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Checks and Balances on Executive Compensation  [PDF]
Mai Iskandar-Datta
Open Journal of Business and Management (OJBM) , 2014, DOI: 10.4236/ojbm.2014.21003
Abstract: Checks and Balances on Executive Compensation
CEO Compensation and Company Performance  [PDF]
KJ Sigler
Business and Economics Journal , 2011,
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship of CEO pay and company performance for 280 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for a period from2006 through 2009. The time frame of the study is a period after the adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and after the SEC approval of thecorporate governance rules affecting executive pay for New York Stock Exchange companies. I find there to be a positive and significantrelationship between total CEO compensation and company performance measured by return on equity. The size of the firm appears to be themost significant factor in determining the level of total CEO compensation, according to the results, and the tenure of the chief executive officer isanother significant variable.
DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ITS IMPACT ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Muhammad Iqbal,Khurram Hayat,Khalid Zaman,Muhammad Rafaqat
International Journal of Information, Business and Management , 2011,
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to develop and test a model of the determinants of executive compensation and its impact on organizational performance for a unique sample of Pakistani Companies. A questionnaire was developed for the proposed study and was used to measure Executive Compensation against these determinants. The sample consists of 63 executives from the organizations of Pakistan i.e., Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. The result indicated that measures job complexity, employer’s ability to pay and executive human capital gives details of a significant explanation of the variance in the executive compensation. After data collection process, the given data was tabulated. Data was analyzed through Regression Analysis, Multiple Regression Analysis and Correlation tests. Collectively the independent variables accounted for almost 67% of the variance. The result indicates that company size is closely related to job complexity and employer’s ability to pay. Both these variables succeed to capture the variance in executive compensation accounted for company size.
经理自主权对高管薪酬水平的操纵效应研究评述与展望
Study on the Manipulation Effect of CEO Power on Executive Compensation Level: A Literature Review
 [PDF]

张长征, 王硕, 高灼琴, 赵欣
Management Science and Engineering (MSE) , 2015, DOI: 10.12677/MSE.2015.41001
Abstract:
近年来上市公司业绩持续下滑与高管薪酬水平快速提升的反向变动日益引发公众的质疑和学者的关注,由此学术界在传统委托代理理论框架之外引入了经理自主权理论作为主要理论视角来研究高管薪酬水平问题。在此背景下,本文分别回顾并评述了美国、中国和世界其他地区基于经理自主权理论视角研究高管薪酬水平的历史进程与最新动态。结果表明,经理自主权对高管薪酬水平的正向操纵效应在学术界已达成基本共识,但是具体的操纵效应强度将因国家、行业、所有权属性等情境因素有显著权变性差异,而且学者对操纵效应发生机理也存在多种有待进一步检验的竞争性观点。整体而言,该领域研究结论的有效性越来越高,但也存在着诸多研究不足。未来研究应秉持扬弃精神,在经理自主权度量、控制变量选择、数据准确性提升和实证模型设计四个方面进一步丰富和拓展本领域研究。
Recently the inverse change between the persistent decrease of list companies’ performance and quick growth of executive compensation level has received more and more attention both from the public and the scholars. Therefore, the theoretical circle introduces CEO power (or managerial discretion) theory as the main theory perspective on the studying of executive compensation level outside the traditional framework of principal-agent theory. Under this condition, the paper focuses on the historical process and the latest progress of the literature on the manipulation effect of CEO power on executive compensation level all over the world, but taking the studies in American and China as the key parts. Results show that the studies on this issue have received a consensus that the positive manipulation effect of CEO power on executive compensation level does exist, while the specialized manipulation degree will be different according to different countries, ownership characteristics, and industries. What is more, there are already many competing views on the mechanism of how such manipulation effect happens, which need to be confirmed further. On the whole, the validity of the research conclusions is getting higher, but there are still many shortcomings. The future studies should explore and enrich the literature in this field by especially emphasizing on the measure of CEO power, the choice of control variables, the enhancement of data correctness and the design of empirical models.
