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La teoría davidsoniana de la akrasia  [PDF]
Carlos E. Caorsi
Signos filosóficos , 2005,
Abstract: Resumen: El tratamiento davidsoniano de la akrasia recurre a la introducción de un tipo de operador, el conector prima facie. Este operador debe dar lugar a juicios condicionales en los cuales la afirmación del antecedente no permita obtener el consecuente como conclusión separada y permitir separar el consecuente a los efectos de obtener como conclusión un juicio incondicional. En este artículo, me propongo, mostrar las razones que llevaron a Davidson a proponer este operador, y desarrollar una interpretación del mismo que permita cumplir con las dos exigencias antes se aladas. Abstract: Davidson’s treatment of akrasia resorts to the introduction of a type of operator, the prima facie connector. This operator should yield conditional judgments in which the affirmation of the antecedent does not admit to obtain the consequent as a separate conclusion; and it must allow to separate the consequent in order to obtain the non-conditional judgment. In this article I intend to show the reasons which led Davidson to propose this particular operator and then I intend to develop an interpretation of the operator which satisfies the two requirements aforementioned.
Platonism and Akrasia in Chrysippus. The Interpretation of Marcelo Boeri
Ricardo Salles
Ideas y Valores , 2010,
Abstract: The paper addresses two questions regarding the interpretation of akrasia among the Stoics, offered by Marcelo Boeri in his book Appearance and Reality in Greek Thought: On the one hand, can Chrysippus’s monistic adaptation of the Platonic model of the divided soul set forth in Book iv of the Republic provide a philosophically satisfactory explanation of the classical phenomenon of akrasia? On the other hand, is this phenomenon the true explanandum of this adaptation? The paper shows that the answer to both these questions could be negative and thus different from the answer provided by Boeri in his book. The argument is based on the analysis of Plutarch vm 446f-447b and on the analysis of the classical problem of akrasia.
Davidson, Dualism, and Truth  [cached]
Nathaniel Goldberg
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy , 2012, DOI: 10.4148/jhap.v1i7.1590
Abstract: Happy accidents happen even in philosophy. Sometimes our arguments yield insights despite missing their target, though when they do others can often spot it more easily. Consider the work of Donald Davidson. Few did more to explore connections among mind, language, and world. Now that we have critical distance from his views, however, we can see that Davidson’s accomplishments are not quite what they seem. First, while Davidson attacked the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, he in fact illustrated a way to hold it. Second, while Davidson used the principle of charity to argue against the dualism, his argument in effect treats the principle as constitutive of a conceptual scheme. And third, while Davidson asserted that he cannot define what truth ultimately is—and while I do not disagree—his work nonetheless allows us to saymore about truth than Davidson himself does. I aim to establish these three claims. Doing so enriches our understanding of issues central to the history of philosophy concerning how, if at all, to divvy up the mental or linguistic contribution, and the worldly contribution, to knowledge. As we see below, Davidson was right in taking his work to be one stage of a dialectic begun by Immanuel Kant.1 He was just wrong about what that stage is. Reconsidering Davidson’s views also moves the current debate forward, as they reveal a previously unrecognized yet intuitive notion of truth—even if Davidson himself remained largely unaware of it. We begin however with scheme/content dualism and Davidson’s argument against it.
El pensamiento como principio: Descartes según Hegel en las Lecciones de historia de la filosofía
Diana María López
T?3picos , 2011,
Abstract: Nuestro trabajo se orienta a presentar lo desarrollado por Hegel sobre el pensamiento de Descartes en sus Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, teniendo en cuenta tres momentos: 1) la opción de Hegel por los Principios; 2) el lugar de Descartes en la "historia de la filosofía"; y 3) algunas conclusiones en torno a la tesis de que "avanzar en el pensamiento" sólo es posible en la medida en que uno reconozca a la historia de la filosofía no como una "galería de opiniones" sino como una fuente inagotable de problemas y cuestiones. The aim of this paper is to present Hegel's developments on Descartes' thinking in the Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, taking three moments into consideration: 1) Hegel's option for the Principles; 2) Descartes' position in the "history of philosophy"; and 3) some reflections concerning the thesis of "moving forward in thought", which is only possible if history of philosophy is seen not as a "gallery of opinions" but as a source of inexhaustible problems and questions.
