Abstract:
it seems obvious -or almost- that we do possess a great amount of modal knowledge. we know a lot about necessary facts obtaining in mathematics, and we also know a lot about the contingent character of "middle size dry goods", for example. the question is how to explain that knowledge. in particular, this work will discuss the impact that the dilemma posed by paul benacerraf in the mathematical case would have over modal statements, considering the conceptions about modal facts and possible worlds advanced by david lewis and saul kripke.

Abstract:
this work tries to clarify the notion of a priori justification. first, it is contended that a priori justification should be identified with what appears after rational reflection of our higher cognitive capabilities upon certain content, concerning the truth value of the said propositional content. a priori justification characterised in this way should not be considered infallible, nor especially reliable, nor connected to the necessary, although it is contended that the specific modal content of a proposition seems to require a priori justification. finally, it is argued that the usual idea that all propositions a priori are analytic should be considered with special caution: there is no clear sense of analyticity to construe this common thesis. this in any way prevents a wide domain where a priori justification is required for the warrant of our judgements whether some concept is or is not applicable in different cases.

Abstract:
this work considers the validity of the theory of possible worlds as maximal structural universals in relation with the known criticisms against actualist views on possible worlds. in a first part the modal conception based on universals is summarily exposed. then, the different difficulties are presented. two of those appear especially relevant for the modal theory defended here: (i) the confusion of different indiscernible possibilities, and (ii) the explanation of the nature of the representation of possibilities. after the examination of these difficulties, it is shown how the modal theory based on universals can answer both problems.

Abstract:
in this work it is argued that it is not incoherent to attribute conditions of identity founded on causal powers to transcendent universals. after explaining some crucial notions of metaphysics of properties, it is said how conditions of identity for properties have been differentiated between so called “abundant properties” and “sparse properties”.

Abstract:
this work presents the subtraction argument for transcendent universals, i.e., for universals that are not instantiated. the argument depends on two main premises: (i) the contingency of the different instantiations of a universal, and (ii) the ontological independence between these instantiations. by the first premise one can postulate metaphysically possible worlds where given instantiations of a universal are subtracted. one can consider, then, a possible world where only one object instantiates a universal. by the principle (ii) of independence, construed in a particular way, one can postulate in this point a possible world where no object instantiates the universal. it is contended that the independence thesis (ii) is too strong for the defender of immanent universal, who can construe it in a milder guise, compatible with the generic dependence of universals to having some or other instance.

Abstract:
the work presents the conjecture that possible worlds are maximal structural universals. first, the paper explains roughly the different actualist extant conceptions of possible worlds and the systematic problems they have to face. it is argued that the conjecture presented shows how all those different conceptions can be unified in a single simple theory. second, it is explained why the best alternative for the constitution of the modal space is a domain of transcendent universals. finally, some difficulties for the conception are briefly indicated. a definitive justification of the conjecture presented should consist mainly in tackling those difficulties.

Abstract:
this work presents and discusses several forms of construing the modal ontological space, assuming possible worlds as maximal structural universals, and assuming also that there is no way to represent with structural universals the facts about transworld identity and distinctness between objects. two main theoretical options determine the configuration that the modal space would have: (a) the introduction as component of maximal structural universals of actual individuals' haecceitates, and (b) the introduction of counterparts. in the case (a), the facts about transworld identity of merely possible objects is not determined. it is argued that it is not reasonable to supplement this configuration of modal space with counterparts. in the case that haecceitates are not introduced, all transworld facts of identity and distinctness of objects are not determined, so here the supplement of counterparts is most welcomed. these options have their own theoretical costs regarding, for example, accessibility relations between possible worlds and other crucial modal theses.

Abstract:
this work presents the idea of a unique pluriverse instead of a plurality of possible worlds as an explanation of modal facts. first we state the idea and motivations of a pluriverse sentence in the context of a linguistic theory of modality. then we defend a conception of modal facts dependent on universals in which possible worlds should be understood as maximal structural universals. here the pluriverse universal is one single property determining the totality of the modal space. each way the world might be is represented in the pluriverse universal as a disjunct in the universal. finally, we explain a main difficulty for the pluriverse universal as a metaphysical explanation of modality: it seems to require a previous domain of actual and merely possible objects.

Abstract:
this paper discusses a well-known objection to libertarian free will in a non-deterministic world. in a non-deterministic world the complete state of affairs of the world in an instant of time t is compatible with different alternative complete states of affairs in the future of t. it has been argued that, in so far as different alternatives are possible to a free decision, it is a matter of chance and luck that that decision is taken. if a free decision is a matter of luck, then the agent cannot be considered responsible for it. it is argued that the difficulty appears from an anti-realist conception of causality, where causal facts are supervenient on regularities or counterfactual dependences. a realist conception of causality can, then, explain how the agent is causally in control of the free decision taken when the decision does not fall under a regularity or a counterfactual dependence. once considered how the agent is in control of the decision, it is argued that one cannot say that the free decision is a matter of luck for the agent.

Abstract:
this work considers the program of reduction of universals by classes of resembling tropes. several questions appear concerning the relation of resemblance: (1) does not the "respects" for resemblance presuppose a universal? (2) does not the fact that the relation of resemblance is a relation induce a vicious regress? (3) if there are different respects of comparison between tropes, then there is space for the traditional difficulties against resemblance nominalism: the "imperfect community" and the "companionship" difficulties. can these problems be handled by classes of tropes? (4) the relation of resemblance required is "perfect resemblance", that is, a relation of resemblance transitive, with no margin for degrees, and with no variation in the respects of comparison between tropes. are there any perfect resembling tropes? after consideration, it appears that the defender of tropes seems to have answers for the questions (1), (2) and (3), but it seems that there are no plausible answers for the question (4). the classes of exact resemblance that are going to replace the universals should be classes of possible tropes and there are no reasonable ways of explaining the modal facts required for these tropes.