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Search Results: 1 - 10 of 76 matches for " Reductionism "
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Nonalgorithmicity and algorithmicity of protein science  [PDF]
Qinyi Zhao
Advances in Bioscience and Biotechnology (ABB) , 2011, DOI: 10.4236/abb.2011.25050
Abstract: The metaphysical features of the mechanism for the integration of the information underlying protein folding were studied by applying principles of system logic theory. We conclude that it is not possible to predict all protein three-dimensional structures from protein sequences by one program only. This conclusion is validated in structural genomics in that we also cannot predict protein function from three-dimensional structure by one program only. Our theory also demonstrates that bioinformation flow from gene to biological function is an integration process, rather than an expression (translation) process. A system relationship between a gene and its biological function is also proposed. This electronic document is a “live” template.
Why Rosenberg and Kaplan's attempt to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism concerning biology is unsatisfactory
Perovi? Slobodan
Theoria, Beograd , 2008, DOI: 10.2298/theo0801007p
Abstract: A. Rosenberg and D. Kaplan argue that their account of the Principle of Natural Selection (PNS), as a law of physical systems (including those systems studied by biology) underived from familiar physical laws, provides the precisely explanatory autonomy of biology sought after by antireductionists, without violating the principles of reductive physicalism. I argue, however, that the possibility of the PNS being an underived law of physical systems may be neutral to the explanatory autonomy of biology. In fact, if wedded with reductive physicalism (the possibility considered by these authors), it may yield only a very limited explanatory autonomy of biology, no stronger than the quasi-autonomy generally ascribed to it by reductionists. In the physicalist world, the PNS is operational and thus discoverable at the higher ontological levels (those concerning living cells, individuals, groups, populations and species), because the operation of a law concerning higher-level systems is grounded in its operation at the lower levels (atoms and molecules). Consequently, in terms of the explanatory criterion, a generalization discovered by biologists may be established as a law only if its status is confirmed in the form of its applicability to molecular and other systems studied by chemistry and physics. Otherwise, there is a danger that it could be a 'just so story.' The authors' narrow understanding both of antireductionism and biological laws as reducible to those concerning molecular systems provides only an illusory vindication of the explanatory autonomy: in the case of the PNS, although biologists happened to be the first to utilize it, their research concerning cells, individuals, populations and species could not possibly have established it as a law. This results, at best, in the inter-theoretic irreducibility of molecular biology as a discipline of physical science. I argue that a substantial explanatory autonomy of biology concerns the causal powers of biological systems at multiple levels, where the PNS, or any other biological law, is a basic law of nature in that it is concerned with the entities whose causal power is irreducible to that of the lower-level entities. Thus, only if confirmable at the levels higher than the molecular, could the generalizations discovered by biologists reflect such autonomy.
Persona: Categoría fundamental y desafío práctico
Saldarriaga Madrigal,Andrés;
Estudios de Filosofía , 2009,
Abstract: abstract: one of the basic concepts of practical philosophy is that of person. without this concept some essential matters of politics, ethics, law and morality cannot be coherently thought out. the complexity of human existence - which is "summarized" in that a person is never only a subject of law, a citizen or an inheritor of a certain cultural tradition - implies the risk of reductionism, that is, of the explanation of what it means to carry out the life of a person from only one perspective of human existence. after presenting some of the central periods of prehistory and history of the concept of person, the article offers some elements that could serve to formulate a non-reductionist concept of person in the specific realm of the philosophy of social justice.
O impacto epistemológico das investiga??es sobre "complexidade"
Jorge, Maria Manuel Araújo;
Sociologias , 2006, DOI: 10.1590/S1517-45222006000100003
Abstract: complexity posed as a philosophical idea (even trough it is from the sciences that approach it) was seen by some as the expression of a new "epistemological spirit" that would be changing not only our mechanist image of nature but also our relationship to it and the way we do science, in a more qualitative, less aggressive, and more human approximation. by overcoming traditional reductionism, by acknowledging the autonomy and interrelations of the distinct levels of reality and the symbiosis between order and disorder, regularities and randomness, sciences, assimilating the spirit of complexity, would be open to an awareness of their fundamental limits. by considering the approach of "complex systems" in some disciplines, i argue that, because of demands for effectiveness and objectivity, the search for simplification, compression, and the effort towards "calculation" of all its objects, the typical face of sciences remains, including those of "complexity.
