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十六国北朝政区演变的背景、特征及趋势略论——以特殊政区为中心
A Brief Discussion on the Background, Feature and Trend of the Evolution of Administrative Regions during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties ——Focusing on Special Administrative Regions
 [PDF]

牟发松
- , 2017,
Abstract: 摘要 魏晋以来,直至十六国、北朝前期,伴随着北境诸少数族或主动或被动内徙,秦汉以来的郡县制政区从北方边境渐次后撤,而代之部落组织式的或军事统制式的特殊政区,即领民酋长、地方护军、军镇,以及地方行台等。北朝后期(大致始于北魏孝文帝朝),随着民族融合的深化,统一进程的加速,反映在政区上则是特殊政区的普遍退出,郡县制政区的全面回归,这正是十六国北朝政区演变的大势所趋。
Abstract:From the Wei and Jin Dynasties to the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and early Northern Dynasties, with the northern minorities’ active or passive migration, the administrative regions under the prefecture and county system gradually retreated from the northern border and was replaced by special administrative regions under the tribal and military controlled system, which were the regime of Lingminqiuzhang, local Hujun, garrison towns and the local Xingtai. During the late Northern Dynasties (since Emperor Xiaowen of Northern Wei), with the deepening of national integration and the acceleration of unification, special administrative regions withdrew generally and the prefecture and county system regressed universally. It was the trend of the evolution of administrative regions during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties.
关于清代榷关“差官”问题的考察  [PDF]
祁美琴
清史研究 , 2003,
Abstract: ?清代榷关的管理分专管与兼管两种形式,本文通过对专管官即监督的身份、品秩、铨选方式和兼管官即有关省份的督抚、将军及其委员的身份职责等规定与变化的梳理,对内务府官员与榷关监督关系等方面的分析,揭示清代榷关人事管理中的一般与特殊的关系。
Dynamic Monopoly with Demand Delay  [PDF]
Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
Theoretical Economics Letters (TEL) , 2014, DOI: 10.4236/tel.2014.42022
Abstract:

This study analyses the dynamics of nonlinear monopoly. To this end, the conventional assumptions in the text-book monopoly are modified; first, the complete information on the market is replaced with the partial information; second, the instantaneous information is substituted by the delay information. As a result, since such a monopoly is unable to jump, with one shot, to the optimal point for which the profit is maximized, the monopoly has to search for it. In a continuoustime framework, the delay destabilizes the otherwise stable monopoly model and generates cyclic oscillations via a Hopf bifurcation. In a discrete-time framework, the steady state bifurcates to a bounded oscillation via a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Although this has been only an introduction of delay into the traditional monopoly model, it is clear that the delay can be a source of essentially different behavior from those of the nondelay model.

关于清代榷关额税的考察?  [PDF]
祁美琴
清史研究 , 2004,
Abstract: ?清代榷关制度的核心内容是税收,而税收的核心内容就是“额税”的确定;“额税”的确定始于明朝的钞关。清朝统治者在对明代钞关制度的继承与发展中,首要任务就是对明末钞关“额税”重新核定以及对清代新增榷关额税的确定。本文考察的清代榷关的“额税”专指作为其正项收入的正额和盈余两部分。
Economic Model for Monopoly Analysis in Telecommunication  [PDF]
Jürgen Albinger
Business Intelligence Journal , 2009,
Abstract: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 sought to end the monopoly that once existed in the telecommunications industry. Since its adoption, the telecommunications industry has been undergoing a period of rapid change and development. The entry of new players into the market encouraged them to seek new ways to attract and keep customers. These changes have led to a rapid influx of new technology and services. Many times what defines a monopoly is not clear in every circumstance and there are many pending lawsuits for violations of antitrust laws in the courts today. Economic models are useful in resolving issues of whether a monopoly truly exists, or whether claims are unsubstantiated. Previous models were applicable only in certain situations. These models are unreliable in predicting monopolies outside the parameters for which they were designed. This research will develop and test an economic model that accurately predicts the existence of a monopoly in the telecommunications sector, based on the United States of America's marketplace case, as the best representative example to deal with.
央企董事会建设述评  [PDF]
李建红
华东政法大学学报 , 2012,
Abstract: 央企董事会建设试点的关键在于解决央企存在已久的“内部人控制”问题。试点中采取的引入外部董事等措施抓住了问题的要害。引入外部董事的具体方式有两种:外部董事长模式和外部董事模式。央企董事会建设初步解决了政府和企业的关系问题、出资人和出资企业的关系问题以及“一把手”体制问题,但仍然需要解决试点差异性、提高外部董事比例以及平衡董事会和其他机构关系的问题。因此,需要外部董事制度的法律保障、平衡董事会与国资委、监事会、党委会的关系,加强外部董事队伍建设以及完善董事会、董事评价机制。
我国央企监督机制之反思与重构  [PDF]
杨秋波
- , 2018,
Abstract: 科学完善的监督机制是央企健康发展的重要保证,也是央企改革发展的重要目标。我国央企监督机制存在公司治理结构监督形式化、监督投入大效果不彰等五大困局,造成一些央企监督乏力、违纪违法问题较为严重。顺应新一轮央企改革需要,改革监督机制要贯彻法治原则、分类监督原则、统一原则,科学构建监督体系。赋予企业真正市场主体地位,完善公司法人治理结构,形成有效内部监督制约机制,同时整合外部监督力量,形成高效精干的监督体系,保证央企经营者谨慎履行受托责任,维护企业利益。
Official Education during the Jin Dynasties
Xiancheng He
Open Access Library Journal (OALib Journal) , 2019, DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1105505
Abstract:
During the Jin Dynasties, the central official education was generally char-acterized by the establishment of schools from time to time. The Imperial College (in feudal China) set up special Imperial College doctors and The Imperial Academy in ancient China set up libationers, doctors and teaching assistants. Chamberlain for ceremonials is the highest official leader of the central official education. The prosperity and decline of local official schools were closely related to the degree to which local officials attach importance to themselves. The establishment of schools by local officials was a “rebellion” against the social trend of the Jin Dynasties, which advocated metaphysical style.
Research on the Efficiency of China’s Anti-monopoly Law  [cached]
Lin Shi
Asian Social Science , 2009, DOI: 10.5539/ass.v5n2p93
Abstract: This paper focuses on the efficiency of China’s new Anti-monopoly law. The monopoly enterprises seriously influence the equality of social distribution. In China, the “State-owned enterprises monopoly” is a controversial argument items. It has great influence on the efficiency of the anti-monopoly law enforcement. In this paper, this problem will be discussed.
A STUDY ON CHINESE SALT MONOPOLY MECHANISM INNOVATION
Ming CHEN,Jun-wen FENG,Xiao-yan LI
Management Science and Engineering , 2010,
Abstract: With a comparative analysis on the monopoly and non-monopoly system of Chinese Salt Monopoly, the author believes a competitive margin can be earned through improving the management of owner and perfecting its value chain within an open market. The paper proposes an innovation model in order to give some constructive suggestions regarding the next reform of the Chinese salt industry. Simultaneously, the author references the use of the Balanced Scorecard and the DEA evaluation mechanism. By doing so, it enables us to pinpoint the issues on reforming the system. Key words: China Salt, Salt Monopoly, Innovation, Evaluation
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