This paper deals with the doctrine of transubstantial change advocated by Mulla Sadra in which substances as well as accidents are thought to be in constant and gradual change. Against Aristotle’s doctrine of accidental change, Mulla Sadra argues that no stable ground can bring about change and since substance is renewable it cannot carry identity of a changing existent. Here we investigate whether identity is possible or not. If it is possible then what becomes a ground for establishing identity of changing substances.
Central to Aristotle’s metaphysics is the question of individuality. The
individuality of each substance is explained in relation to “matter” because the “form” is universal.
Avicenna, as one of the Aristotelian Neoplatonist philosophers, is not content
with this explanation and proposes to establish individuality on other grounds.
In this paper, I argue that in his perspective it is not the “matter” which determines individuality but rather the
principle of existence.