Promesa e ipseidad: La crítica de Ricoeur al reduccionismo
Blanco Ilari,Juan Ignacio;
Revista latinoamericana de filosof?-a , 2006,
Abstract: abstract: the distinction idem - ipse is one of the keys of ricoeur's thought. the interaction of the mutual distinction - relation is the core of his philosophical anthropology. this distinction allows him to establish criticism towards reductionism, particularly that represented by derek parfit. in this paper, we will analyze this criticism in the light of the phenomenon of the promise, model of the identity - ipseity. we will try to show how ricoeur establishes the condition of possibility of a promise by means of a triple access: a linguistic, moral, and ontological access. this way, we will create a categorial network that has the notion of illocutionary force, the response to the expectations of others and the availability as central elements. the triad language - moral - ontology therefore fulfils a double function, it shows the weaknesses of reductionism, and devises an alternative ontology: the ontology of ipseity.
Zooming (a little) out of the M-theory
Roberto Piergentili
Journal of Molecular Biochemistry , 2013,
Abstract:
Free Will and Advances in Cognitive Science  [PDF]
Leonid Perlovsky
Open Journal of Philosophy (OJPP) , 2012, DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.21005
Abstract: Freedom of will is fundamental to morality, intuition of self, and normal functioning of society. However, science does not provide a clear logical foundation for this idea. This paper considers the fundamental argument against free will, so called reductionism, and why the choice for dualism against monism, follows logically. Then, the paper summarizes unexpected conclusions from recent discoveries in cognitive science. Classical logic turns out not to be a fundamental mechanism of the mind. It is replaced by dynamic logic. Mathematical and experimental evidence are considered conceptually. Dynamic logic counters logical arguments for reductionism. Contemporary science of mind is not reducible; free will can be scientifically accepted along with scientific monism.
Free Will, Subjectivity and the Physics of the Nervous System  [PDF]
Mauro Ceroni, Giovanni Maria Prosperi
Open Journal of Philosophy (OJPP) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.83023
Abstract: We want to stress the irreducibility of subjectivity to a pure physical process and, related to this the existence of an actual free will. A discussion on the existence of free will goes back at least to the Middle Ages. Today however the problem has been considered again in the framework of Neurophysiology and in connection with specific experiments. The problem is related to reductionism, i.e. the claim that subjectivity could be considered an epiphenomenon of the cerebral processes, the argument being that all our sensorial perceptions, the control of movement, our states of wakefulness or of unconsciousness can be related to the activation or to the block of specific areas of our cerebral cortex. In the frame of this conception free will is denied essentially on the basis of physical determinism. In contrast to such attitude, we argue that experiences like consciousness of ourselves, of a personal identity or even simply of qualia completely escape from concepts of physical nature. As a consequence of the specific epistemological choice, they cannot even be expressed in the language of Physics. The point of view of Physics and introspection appear both essential but complementary and irreducible one to the other; any attempt to do so brings to unresolvable aporias. Specifically on free will, we note that our nervous system is a complex mesoscopic system, for an understanding of its occurrences, reference to Quantum Theory is essential. As consequence, its reaction to any external input is not uniquely determined but is open to a plurality of responses for which only a distribution of probability is given. Physics does not provide any cause for one response rather than another, while we experience our response to be intentional. Quantum Mechanics seems to offer the logical space to reconcile Physics with introspection. Some basic notions on the structure and working of neurons and of the central nervous systems are also recalled, Liebet’s experiments on retarded awareness and the role of free will in the knowledge process are discussed.
A teleologia na biologia contemporanea
Ferreira, Marcelo Alves;
Scientiae Studia , 2003, DOI: 10.1590/S1678-31662003000200004
Abstract: the status of teleological thought in contemporary biology entails controversy. the supporters of the reductionist programme in biology strive to eliminate it, whereas instrumental and realist interpretations of the problem seek a justification for its permanence. this article tries to defend the reasons for the permanence of teleological thought, particularly those of realist background.
Crítica a los reduccionismos epistemológicos en las ciencias sociales
Guadarrama González,Pablo;
Revista de Filosofía , 2009,
Abstract: this paper aims to criticize the epistemological reductionisms in the social sciences, among which are: geocentric reductionism, geographic, economic, linguistic, logical analysis, structural-functionalist, hermeneutic, phenomenological and emergent reductionism. in contrast to these reductionisms, there are several approaches that have emerged in the history of human thought, that with different terms, have been trying to overcome these reductionist points of view, such as: the dialectical paradigm, the holistic, the complexity and the postcolonial paradigms. as final thoughts, the paper highlights that there have always been and there will always be epistemic grounds to conceive -both unilaterally and multilaterally- reality; and the fact that one or another perspective prevails will depend on the level of development of science and philosophy ( the greater or lesser recognition that the protagonist of some sciences has, in particular, given their social and technological impact), as well as on the degree of development and solution for social contradictions of the historical epoch in which reductionisms are generated and dissolved.
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