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Political Failures and Intergovernmental Competition  [PDF]
Jean Hindriks
Economics Research International , 2012, DOI: 10.1155/2012/409135
Abstract: In normative public economics, intergovernmental competition is usually viewed as harmful. Although empirical support for this position does not abound, market integration has intensified competition among developed countries. In this paper we argue that when assessing welfare effects of intergovernmental competition for various forms of political failures (the public choice critique), the outcome is ambiguous and competition can be welfare improving.
Political Failures and Intergovernmental Competition  [PDF]
Jean Hindriks
Economics Research International , 2012, DOI: 10.1155/2012/409135
Abstract: In normative public economics, intergovernmental competition is usually viewed as harmful. Although empirical support for this position does not abound, market integration has intensified competition among developed countries. In this paper we argue that when assessing welfare effects of intergovernmental competition for various forms of political failures (the public choice critique), the outcome is ambiguous and competition can be welfare improving. 1. Introduction What is the role of competition between governments? If competition is the fundamental force of efficient economic performance in the private sector, why should it be different for the public sector? Why cannot the same disciplining effect of competition be applied to the public sector as well? In the private sector competition will promote efficiency because firms which best satisfy consumers’ preferences will survive and prosper, while others will lose customers and fail. Extending this argument to the public sector, competition among governments and jurisdictions should induce them to best serve the will of their residents. If they fail to do so, residents will vote out their incumbent or they can leave for other jurisdictions, which offer a better deal. The purpose of this paper is to show that if the normative public economics view of a harmful tax competition and a risk of a race to the bottom has some merit, it also needs to be seriously qualified. Indeed a positive role for intergovernmental competition in general and fiscal competition in particular can be found. There are two main ways. First, the role for intergovernmental competition can be compared to an auction mechanism to get resources allocated to their best possible uses. Another possibility is that there is an agency problem in government which tends to make the public sector inefficient and possibly too large. In this paper we shall concentrate on this agency problem to show that intergovernmental competition can be welfare enhancing. This is in stark contrast with EU stance on intergovernmental competition, which perceives it purely as messing up incentives with very damaging consequences for welfare. It should be stressed at the outset that the purpose is to present a “public choice” perspective on the topic of intergovernmental competition in a manner that is provocative to stimulate debate even if it is not found persuasive. The intention is to temper normative public economics analysis with some public choice perspectives. That does not mean that we claim the public choice approach to be the correct one. Normative
The True Strong Point of Democratic Firm Management  [PDF]
Bruno Jossa
Modern Economy (ME) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/me.2018.910101
Abstract: According to the author, the benefits society would derive from the transfer of corporate decision powers to workers upon the establishment of a democratic firm system include both the disempowerment of capitalists and, most importantly, a powerful impetus in the direction of full democracy. Capitalism is a despotic system enabling capitalists to impose their laws not only on workers, but even on politics and culture has been gaining wide currency. Therefore, one major advantage of democratic firm management is the enforcement of the “one head, one vote” principle in lieu of the “one share, one vote” criterion.
Firm competition in a probabilistic framework of consumer choice  [PDF]
Hao Liao,Rui Xiao,Duanbing Chen,Matus Medo,Yi-Cheng Zhang
Quantitative Finance , 2013, DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2013.12.026
Abstract: We develop a probabilistic consumer choice framework based on information asymmetry between consumers and firms. This framework makes it possible to study market competition of several firms by both quality and price of their products. We find Nash market equilibria and other optimal strategies in various situations ranging from competition of two identical firms to firms of different sizes and firms which improve their efficiency.
R&D subsidy policy of domestic firmconsidering foreign firm competition  [PDF]
Zhang Wei, , Zhong Weijun, Mei Shu’e
- , 2016, DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2016.04.020
Abstract: Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development(R&D)investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms provided by the government, and the R&D subsidy policy of domestic firms in competition with foreign firms is analyzed. The equilibrium output, R&D investment of the domestic firm, social welfare and the value of government subsidies are derived, in the case of the two policies, R&D investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms, provided by the government. The results show that, the equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the R&D investment subsidy policy are both less than those under the product subsidy policy; the optimal R&D investment under the R&D investment subsidy policy is less than that under the product subsidy policy; and the R&D product subsidy has a more obvious incentive effect on firm R&D investment. Under the background of the leading edge of technology of foreign firms, the product subsidy policy drawn up by the government to encourage R&D innovation of domestic firms is more effective than the R&D investment subsidy policy.
