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Scientific Annals of the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi : Economic Sciences Series , 2010,
Abstract: In this paper we assess the transparency level in the field of financial stability, using the Sotom-ska-Krzysztofik and Szczepanska index for the central banks from the European Union countries and European Central Bank (ECB) – 28 central banks, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Russia and 3 candidates to EU: Turkey, Macedonia and Croatia, totally 35 central banks. Also, we do a comparison between our results in 2010 and Sotomska-Krzysztofik and Szczepanska calculation in 2004, for the central banks that was commonly assessed. We conclude that the preoccupations of central bank communication policy in the field of financial stability have increased in the last period. The main factors that have been influencing these trends were the process of European integration and the actual international financial crises.
Central Bank Transparency and Financial Market: Evidence for the Brazilian Case  [cached]
Helder Ferreira de Mendon?a,José Sim?o Filho
Revista Brasileira de Finan?as , 2011,
Abstract: The main objective of this paper is an empirical analysis concerning the effects caused by Central Bank of Brazil transparency on the Brazilian financial market. Furthermore, a brief review of the literature regarding central bank transparency is presented. The effects of the different dimensions of the monetary authority’s transparency on yield interest are examined. Moreover, the consequences regarding changes in the country risk are considered in this study. The findings denote that the Central Bank of Brazil transparency works as a guide for the future interest rate market and that the different dimensions of transparency contribute to a better market efficiency.
Dumiter Florin Cornel
Annals of the University of Oradea : Economic Science , 2012,
Abstract: In the past, central banks used to be very reserved regarding their activities, strategies and monetary policy decisions and actions. As central banks become more and more independent, transparency gained importance based upon accountability arguments. An important fact for adopting an increasing central bank transparency lies in its importance of influencing the development of expectations. The concept of central bank transparency has emerged in the economic literature relatively later than some other key concepts. The widespread agreement of an inflation targeting regime and a more transparent central bank is desired by the most central banks around the world in the context of the need of the public disclosure of macroeconomic models, the quarterly time series for indicators like: inflation, output, budgetary deficit, public debt, interest rate, inflation expectations, the public announcement of the monetary policy decisions, objectives and targets, the publication of some key monetary tools like: inflation report, financial stability report, monetary policy committee report, annual report. These are all key issues in the construction of a more transparent and independent central bank in the context of a good global governance. Moreover, for the fruitful success of the central bank, latum sensu, and monetary policy, stricto sensu, it must be encompassed a complex monetary policy committee mechanism. This complex mechanism must by edowed with the collegial approach of the monetary policy committee, structure of the voting mechanism within the committee, the importance of the person which announces the changes within the interest rates and the public disclosure of these informationa€ s enriched in a communication strategy. This communication strategy is very important for assessing and public understanding of the central banka€ s actions but also for communicating the objectives, targets and forward looking approaches of the monetary policy in the global context of the transmission mechanism.
Monetary Policy Transparency: Evidence from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)  [PDF]
Aminu Yusuf Usman, Umar Salisu
Modern Economy (ME) , 2016, DOI: 10.4236/me.2016.710109
Abstract: The idea of transparency in monetary policy has gained significant attention in the last two decades both in the academia and Central Banking Circle. As such, a number of Central Banks in the World, CBN inclusive subscribed to the trend toward a more transparent monetary policy framework. The degree of transparency is claimed to vary across Central Banks and monetary policy framework. Therefore, its effects may likely vary. This study measures monetary policy transparency using the case of Nigeria’s apex Bank (CBN) by employing the Eijffinger and Geraat (2006) Index. We based our analysis on information provided by CBN from 2007-2015. The result indicates that CBN had a score of 11 out of 15 points. Considering the aggregate score, CBN can be regarded as being transparent in its monetary policy. However, looking at specific transparency dimensions, it is clear that CBN exhibits weak performance in the economic and operational dimensions which constitute important aspects of transparency. The release of accurate data on key economic variables and disclosure of policy models used for policy analysis would enhance the process of coordinating private agents’ expectation toward fundamentals as well as strengthen their confidence on the monetary authority, thereby boost credibility. We recommend on this basis for CBN to partner with National Bureau of Statistics to gain access to data on unemployment and capacity utilization and on more frequent manner. This paper generally recommend that CBN should explicitly provide wide-ranging and accurate information on monetary policy, data on key variables relevant for policy decisions and macroeconomic model used for policy analysis in a timely and more frequent manner.
