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Search Results: 1 - 10 of 44 matches for " externalism "
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The History of Archaeology as Seen Through the Externalism-Internalism Debate: Historical Development and Current Challenges
Oscar Moro Abadía
Bulletin of the History of Archaeology , 2009, DOI: 10.5334/bha.19203
Abstract: While internalism and externalism are nothing more than two categories coined by historians of science during the 1960s (for an introduction to the internalism-externalism debate, see: Basalla 1968; Lakatos 1970; Ben-David 1971; Agassi 1981; Morrell 1981 and Shapin 1992), they are terms often used by historians of archaeology to define the two different interpretations of the history of their discipline (e.g. Meltzer 1989: 17–18; Trigger 2001: 635; Schlanger 2004: 165–166; Trigger 2006: 25; Díaz-Andreu 2007: 4; Kaeser 2008: 10). Why have these terms proven to be so popular?
Externalismo y escepticismo
Silva Filho,Waldomiro José;
Enlace , 2006,
Abstract: this article proposes what knowledge is from externalist and sceptical positions that attempt to question the cognitive material ?basis? of such a form of knowledge. these ideas are developed departing from the thesis postulated by davidson about the difficulty that is generated by the logical and semantic presumption that it is not possible to think about external objects because of the relativist and contingent nature of what is understood as ?truth?. the sceptical renounces to this possibility of knowledge because nothing is absolute in the external world. however, according to davidson, precisely, it is departing from our construction of an external world, how this world can bring about the conditions that make our rationality possible; that is to say, the diverse degrees of knowledge and truth that serve us to argue about what is possible to know. ?common speech, dialogue and triangulation? are concepts employed by davidson to show the insufficiency of scepticism in trying to deny the ?world of objects? that form part of thought and reality towards which thought is headed and returns. the relationship of thought to the world is organized by the use of language and signification with which we communicate.
O internalismo pode integrar uma análise correta do conceito de conhecimento?
Valcarenghi, Emerson Carlos;
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia , 2008, DOI: 10.1590/S0100-512X2008000100003
Abstract: this essay tries to show, inside the internalism-externalism dispute, that internalist theory of doxastic justification in useless in obtaining conceptual analysis of knowledge. to show this point, first we try to fix a basis through which we could make an adequate evaluation of the internalist proposal. so, this essay tries, in the most accurate way, to fix the philosophical question in dispute by those proposals. after enunciating it, this essay tries to draw one or more responses from the internalist proposal. with the internalist response in hands, we try to show that it is false and, therefore, that it is not useful to obtain a true analysis of the concept of knowledge.
O pensamento sem estaca zero (A mentalidade externalista e as raz?es nossas de cada dia)
Bensusan, Hilan;
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia , 2004, DOI: 10.1590/S0100-512X2004000200002
Abstract: when we offer reasons for a belief or an action we prompt the audience to recognize authorities (of facts, of shared observations, of commonly held principles etc.). this recognition seems to be constitutive of the very state we find ourselves in when we have or accept reasons. on the other hand, often we are inclined to say that either we have or we don't have reasons for something; we sound as if in case we have reasons, their acceptance is compulsory. sometimes, when we move in the space of reasons we have the impression that reasons are already there, that they are independent from our best judgment and we should rather learn to be sensitive to their claim. in this paper i consider realism about reasons as a way of stating externalism and i then examine connections between externalism in semantics and in epistemology. i argue that a realism about reasons could make use of a davidsonian strategy to put together the idea that reasons are in the world with the conception according to which recognition is part of what constitutes a reason.
Phenomenal Consciousness and the Sensorimotor Approach. A Critical Account  [PDF]
Alessandro Dell’Anna, Alfredo Paternoster
Open Journal of Philosophy (OJPP) , 2013, DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.34064
Abstract: The paper discusses some recent suggestions offered by the so-called sensorimotor (or enactivist) theorists as to the problem of the explanatory gap, that is, the alleged impossibility of accounting for phenomenal consciousness in any scientific theory. We argue in the paper that, although some enactivist theorists’ suggestions appear fresh and eye-opening, the claim that the explanatory gap is (dis)solved is much overstated.