Research on Influencing Factors of Executive Compensation in China’s Monopoly Industries  [PDF]
Yun Dai
Open Journal of Business and Management (OJBM) , 2014, DOI: 10.4236/ojbm.2014.23026
Abstract: The annual salary income of the executives in the state-owned monopoly industry has become the focus of the society recently. With the improvement of enterprise efficiency, executives deserve to get high pay. However, it’s should be noted that because of the state-owned monopolies’ special status, business performance relies heavily on administrative monopoly power, but not actually the efforts of leaders. In this case, the income distribution mechanism is distortion, which has caused great dissatisfaction. This paper aims to study the main affecting factors of the executive compensation of state monopolies, with 1280 firm-year observations of 183 monopoly companies. We find that 1) Executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance, firm size, CEO duality; 2) Executive compensation is negatively correlated to state share proportion and independent director proportion; 3) Company location, industry both have significant influence on executive compensation.
Optimal Executive Compensation Dispersion and Product Market Structure  [PDF]
Ding Chen, Shin-Hwan Chiang, Yutong Li
American Journal of Industrial and Business Management (AJIBM) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2018.89135
Abstract: Executive compensation is considered as one of the most crucial issues for the corporate governance. The proper executive compensation dispersion can be employed to motivate the top managers and then to boost the firm performance, but the definition of “proper” varies in the existing literature. The bigger dispersion is better for firm performance based on Tournament Theory but smaller one is better according to some other theories. In this paper, we try to theoretically study the optimal executive compensation by considering the internal and external situation of the firm at the same time, especially the influence of product market. We find the optimal compensation dispersion will increase (decrease) if more (less) firms enter the market when the cost of sabotage increases more rapidly than the cost of effort, vice versa. The findings imply the firm should increase (decrease) the compensation dispersion if the intensity of competition in product market decreases (increases) when sabotage is expensive and the firm should increase (decrease) the compensation dispersion if the intensity of competition in product market increases (decreases) when sabotage is cheap.
Executive remuneration and company performance for South African companies listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX)
HE Scholtz, A Smit
Southern African Business Review , 2012,
Abstract: It is often believed that it is the role of the executive directors of a company to create value and profits for the company. The question arises: should directors then receive an increase and performancerelated remuneration if value is not created? This article examines the relationship between short-term executive compensation and company performance for a sample of companies listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX) in South Africa between 2003 and 2010. Evidence is provided that there is a strong relationship between executive remuneration and some company performance variables, such as total assets, turnover and share price. The corporate governance measures and disclosure requirements applicable to executive remuneration are also examined.
The Impact of Directors with Foreign Experience on Executive Compensation: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies  [PDF]
Rui Xiao
Open Journal of Business and Management (OJBM) , 2017, DOI: 10.4236/ojbm.2017.54055
Abstract:
We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on executive Compensation. Using a data set from Chinese listed companies, we find out that executive compensation tends to be higher in companies with directors that have foreign experience. To evaluate this change in executive compensation, we further explore the impact of director with oversea background on pay performance link in these companies, which is an indicator of corporate governance and compensation management. Result shows that the impact of directors with foreign experience depends on the equity nature of the company.
Research on the Relationship between External Compensation Gap of Executives and Enterprise Innovation  [PDF]
Yangyang Gu, Zhongjun Yang
Open Journal of Social Sciences (JSS) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/jss.2018.68022
Abstract: How to use the pay contract to encourage executives to implement innovation activities has become an important issue to be solved by the theoretical and practical circles. Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2015, this paper examines the impact of external compensation gap on corporate innovation, and further discusses the contextual effects of executive talent and property rights. The study finds that the external compensation gap of executives has a positive effect on enterprise innovation. Moreover, the higher talent executives possess, the more obvious the external compensation gap will promote the innovation of enterprises. In addition, compared with state-owned enterprises, the external compensation gap of non-state-owned enterprise executives has a more significant effect on corporate innovation. This paper not only expands the economic consequences of the external compensation gap, but also provides inspiration for companies to adjust the compensation structure and encourage executives to promote enterprise innovation.
ISSUES RELATED TO A REASONABLENESS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ANALYSIS  [PDF]
Adrian MICU,Angela Eliza MICU
Annals of Dun?rea de Jos University. Fascicle I : Economics and Applied Informatics , 2006,
Abstract: In most companies, there is ongoing conflict between managers in charge of covering costs (finance and accounting) and managers in charge of satisfying customers (marketing and sales). Accounting journals warn against prices that fail to cover full costs, while marketing journals argue that customer willingness-to-pay must be the sole driver of prices. This article will further explain these reasons to conduct an independent reasonableness of executive/professional practitioner compensation analysis. In addition, this article will discuss many of the typical factors that the independent analyst will consider in assessing the reasonableness of executive compensation for controversy, taxation, corporate planning, and corporate governance purposes.
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