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Search Results: 1 - 10 of 9931 matches for " Alejandro Rosas "
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DARWIN Y LOS DILEMAS SOCIALES
ROSAS,ALEJANDRO;
Acta Biológica Colombiana , 2009,
Abstract: i describe the project of a darwinian explanation of morality following darwin?s basic ideas as expressed in the descent of man. in contrast to the traditional interpretation, i argue that darwin did not assume, nor is it necessary to assume in a darwinian perspective, an inevitable conflict between individual and group selection in the explanation of morality. both operate in synergy to favor traits that support moral behavior. i also argue that two teachings result from this darwinian project, one for moral philosophy and the other for the theory of natural selection. the first puts social dilemmas in the heart of human morality; the second puts cooperation in the core of natural selection. i illustrate the second point with recent research into the evolution of multicellular organisms.
LA EVOLUCIóN DE LA MORAL CONTRACTUAL
ROSAS,ALEJANDRO;
Ideas y Valores , 2011,
Abstract: evolutionary explanations of altruism and human cooperation, first set forth by pioneers such as darwin, hamilton and trivers, suggest that biology might be capable of offering a plausible scientific explanation of the core of human morality. according to this project, morality and human cooperation arise when resources are scarce; they cannot be exploited by isolated individuals; and individuals cannot maintain a long-term position of domination over others in order to advance their selfish ends. an important philosophical question that arises with respect to this project has to do with the concepts of de morality and moral motivation that it presupposes. the evolutionary project has not been clear in this respect. the article argues in favor of two theses: 1) evolutionary explanations of cooperation suggest a contractual type of morality, but they are ambiguous regarding the motivations favored by natural selection, thus reflecting, without resolving it, a traditional disagreement between hobbes's moral contractualism (selfish motivations) and that of kant (altruistic motivations); 2) in their current form, these explanations cannot resolve that disagreement, but a reflection on the role of the capacity to interpret the motivations and character of others in the evolution of morality could provide arguments in favor of kantian contractualism.
Kant y la ciencia natural de los organismos
Rosas,Alejandro;
Ideas y Valores , 2008,
Abstract: regarding the explanation of organisms as instances of complex design, kantian philosophy faces a difficult problem: as material entities they should be explained through mechanical laws, but because of their design, they call for an explanation through final causes. nonetheless, both explanations are unacceptable. does kant offer any way out? part of his solution is that both teleology and mechanicism must apply as regulative principles. but this implies limiting mechanicism to a regulative idea, which is inconsistent with his claim that newtonian mechanics are a priori valid and constitutive of natural science and its objects. i inquire into kant's positive doctrine on the natural explanation of organisms, combining teleology and mechanicism, and into the way this fits in his natural philosophy.
SELECCIóN NATURAL Y MORALIDAD
ROSAS,ALEJANDRO;
Ideas y Valores , 2006,
Abstract: abstract: in this essay, i address recent attempts to account for morality as an adaptation due to natural selection. after a brief introduction, my exposition has four sections. i first explain the paradox of biological altruism. second, i explain the solution to the paradox in terms of group selection. this solution was presumably applied by darwin himself as he discussed human morality, and it has experienced a recent revival, though it remains suspicious to most biologists. in the third section i offer a socio-biological solution that opts for denying that morality can be explained by any form of natural selection. morality is opposed to human nature as designed by natural selection. in the fourth, i argue for an explanation in terms of individual selection. it does not oppose morality to nature, and does not need the workings of group selection; rather, it operates through the agents' psychological preferences in social interaction.
DARWIN Y LOS DILEMAS SOCIALES
Rosas Alejandro
Acta Biológica Colombiana , 2009,
Abstract:
The Evolution of Contractual Morality
Alejandro Rosas
Ideas y Valores , 2011,
Abstract: Evolutionary explanations of altruism and human cooperation, first set forth by pioneers such as Darwin, Hamilton and Trivers, suggest that biology might be capable of offering a plausible scientific explanation of the core of human morality. According to this project, morality and human cooperation arise when resourcesare scarce; they cannot be exploited by isolated individuals; and individuals cannot maintain a long-term position of domination over others in order to advance their selfish ends. An important philosophical question that arises with respect to this project has to do with the concepts of de morality and moral motivation that itpresupposes. The evolutionary project has not been clear in this respect. The article argues in favor of two theses: 1) evolutionary explanations of cooperation suggest a contractual type of morality, but they are ambiguous regarding the motivations favored by natural selection, thus reflecting, without resolving it, a traditionaldisagreement between Hobbes’s moral contractualism (selfish motivations) and that of Kant (altruistic motivations); 2) in their current form, these explanations cannot resolve that disagreement, but a reflection on the role of the capacity to interpret the motivations and character of others in the evolution of morality could provide arguments in favor of Kantian contractualism.
