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Study of the Instant Incentive Mechanism for Zero-Time Enterprise  [PDF]
Yang Hu, Xinrong Yang
Journal of Service Science and Management (JSSM) , 2010, DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2010.31016
Abstract: The zero-time enterprise’s mission is response to the market and customer needs in “zero time” in order to gain more customers and competitive advantages. To realize zero-time response to market and customers, it should inspire the employees’ work enthusiasm and creativity, so that they can do their work conscientiously to ensure quick and smooth going. This paper discussed how to establish an effective instant incentive mechanism for zero-time enterprise, which is a problem of rich practical significance. Firstly, based on the briefly explanation of zero-time enterprise, it analyzed the characteristics and principles of zero-time enterprise; and then elaborated the important roles of instant incentive. Finally, it proposed the basic contents of instant incentive and the “Trine” realization mechanism.
The Influence Mechanism of Employee-Oriented Human Resource Management on Employees’ Proactive Behavior
Jianfei Pan
Open Access Library Journal (OALib Journal) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1104695
This study attempts to explore the incentive mechanism of employees’ proactive behavior in the context of advocating and practicing socially responsible human resource management (SR-HRM). By conducting theoretical analysis and hypothesis, this study focuses on the influence of employee-oriented human resource management (EOHRM) on employees’ proactive behavior, and then assumes the role of employees’ perceived insider status and learning goal orientation.
The Incentive Problems Study of the Employees of the New Generation under the Structure of Grade in China  [PDF]
Qing Xia, Hongyan Li
American Journal of Industrial and Business Management (AJIBM) , 2013, DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2013.38081

The incentive problems of the employees of the new generation are increasingly becoming the focus of managers, because they go to work and gradually become the main force in the labor market. However, special social-economic background has given the crowd a few generational features, which require us to explore the incentive work of the new generation with a whole new perspective. In addition, our country is a country which attaches great importance to the cultural inheritance and the traditional national culture deeply affects every generation in different degree. The social structure of the structure of grade as an important part of traditional Chinese culture is bound to be a unique impact on the employees of the new generation. So, this paper will elaborate the incentive problems of the new generation mainly from the perspective of the China’s social structure (the structure of grade) and theory of cognitive dissonance.

On the Implementation of Equity Incentive and the Risk Control in Chinese Listed Companies  [cached]
Yong Cheng
Asian Social Science , 2012, DOI: 10.5539/ass.v8n11p133
Abstract: The application of equity incentive in Chinese listed companies faces many problems, e.g. preconditions are too broad, performances cannot be assessed strictly, or expected returns are unpredictable, ultimately which cause greater risks in equity incentive. Risks in equity incentive impact the establishment of long-term incentive mechanism in Chinese listed companies, weakening employees’ enthusiasm for work. Equity incentive risks are chiefly derived from the absence of owners, the imbalance of corporate governance, the non-regulated securities market, and the imperfect regulatory system. To identify and control the risks in the implementation of equity incentive to achieve the purpose of equity incentive needs to be resolved urgently for the reform of pay system in Chinese listed companies.
Research on Improving the Talent Incentive Mechanism of Artificial Intelligence Industry in China  [PDF]
Biyun Lin, Qingjun Meng, Changzheng Zhang
Open Journal of Social Sciences (JSS) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/jss.2018.64012
Under the double drives of national attention and market demand, the artificial intelligence industry in China has developed rapidly in recent years. However, the problem lacking artificial intelligence talents is very prominent which should not be ignored. The loss of them is closely related to the imperfect incentive mechanism. Therefore, in order to better improve the talent incentive mechanism and help enterprises retain talented people, research will provide effective countermeasures mainly from two angles, government and enterprise. For example, the government should strengthen the planning of the talent incentive system; the company ought to vigorously promote the property rights incentive program and etc.
