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Scheduling Jobs with a Common Due Date via Cooperative Game Theory  [PDF]
Irinel Dragan
American Journal of Operations Research (AJOR) , 2013, DOI: 10.4236/ajor.2013.35042
Abstract: Efficient values from Game Theory are used, in order to find out a fair allocation for a scheduling game associated with the problem of scheduling jobs with a common due date. A four person game illustrates the basic ideas and the computational difficulties.
On the Coalitional Rationality of the Shapley Value and Other Efficient Values of Cooperative TU Games  [PDF]
Irinel Dragan
American Journal of Operations Research (AJOR) , 2014, DOI: 10.4236/ajor.2014.44022
Abstract: In the theory of cooperative transferable utilities games, (TU games), the Efficient Values, that is those which show how the win of the grand coalition is shared by the players, may not be a good solution to give a fair outcome to each player. In an earlier work of the author, the Inverse Problem has been stated and explicitely solved for the Shapley Value and for the Least Square Values. In the present paper, for a given vector, which is the Shapley Value of a game, but it is not coalitional rational, that is it does not belong to the Core of the game, we would like to find out a new game with the Shapley Value equal to the a priori given vector and for which this vector is also in the Core of the game. In other words, in the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, we want to find out a new game, for which the Shapley Value is coalitional rational. The results show how such a game may be obtained, and some examples are illustrating the technique. Moreover, it is shown that beside the original game, there are always other games for which the given vector is not in the Core. The similar problem is solved for the Least Square Values.
Requirements Quality Online Courses  [PDF]
Dragan Damjanovi?
Intelligent Information Management (IIM) , 2014, DOI: 10.4236/iim.2014.63010

Every day on the Internet appear online courses (good, bad, free, expensive, legal, illegal, ...). They can be of great benefit, especially to people who, because of a lack of free time can not attend face-to-face teaching, and have a duty of continuous professional development. In this great offer, it is really difficult to choose the right one that will fully meet the strict criteria. In this paper, we point to the conditions and requirements that may significantly facilitate students making their final decision regarding the selection of different forms of online training.