Anton Com?nescu
Romanian Journal of European Affairs (RJEA) , 2009,
Abstract: During the last decade, central bank communication and transparency became undisputable conditions of an effective monetary policy. Central banks around the world seek to consolidate their credibility by communicating effectively their policy goals to the financial markets and the public at large. Nevertheless, transparency has its challenges, particularly in times of financial turmoil when markets can misinterpret central bank messages. The way central banks manage to maintain credibility through effective communication both in normal and exceptional situations remains part of the art of monetary policy. Important challenges are posed to communication, in the context of conflicting pressures towards disclosure versus secrecy. The mantra of transparency still has its ayatollahs but some precepts have to be reconciled with the risks of misguiding the markets. Crowding out of private information, potential fuelling of banking panics and moral hazard are few of the problems that could threaten the performance of a central bank in communicating to its various audience.
Dumiter Florin Cornel,Coroiu Sorina
Annals of the University of Oradea : Economic Science , 2011,
Abstract: The empirical evidence upon the macroeconomic performances of the independent central banks do not always have been successfully. In some cases, the consistency of the indices based on the interpretation of central banks statues used for measuring the degree of central bank independence is controversial, particularly for some of the indices. Moreover, the correlations between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance variables are not always confirmed, the causal relationship between central bank independence and inflation is controversial, and the higher disinflation costs, as a result of a higher sacrifice ratio correlated with the degree of independence is controversial, too. The effects of central bank independence upon macroeconomic performances focalized upon the empirical evidence of inflation, output or economic grouth and the disinflation costs. This is due to the lack of studies vis - vis of relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performances regarding some variables like interest rates and budgetary deficits. Specialists consider inflation and output as the main determinats of the social welfare. The economic literature regarding this fact suggests that the central bank is seen as a free lunch institution. This hypothesis sustains that independent central banks will have social benefits in terms of lower inflation rates, but without any costs in terms of the real macroeconomic performances as a higher output volatility or a lower economic growth. In this article we provide a qualitative analyses regarding the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performances. For this purpose the authors used the new index for measuring central bank independence and inflation targeting based on three pillars: political and legal central bank independence, central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy, central bank transparency and accountability. For estimating the connections between the evolution of central bank independence and macroeconomic performances we used five macroeconomic variables: GDP in constant prices, Harmonised Price Consumer Index, unemployment rate, budgetary deficit and current account deficit. Both measuring the degree of central bank independence and evaluating the average levels of the macroeconomic variables were analysed in the period 1990 - 2009, within 20 less developing countries. The final results will help clarify the complex relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performances in countries who fostered a large amount of institu
Central bank and the monetary commitment
Jak?i? Miomir P.
Economic Annals , 2004, DOI: 10.2298/eka0460091j
Abstract: The central bank as the key monetary institution has to assure monetary policy credibility, which is of vital importance in the process of macroeconomic stabilization. The author analyses the concepts of central bank independence and accountability as a basis for successful macroeconomic policy, and the concept of monetary commitment which is of essential importance for monetary regime and formulation of monetary rules.
Central Bank independence  [PDF]
Vasile DEDU,Tiberiu STOICA
Theoretical and Applied Economics , 2012,
Abstract: In this paper we present the key aspects regarding central bank’s independence. Most economists consider that the factor which positively influences the efficiency of monetary policy measures is the high independence of the central bank. We determined that the National Bank of Romania (NBR) has a high degree of independence. NBR has both goal and instrument independence. We also consider that the hike of NBR’s independence played an important role in the significant disinflation process, as headline inflation dropped inside the targeted band of 3% ± 1 percentage point recently.
Statutory Central Bank Independence in Taiwan  [cached]
Chiayang James Hueng
Asian Social Science , 2010, DOI: 10.5539/ass.v6n11p17
Abstract: This paper critically reviews the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Act and finds that the level of legal independence of the central bank is relatively low compared to the rest of the world. However, Taiwan has been able to combine low inflation with a legally dependent central bank. We provide possible explanations to this low inflation/low independence puzzle in Taiwan and argue that Taiwan should still follow the trend of creating a more independent central bank.
Do Monetary Policy Transparency, Independence and Credibility Enhance Macro-Financial Stability?  [cached]
Eleftherios SPYROMITROS,Sukriye TUYSUZ
International Journal of Economics and Finance , 2012, DOI: 10.5539/ijef.v4n4p44
Abstract: This paper, using panel data approach, evaluates the effect of, respectively, the central bank transparency, independence and credibility on, respectively, the level and variability of realized and expected economic performance. It also analyzes the effects of central banks characteristics on the level and variability of Government bond rate. The results obtained suggest that central bank independence does not influence the realized and expected level and variability of economic performance. As for the central bank transparency, our findings are consistent with the view that greater transparency could have a desirable reputational effect that lowers inflation expectations and long-term nominal interest rates. Finally, our results show that central bank credibility negatively influences the level and variability of Government bond rate.
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