An Incentive Mechanism for Tree-based Live Media Streaming Service  [cached]
Shuang Yang,Xin Wang
Journal of Networks , 2010, DOI: 10.4304/jnw.5.1.57-64
Abstract: Tree-based structure is widely used in peer-topeer streaming service and is the fundamental of many other structures, but it suffers a lot from the existence of free-riders. Based on the static analysis of the treebased structure, we further discuss the streaming service working in dynamic situation. We then present an incentive mechanism for tree-based live streaming service which requires the least cost to change the overlay by rotation, so it performs well in the dynamic situation. This incentive mechanism not only limits the damage of free-riders, but also provides better quality of service(QoS) for users with more contribution. In addition, we show this incentive mechanism can avoid cheating to some extent. We run a series of simulation experiments to show its validity.
Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Market Applications  [PDF]
Jiajun Sun
Computer Science , 2013,
Abstract: Recently, a novel class of incentive mechanisms is proposed to attract extensive users to truthfully participate in crowd sensing applications with a given budget constraint. The class mechanisms also bring good service quality for the requesters in crowd sensing applications. Although it is so important, there still exists many verification and privacy challenges, including users' bids and subtask information privacy and identification privacy, winners' set privacy of the platform, and the security of the payment outcomes. In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanism for crowd sensing applications with the budget constraint, not only to explore how to protect the privacies of users and the platform, but also to make the verifiable payment correct between the platform and users for crowd sensing applications. Results indicate that our privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanism achieves the same results as the generic one without privacy preservation.
An Incentive Mechanism for Periodical Mobile Crowdsensing from a Frugality Perspective  [PDF]
Jiajun Sun
Computer Science , 2014,
Abstract: Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has been intensively explored recently due to its flexible and pervasive sensing ability. Although many incentive mechanisms have been built to attract extensive user participation, Most of these mechanisms focus only on independent task scenarios, where the sensing tasks are independent of each other. On the contrary, we focus on a periodical task scenario, where each user participates in the same type of sensing tasks periodically. In this paper, we consider the long-term user participation incentive in a general periodical MCS system from a frugality payment perspective. We explore the issue under both semi-online (the intra-period interactive process is synchronous while the inter-period interactive process is sequential and asynchronous during each period) and online user arrival models (the previous two interactive processes are sequential and asynchronous). In particular, we first propose a semi-online frugal incentive mechanism by introducing a Lyapunov method. Moreover, we also extend it to an online frugal incentive mechanism, which satisfies the constant frugality. Besides, the two mechanisms can also satisfy computational efficiency, asymptotical optimality, individual rationality and truthfulness. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our online mechanisms.
Behavior-Based online Incentive Mechanism for Crowd Sensing with Budget Constraints  [PDF]
Jiajun Sun
Computer Science , 2013,
Abstract: Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages the ubiquity of sensor-equipped mobile devices to collect data. To achieve good quality for crowd sensing, incentive mechanisms are indispensable to attract more participants. Most of existing mechanisms focus on the expected utility prior to sensing, ignoring the risk of low quality solution and privacy leakage. Traditional incentive mechanisms such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and its variants are not applicable here. In this paper, to address these challenges, we propose a behavior based incentive mechanism for crowd sensing applications with budget constraints by applying sequential all-pay auctions in mobile social networks (MSNs), not only to consider the effects of extensive user participation, but also to maximize high quality of the context based sensing content submission for crowd sensing platform under the budget constraints, where users arrive in a sequential order. Through an extensive simulation, results indicate that incentive mechanisms in our proposed framework outperform the best existing solution.
The Incentive Mechanism of Green Supply Chain for Raw Material Procurement  [cached]
Jian Cao,Liling Hu,Hongli Wen
Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology , 2013,
Abstract: To promote the development of green products’ market, the Green Supply Chain (GSC) is a key tool for enterprises. The reasonable coordinating and incentive mechanisms between the members in the GSC are helpful for the effective operation of GSC. For a two-echelon GSC system including a manufacturer and a supplier, the green degree of raw material is the private information for the supplier. To solve this asymmetric information problem, an incentive mechanism is designed by applying the transfer payment method as well as the optimal control theory. It indicates that the proposed mechanism can reveal the real green degree of raw material provided by the supplier and achieve the mutually beneficial maximization as far as possible. The conclusions have good guidance values for the GSC’s operation at initial stage of the green market.
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