Abstract:
The main theorem of this article is that every countable model of set theory M, including every well-founded model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe. In other words, there is an embedding $j:M\to L^M$ that is elementary for quantifier-free assertions. The proof uses universal digraph combinatorics, including an acyclic version of the countable random digraph, which I call the countable random Q-graded digraph, and higher analogues arising as uncountable Fraisse limits, leading to the hypnagogic digraph, a set-homogeneous, class-universal, surreal-numbers-graded acyclic class digraph, closely connected with the surreal numbers. The proof shows that $L^M$ contains a submodel that is a universal acyclic digraph of rank $Ord^M$. The method of proof also establishes that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: for any two countable models of set theory, one of them is isomorphic to a submodel of the other. Indeed, they are pre-well-ordered by embedability in order-type exactly $\omega_1+1$. Specifically, the countable well-founded models are ordered by embeddability in accordance with the heights of their ordinals; every shorter model embeds into every taller model; every model of set theory $M$ is universal for all countable well-founded binary relations of rank at most $Ord^M$; and every ill-founded model of set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. Finally, strengthening a classical theorem of Ressayre, the same proof method shows that if $M$ is any nonstandard model of PA, then every countable model of set theory---in particular, every model of ZFC---is isomorphic to a submodel of the hereditarily finite sets $HF^M$ of $M$. Indeed, $HF^M$ is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

Abstract:
The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

Abstract:
I shall argue that the commonly held V not equal L via maximize position, which rejects the axiom of constructibility V = L on the basis that it is restrictive, implicitly takes a stand in the pluralist debate in the philosophy of set theory by presuming an absolute background concept of ordinal. The argument appears to lose its force, in contrast, on an upwardly extensible concept of set, in light of the various facts showing that models of set theory generally have extensions to models of V = L inside larger set-theoretic universes.

Abstract:
The Wholeness Axioms, proposed by Paul Corazza, axiomatize the existence of an elementary embedding j:V-->V. Formalized by augmenting the usual language of set theory with an additional unary function symbol j to represent the embedding, they avoid the Kunen inconsistency by restricting the base theory ZFC to the usual language of set theory. Thus, under the Wholeness Axioms one cannot appeal to the Replacement Axiom in the language with j as Kunen does in his famous inconsistency proof. Indeed, it is easy to see that the Wholeness Axioms have a consistency strength strictly below the existence of an I_3 cardinal. In this paper, I prove that if the Wholeness Axiom WA_0 is itself consistent, then it is consistent with V=HOD. A consequence of the proof is that the various Wholeness Axioms WA_n are not all equivalent. Furthermore, the theory ZFC+WA_0 is finitely axiomatizable.

Abstract:
I prove several theorems concerning upward closure and amalgamation in the generic multiverse of a countable transitive model of set theory. Every such model $W$ has forcing extensions $W[c]$ and $W[d]$ by adding a Cohen real, which cannot be amalgamated in any further extension, but some nontrivial forcing notions have all their extensions amalgamable. An increasing chain $W[G_0]\subseteq W[G_1]\subseteq\cdots$ has an upper bound $W[H]$ if and only if the forcing had uniformly bounded essential size in $W$. Every chain $W\subseteq W[c_0]\subseteq W[c_1]\subseteq\cdots$ of extensions adding Cohen reals is bounded above by $W[d]$ for some $W$-generic Cohen real $d$.

Abstract:
In the context of large cardinals, the classical diamond principle Diamond_kappa is easily strengthened in natural ways. When kappa is a measurable cardinal, for example, one might ask that a Diamond_kappa sequence anticipate every subset of kappa not merely on a stationary set, but on a set of normal measure one. This is equivalent to the existence of a function l:kappa-->V_kappa such that for any A in H(kappa+) there is an embedding j:V-->M having critical point kappa with j(l)(kappa)=A. This and similar principles formulated for many other large cardinal notions, including weakly compact, indescribable, unfoldable, Ramsey, strongly unfoldable and strongly compact cardinals, are best conceived as an expression of the Laver function concept from supercompact cardinals for these weaker large cardinal notions. The resulting Laver diamond principles can hold or fail in a variety of interesting ways.

Abstract:
Infinite time Turing machines extend the operation of ordinary Turing machines into transfinite ordinal time. By doing so, they provide a natural model of infinitary computability, a theoretical setting for the analysis of the power and limitations of supertask algorithms.

Abstract:
Infinite time Turing machines extend the classical Turing machine concept to transfinite ordinal time, thereby providing a natural model of infinitary computability that sheds light on the power and limitations of supertask algorithms.

Abstract:
If an extension Vbar of V satisfies the delta approximation and cover properties for classes and V is a class in Vbar, then every suitably closed embedding j:Vbar to Nbar in Vbar with critical point above delta restricts to an embedding j|V:V to N amenable to the ground model V. In such extensions, therefore, there are no new large cardinals above delta. This result extends work in math.LO/9808011.

Abstract:
The landmark Levy-Solovay Theorem limits the kind of large cardinal embeddings that can exist in a small forcing extension. Here I announce a generalization of this theorem to a broad new class of forcing notions. One consequence is that many of the forcing iterations most commonly found in the large cardinal literature create no new weakly compact cardinals, measurable cardinals, strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, supercompact cardinals, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, and so on.