomnienie o profesorze Jerzym Perzanowskim (1943- 2009)
Leopold ZGODA
Argument : Biannual Philosophical Journal , 2011,
Abstract:
The media and the military: Allies or adversaries?
Leopold Scholtz
Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , 2012, DOI: 10.5787/28-2-213
Abstract: Military commanders like Alexander the Great or Richard the Lionheart did not have to take public opinion greatly into account when they planned their campaigns in their day. Today it is a very different situation. In the light of the above this article starts with two somewhat startling quotes by the futurologists Alvin and Heidi Toffler: "The people thinking hardest about warfare in the future know that some of the most important combat of tomorrow will take place on the media battlefield." They also state: “[T]he media, including channels and technologies unimagined today, will be a prime weapon for Third Wave combatants in both the wars and anti-wars of the future, a key component of knowledge strategy.” In recent years, much has been made of the adversarial relations between journalists and the military. The media have, for instance, been blamed for the US defeat in Vietnam, for unthinkingly blabbing about tactical decisions in advance in the Falklands, etc. From their side, journalists have been blaming the military for not trying to understand the nature of their job, of covering up a number of bad things, etc.
THE NAMIBIAN BORDER WAR: AN APPRAISAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGY
Leopold Scholtz
Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , 2011, DOI: 10.5787/34-1-15
Abstract: From the sixties to the late eighties, the border war became a household term in South Africa. Hundreds of thousands of young white men were called up for military service, and many served in some or other capacity in Namibia – then South West Africa – often in the so-called operational area, often as combat troops. These young men were told that they were there to fight communism and that Swapo (the South West African People’s Organisation), the enemy, had to be bested for peace and freedom to come to the southern African subcontinent. Nevertheless, when the UN-supervised elections came after years of international wrangling, Swapo won handsomely, obtaining 57 per cent of the votes. The South African Government and South African Defence Force (SADF) was taken aback, because they really had believed that the anti-Swapo coalition would get a majority.2 The question therefore is: How was this possible? Did the South Africans, who developed a sophisticated strategy to counter-revolutionary guerrilla warfare and really were convinced that they had Swapo on the run, make mistakes they were not aware of? Did they disobey in practice the rules they supported in theory? It will be the purpose of this analysis to answer this question.
THE STANDARD OF RESEARCH ON THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE, 1987–1988
Leopold Scholtz
Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , 2011, DOI: 10.5787/39-1-105
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to examine the standard of research about the so-called Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. After examining what objectivity for the academic researcher should mean, two categories of researchers are looked at. The first is called the “non-researchers”. They are those who do no or virtually no real research into the events at Cuito Cuanavale, but uncritically copy what politicians and politically correct academics have to say about the subject. The focus also falls on one particular historian, Italian-American Professor Piero Gleijeses. On the basis of several articles (his book about Cuba s role in Africa until 1976 is judged to be good), the conclusion is that his evident admiration for Cuba and its dictator, President Fidel Castro, and his revulsion at apartheid South Africa brings about a one-sided and distorted picture of what went on at Cuito Cuanavale and the Border War in general. The last category is the “serious researchers”, whose work is based on good research. Although their work displays certain gaps in the sense that they had no access to Cuban or Angolan sources, they generally are much more reliable in their facts than the “non-researchers” and Professor Gleijeses.
IRAQ 2003 (PART 2): THE ROAD TO BAGHDAD
Leopold Scholtz
Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , 2012, DOI: 10.5787/32-2-136
Abstract: The operational plans The attack on Iraq, or Operation Iraqi Freedom as it was called, would be very different from its predecessor Operation Desert Storm, 12 years before. The main strategic difference was, of course, the fact that Desert Storm encompassed an enormous international military coalition, with ground, air and naval forces being supplied by America, Britain, France, Italy, Australia, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. Iraqi Freedom was shouldered by only two countries, the US and the UK, with Australia supplying a small contingent of SAS troops, the Czech Republic a platoon of chemical warfare troops and Spain a hospital ship. To drive the Iraqi occupying forces out of Kuwait in 1991, an enormous force of 15 divisions had been amassed. These had been organised into 3 American corps (XVIII Airborne Corps, consisting of two airborne divisions, a mechanised infantry division, as well as a French light armoured division; VII Corps, consisting of three US and one UK armoured divisions and one US mechanised infantry division; and a US Marine corps, consisting of two Marine divisions), a Saudi Arabian corps of two divisions, an Egyptian corps of two divisions, and a Syrian division.3 For Iraqi Freedom, only a single army corps (V), consisting of two mechanised infantry divisions and an airborne division, together with a marine division, an understrength composite British armoured division, and some smaller independent units, was available. And because of political wrangling, one mechanised infantry division arrived far too late on the battlefield to participate in the fighting. So, compared to 15 divisions in 1991, the job would now have to be done by only four. Nevertheless, with the new American weapons of precision and the extremely able Abrams tank, a repeat of Gulf War I was not really necessary.
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