On the Gas Routing via Game Theory  [PDF]
Irinel Dragan
American Journal of Operations Research (AJOR) , 2015, DOI: 10.4236/ajor.2015.54022
Abstract: The delivery of the natural gas obtained by drilling, fracking and sending the product to consumers is done usually in two phases: in the first phase, the gas is collected from all wells spread on a large area, and belonging to several companies, and is sent to a depot owned by the city; then, in the second phase, another company is taking the gas on a network of ducts belonging to the city, along the streets to the neighborhoods and the individual consumers. The first phase is managed by the gas producing companies on the ducts owned by each company, possibly also on some public ducts. In this paper, we discuss only this first phase, to show why the benefits of these companies depend on the cooperation of the producers, and further, how a fair allocation of the total gas obtained, to the drilling companies, is computed. Following the model of flow games, we generate a cooperative transferable utilities game, as shown in the first section, and in this game any efficient value gives an allocation of benefits to the owners of ducts in the total network. However, it may well happen that the chosen value is not coalitional rational, in the game, that is, it does not belong to the Core of the game. By using the results obtained in an earlier work of the author, sketched in the second section, we show in the last section how the same allocation may be associated to a new game, which has the corresponding value a coalitional rational value. An example of a three person flow game shows the game generation, as well as the procedure to be used for obtaining the new game in which the same value, a Shapley Value, will give a coalitional rational allocation.
On the Coalitional Rationality of the Banzhaf Value and Other Non-Efficient Semivalues  [PDF]
Irinel Dragan
Applied Mathematics (AM) , 2015, DOI: 10.4236/am.2015.612182
Abstract: In the Inverse Set relative to a Semivalue, we are looking for a new game for which the Semivalue of the original game is coalitional rational. The problem is solved by means of the Power Game of the given game. The procedures of building the new game, as well as the case of the Banzhaf Value are illustrated by means of some examples.
On the Coalitional Rationality and the Inverse Problem for Shapley Value and the Semivalues  [PDF]
Irinel Dragan
Applied Mathematics (AM) , 2017, DOI: 10.4236/am.2017.811116
In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition to the players who agreed to cooperate and form the grand coalition. Such allocations are obtained by means of values, having some fairness properties, expressed in most cases by groups of axioms. In an earlier work, we solved what we called the Inverse Problem for Semivalues, in which the main result was offering an explicit formula providing the set of all games with an a priori given Semivalue, associated with a given weight vector. However, in this set there is an infinite set of games for which the Semivalues are not coalitional rational, perhaps not efficient, so that these are not fair practical solutions of the above fundamental problem. Among the Semivalues, coalitional rational solutions for the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value have been given in two more recent works. In the present paper, based upon a general potential basis, relative to Semivalues, for a given game and a given Semivalue, we solve the connected problem: in the Inverse Set, find out a game with the same Semivalue, which is also coalitional rational. Several examples will illustrate the corresponding numerical technique.
The Relationship between Individual and Institutional Freedom  [PDF]
Dragan Miljkovic
Open Journal of Political Science (OJPS) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2018.82007
Abstract: We hypothesize that the institutions that are created to enable functioning of a political and economic system serve to protect that framework. In turn, these institutions increase the individual freedom. Empirical results confirm that the presence of political freedom and institutions have a significant impact on individual freedom considering all 176 countries in the sample. Economic freedom, on the other hand, has no impact on incarceration rates and, in turn, on individual freedom. The auxiliary hypotheses tested confirm that increased wealth and income inequality lead to higher incarceration rates, i.e. lesser individual freedom. This suggests that economic institutions are built in a way that disproportionally protects rights of more affluent segments of societies.
Egalitarian Allocations and the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Value  [PDF]
Irinel Dragan
American Journal of Operations Research (AJOR) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/ajor.2018.86025
Abstract: In a cooperative transferable utilities game, the allocation of the win of the grand coalition is an Egalitarian Allocation, if this win is divided into equal parts among all players. The Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value of a game is a set of games in which the Shapley Value is the same as the initial one. In the Inverse Set, we determined a family of games for which the Shapley Value is also a coalitional rational value. The Egalitarian Allocation of the game is efficient, so that in the set called the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, the allocation is the same as the initial one, but may not be coalitional rational. In this paper, we shall find out in the same family of the Inverse Set, a subfamily of games with the Egalitarian Allocation is also a coalitional rational value. We show some relationship between the two sets of games, where our values are coalitional rational. Finally, we shall discuss the possibility that our procedure may be used for solving a very similar problem for other efficient values. Numerical examples show the procedure to get solutions for the efficient values.
Load Control for Overloaded MPLS/DiffServ Networks during SLA Negotiation  [PDF]
Int'l J. of Communications, Network and System Sciences (IJCNS) , 2009, DOI: 10.4236/ijcns.2009.25047
Abstract: In end-to-end QoS provisioning some bandwidth portions on the link may be reserved for certain traffic classes (and for particular set of users) so the congestion problem of concurrent flows (traversing the network simultaneously) can appear. It means that in overloaded and poorly connected MPLS/DS networks the CR (Constraint-based Routing) becomes insufficient technique. If traffic engineering is supported with ap-propriate traffic load control the congestion possibility can be predicted before the utilization of guaranteed service. In that sense the initial (proactive) routing can be pre-computed much earlier, possible during SLA (Service Level Agreement) negotiation. In the paper a load simulation technique for load balancing control purpose is proposed. It could be a very good solution for congestion avoidance and for better load-balancing purpose where links are running close to capacity. To be acceptable for real application such complicated load control technique needs very effective algorithm. Proposed algorithm was tested on the network with maximum M core routers on the path and detail results are given for N=3 service classes. Further improve-ment through heuristic approach is made and results are discussed. Some heuristic options show significant complexity savings that is appropriate for load control in huge networks.
Controlling Avoidance of Food Safety Regulations in Meat Packing Industry  [PDF]
Dragan Miljkovic, Dane Braun
Open Journal of Political Science (OJPS) , 2013, DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2013.32011

The sale of meat and poultry contains asymmetric information dealing with food safety. Since pathogens in most cases are invisible, consumers lack information on the safety of meat and poultry. Government interaction through the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) in the meat and poultry industry is necessary to regulate the safety of meat and poultry products. Inevitably, any rules in society are likely to include violators. The cost of perfectly safe food is far too great for the industry to bear. The marginal gain in revenue from violating a regulation may be greater than the marginal cost. Violators of rules may resort to sophisticated means to avoid detection of the original violations. The means used to avoid detection may be legal or illegal. Effective regulation of avoidance activities will lead to lower violations of the original crime. Such regulations may be ex-ante or ex-post. This paper discusses potential effectiveness of ex-ante or ex-post regulations on avoidance activities of food safety regulations in the meat and poultry industry. The use of ex-ante measures such as contracting external service providers coupled with the threat of ex-post punishment on service providers would potentially decrease the number of avoidance activities and their associated original crime in the meat and poultry industry.

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