Kant and the Natural Science of Organisms
Alejandro Rosas
Ideas y Valores , 2008,
Abstract: Regarding the explanation of organisms as instances of complex design, Kantian philosophy faces a difficult problem: as material entities they should be explained through mechanical laws, but because of their design, they call for an explanation through final causes. Nonetheless, both explanations are unacceptable. Does Kant offer any way out? Part of his solution is that both teleology and mechanicism must apply as regulative principles. But this implies limiting mechanicism to a regulative idea, which is inconsistent with his claim that newtonian mechanics are a priori valid and constitutive of natural science and its objects. I inquire into Kant’s positive doctrine on the natural explanation of organisms, combining teleology and mechanicism, and into the way this fits in his natural philosophy.
Natural Selection and Morality
Alejandro Rosas
Ideas y Valores , 2006,
Abstract: Resumen:En este ensayo abordo los intentos, relativamente recientes, de dar una explicación de la moralidad como adaptación por selección natural. Mi exposición tiene una introducción y cuatro partes: en la primera explico en qué consiste la paradoja del altruismo biológico. En la segunda expongo la solución que apela a la selección de grupos, recientemente resurgida; la solución que presuntamente aplicó Charles Darwin cuando formuló sus reflexiones biológicas sobre la moralidad humana. En la tercera expongo la solución sociobiológica, que opta por negar que la selección natural pueda explicar directamente la moralidad humana. La moralidad se presenta más bien como opuesta a la naturaleza dise ada por selección natural. En la cuarta parte desarrollo brevemente una explicación de la moralidad como adaptación que beneficia a los individuos. No opone la moralidad a la naturaleza, ni apela a la selección de grupos. Se sirve de un mecanismo de selección que opera a través de preferencias en la interacción social.Abstract:In this essay, I address recent attempts to account for morality as an adaptation due to natural selection. After a brief introduction, my exposition has four sections. I first explain the paradox of biological altruism. Second, I explain the solution to the paradox in terms of group selection. This solution was presumably applied by Darwin himself as he discussed human morality, and it has experienced a recent revival, though it remains suspicious to most biologists. In the third section I offer a socio-biological solution that opts for denying that morality can be explained by any form of natural selection. Morality is opposed to human nature as designed by natural selection. In the fourth, I argue for an explanation in terms of individual selection. It does not oppose morality to nature, and does not need the workings of group selection; rather, it operates through the agents’ psychological preferences in social interaction.
Mistakes To Avoid In Attacking The Moral/Conventional Distinction
Alejandro Rosas
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication , 2012,
Abstract: In an experimental critique of the moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, Kelly et al. (2007) present new experimental data about responses to transgressions involving harm, where the novelty is that transgressors are grown-ups, rather than children. Their data do not support the moral/conventional distinction. The contrast between grown-up and schoolyard transgressions does not seem, however, to explain their results: they also use two schoolyard transgressions with similar negative results for the M/C distinction.I here attempt to explain away their results by calling attention to two mistakes in their experimental design. One refers to the use of questionnaire-items of the type that Turiel and collaborators have called mixed-domain situations, which extend over both a moral and a conventional domain. Participants respond to these cases differently than to prototypical moral situations, because some allow the authority rule to override the moral rule. The second mistake emerges in the grown-up transgressions labeled as Whipping/temporal, Whipping/Authority, Spanking/Authority, Prisoner abuse/Authority. These are not the typical transgressions unambiguously “involving a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been subject to an injustice”. The victims are also transgressors and harm is inflicted on them as punishment. Plausibly, rules about corporal punishment depend on authority in a way that rules about harming the innocent do not.
Algunas implicaciones jurídicas del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo en la Ciudad de México
Alejandro Rosas Martínez
Revista Derecho del Estado , 2011,
Abstract: El artículo analiza y expone el reconocimiento del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo en la Ciudad de México, así como sus implicaciones primarias a partir de su concreción en el sistema jurídico mexicano. El estudio contiene el análisis de la “Sociedad de Convivencia” como un mecanismo de reconocimiento de derechos de carácter civil a personas con relaciones personales de convivencia permanente, entre las que se encuentran las personas con identidad de género distinta de la correspondiente a su sexo y las personas con preferencia sexual distinta de la heterosexual. También se estudia la reforma por la que el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo es posible y el criterio que la Suprema Corte de Justicia de México emitió sobre aquélla con base en una acción de inconstitucionalidad en la que se planteó el alcance del principio de igualdad en el constitucionalismo mexicano a partir de los conceptos de familia, matrimonio, heterosexualidad, homosexualidad, adopción e interés superior del menor.
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