Effects of Bank Branch Competition on Rural Firm Entry and Exit: Evidence from Hokkaido, Japan  [PDF]
Kozo Harimaya, Yasufumi Ozaki
Theoretical Economics Letters (TEL) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/tel.2018.83028
Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of bank branch competition on rural firm entry and exit in Hokkaido, the largest and northernmost prefecture in Japan. Using a panel dataset of 188 municipalities, we run a two-stage least squares regression to examine whether banking competition affects firm entry and exit, respectively. Although the empirical evidence does not strongly support the notion of simultaneously linked firm entry and exit, banking competition has a negative effect on firm exit rates. Furthermore, consistent results are obtained when running a seemingly unrelated regression. Our findings suggest that fierce competition among banks does not contribute to firm survival and region-based relationship banking in less competitive areas can deter firm exit.
Quantity Competition and Price Competition with a Duopoly in a Consumer-Friendly Firm: A Welfare Analysis  [PDF]
Yasuhiko Nakamura
Modern Economy (ME) , 2013, DOI: 10.4236/me.2013.411082
Abstract:


This paper conducts a welfare analysis in a duopoly with differentiated and substitutable goods composed of one consumer-friendly firm and one absolute profit maximizing firm. We suppose that the consumer-friendly firm maximizes the weighted sum of its absolute profit and consumer surplus. In such a duopoly, when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently high and the weight that the consumer-friendly firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function is sufficiently high, the equilibrium social welfare is larger in the quantity competition than in the price competition, which implies that the result is reverse of that obtained in the standard duopoly with substitutable goods composed of absolute profit maximizing firms.


Family ownership and firm performance: The net effect of productive efficiency and growth constraints
Galve-Górriz,Carmen; Salas-Fumás,Vicente;
Innovar , 2011,
Abstract: this paper investigates differences in the behaviour and performance of listed spanish family and non-family firms resulting from the interaction of differences in productive efficiency and in preferences for control between the two groups of firms. we find that family firms grow at a smaller rate, choose less capital-intensive productive technologies and are more efficient in production than non-family firms are. the evidence is consistent with institutional theories of the firm that predict competition among governance forms for the transactions to be governed to minimize production and transaction costs. the results of the paper highlight the relevance of using measures of productive efficiency, instead of measures of profitability, to test the effect of ownership in the performance of firms.
Financing constraints, credit rationing and financing obstacles: evidence from firm-level data in South-Eastern Europe
Iraj Hashi,Valentin Z. To?i
Economic and Business Review , 2010,
Abstract: Financing constraints have been one of the major impediments to doing business in transition economies in general and South-Eastern Europe in particular. Utilizing firm-level survey data and extensive econometric modelling, the paper provides new evidence on financing constraints, credit rationing and financing obstacles for firms in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. The findings suggest that these phenomena are prevalent in the SEE region, especially in the small business sector, a driving force of economic development in these countries. Based on the findings, a number of policy implications aiming at reducing financing constraints for the small business sector are derived.
Human Capital Constraints in South Africa: A Firm-Level Analysis
Ewert P. J. Kleynhans,Johannes Riaan Labuschagne
Managing Global Transitions , 2012,
Abstract: This paper examines human capital constraints in the South Africaneconomy, and the austerity of these constraints on firms in the country.The two key human capital constraints explored in this article arethe inadequately educated workforce and labour market distortions.Regression analysis was applied to examine determinants of increasedlabour productivity in manufacturing firms. Education and labourmarket distortions were found to have a varying influence on outputper worker. Principal Component Analysis (pca) of the explanatoryvariables achieved similar results. This study found that the highest percentageof the total variance is explained by latent variables that incorporateeducation, training, compensation, region and Sector EducationTraining Authority (seta) support and effectiveness.
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