Intuitions, Externalism, and Conceptual Analysis
Jussi Haukioja
Studia Philosophica Estonica , 2009,
Abstract: Semantic externalism about a class of expressions is often thought to make conceptual analysis about members of that class impossible. In particular, since externalism about natural kind terms makes the essences of natural kinds empirically discoverable, it seems that mere reflection on one's natural kind concept will not be able to tell one anything substantial about what it is for something to fall under one's natural kind concepts. Many hold the further view that one cannot even know anything substantial about the reference-fixers of one's natural kind concepts by armchair reflection. In this paper I want to question this latter view and claim that, because of the way our standard methodology of doing theories of reference relies on semantic intuitions, typical externalists in fact presuppose that one can know the reference-fixers of one's natural kind concepts by mere armchair reflection. The more interesting question is how substantial such knowledge can be. I also take some steps toward answering this question.
Skepticism, Contextualism, Externalism and Modality
Ron Wilburn
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2006,
Abstract: In this paper, I argue for the following claims. Contextualist strategies to tame or localize epistemic skepticism are hopeless if contextualist factors are construed internalistically. However, because efforts to contextualize externalism via subjunctive conditional analysis court circularity, it is only on an internalistic interpretation that contextualist strategies can even be motivated. While these claims do not give us an argument for skepticism, they do give us an argument that contextualism, as such, is not likely to provide us with an argument against skepticism.
Mental Content Externalism and Social Understanding  [PDF]
Halvor Nordby
Open Journal of Philosophy (OJPP) , 2012, DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.21001
Abstract: Tyler Burge has in many writings distinguished between (1) mental content externalism based on incorrect understanding and (2) mental content externalism based on partial but not incorrect understanding. Both (1) and (2) have far-reaching implications for analyses of communication and concept possession in various expert-layperson relations, but Burge and his critics have mainly focused on (1). This article first argues that (2) escapes the most influential objection to (1). I then raise an objection against Burge’s argument for (2). The objection focuses on Burge’s claim that a person with a partial understanding of a term in our community expresses our standard concept because he is willing to defer to our standard understanding, while his “Putnamian” twin in a counterfactual community does not. The problem with Burge’s argument for this claim is that he does not consider the possibility that the person in our community and the twin would defer to the same understanding if they were presented with the same alternatives. Drawing from widespread dispositional assumptions about meaning, I argue that Burge must accept that they express the same concept if they would defer to the same understanding. The article closes with an examination on various ways the externalist may attempt to avoid this problem and concludes that none of them succeeds.
La noción de "justificación", ?un concepto dual?
Era?a, ángeles;
Diánoia , 2009,
Abstract: epistemic "internalism" and "externalism" have been two dominant positions within justification theories. intuitions underlying these positions are held to be contradictory and, thereby, it is not possible to make them converge into a unified theory. i will show that this is not only possible, but necessary. in order to do this, i will appeal to the dual system theory, and i will argue that if, (1) as this theory asserts, our reasoning abilities are structured into two different systems, then (2) we have good reasons to assert that the normative status that the notion of "justification" provides to our beliefs is dual, i.e., it offers evaluation criteria that should be differentially used for different kinds of beliefs, which are the result of each of our reasoning systems.
Justificación y racionalidad desde la teoría dual del razonamiento
García-Campos,Jonatan;
Ideas y Valores , 2009,
Abstract: a common assumption in epistemology is that there is an important connection between the notions of justification and rationality. however, this connection is unclear since there is no consensus about what rationality is or what a "correct" notion of justification would be. the purpose of this paper is to explain how the dual system theory of reasoning can build a "bridge" between justification and rationality. we argue that the dual system theory of reasoning supports, to a certain extent, an externalist notion of justification and a consequentialist view of rationality.
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