Distinguishing WV Quine and Donald Davidson
James Pearson
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy , 2011, DOI: 10.4148/jhap.v1i1.1293
Abstract: Given W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s extensive agreement about much of the philosophy of language and mind, and the obvious methodological parallels between Quine’s radical translation and Davidson’s radical interpretation, many—including Quine and Davidson—are puzzled by their occasional disagreements. I argue for the importance of attending to these disagreements, not just because doing so deepens our understanding of these influential thinkers, but because they are in fact the shadows thrown from two distinct conceptions of philosophical inquiry: Quine’s “naturalism” and what I call Davidson’s “humanism.” The clash between Quine and Davidson thus provides valuable insight into the history of analytic naturalism and its malcontents.
Spotlight 6: Davidson Seamount
David Clague,Lonny Lundsten,James Hein,Jennifer Paduan
Oceanography , 2010,
Abstract: Davidson Seamount is located about 80 km off the central California coast in the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary. It is one of the better-explored seamounts in the world, having been sampled and observed during 32 dives by the remotely operated vehicle (ROV) Tiburon. These dives mapped the bottom substrate and biological communities, and collected over 280 rock samples and nearly as many benthic animals.
Davidson on Turing: Rationality Misunderstood?
John-Michael Kuczynski
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2005,
Abstract: Alan Turing advocated a kind of functionalism: A machine M is a thinker provided that it responds in certain ways to certain inputs. Davidson argues that Turing’s functionalism is inconsistent with a cer-tain kind of epistemic externalism, and is therefore false. In Davidson’s view, concepts consist of causal liasons of a certain kind between subject and object. Turing’s machine doesn’t have the right kinds of causal li-asons to its environment. Therefore it doesn’t have concepts. Therefore it doesn’t think. I argue that this reasoning is entirely fallacious. It is true that, in some cases, a causal liason between subject and object is part of one’s concept of that object. Consequently, to grasp certain propositions, one must have certain kids of causal ties to one’s environment. But this means that we must rethink some old views on what rationality is. It does not mean, pace Davidson, that a precondition for being rational is being causally embedded in one’s environment in a certain way. If Tur-ing’s machine isn’t capable of thinking (I leave it open whether it is or is not), that has nothing to do with its lacking certain kinds of causal con-nections to the environment. The larger significance of our discussion is this: rationality consists either in one’s ability to see the bearing of purely existential propositions on one another or rationality is simply not to be understood as the ability see the bearing that propositions have on one another.
Mind, Davidson and Reality
Daniel Laurier
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2005,
Abstract: The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irreal-ism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general characterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show that most candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of in-tentional realism which is not, is a restricted one which is prima facie no more plausible than the corresponding form of irrealism. In the third and last section, I defend my interpretation of what intentional irrealism amounts to against some possible misunderstandings, give some reasons why it should be taken seriously and argue that it could plausibly be at-tributed to Davidson.
Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology  [PDF]
Duncan Pritchard,Christopher Ranalli
Humanities , 2013, DOI: 10.3390/h2030351
Abstract: We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem which generates metaepistemological ramifications for anti-skeptical theories. In particular, we argue that, contra Williams, Rorty’s view that Davidson was offering a theoretical diagnosis of radical skepticism can be consistently maintained with his transcendental approach.
Akrasia (swakheid van die wil) en die kontemporêre gesprek oor subjektiwiteit  [cached]
M.F. Heyns
Koers : Bulletin for Christian Scholarship , 1997, DOI: 10.4102/koers.v62i4.580
Abstract: Akrasia (weakness of will) and the contemporary discourse on subjectivity The issue about akrasia (weakness of the will) concerns the question whether the human will is strong enough to choose and realize actions, or whether a conflict, and a certain type of conflict (i.e. the issue of akrasia), will have the potential to paralyse it. My analysis focuses on ideas of thinkers of the last half of the twentieth century - thinkers like Skinner who practically denies the existence and strength of the se lf and Sartre who postulates a transcendental self with godlike capabilities. I conclude that both leave little room for the idea of akrasia. Akrasia needs a more subtle vision of the power and weakness of the self. To arrive at this conclusion I consider views attempting to reconcile the disempowerment of the se lf by the extra-self with the idea of a self in control of its situation. I argue that these views fail because they assume the akratic conflict to be behi’een the self and extra-self instead of an intra-will conflict. I also deny that the dialectic goal of a fusion o f the self and its situation will give an explanation o f the akratic conflict because dialectics still operate with a centred self which assumes a conflict between the centre and a sub-self periphery. Moreover, this kind of dialectics provides the picture of a permanent victimized self rather than an akratic conflict. I conclude by suggesting the existence of a "dense " self with more subjective capacities than is usually assumed. This, I argue, enhances the scope of, and makes the intra-will conflict more credible.
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