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Endogenous Timing in a Quantity-Setting Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms
American Journal of Economics , 2012, DOI: 10.5923/j.economics.20120205.03
Abstract: This paper considers a model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. There are two production stages, and the firms first announce in which stage they will choose output. Next, if both firms choose the same stage, a simultaneous move game occurs, whereas if both firms choose different stages, a sequential move game arises. The paper shows that the unique equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution in which the labor-managed firm is the leader. As the result, we find that the state-owned firm cannot play the role of Stackelberg leader.
Endogenous Leadership in a Labor-Managed Duopoly
Journal of Game Theory , 2012, DOI: 10.5923/j.jgt.20120104.02
Abstract: This paper examines a quantity-setting model in which two labor-managed firms compete against each other. The paper considers the following situation. Each labor-managed firm must choose output either in period one or in period two. If the labor-managed firms decide to choose output in the same period, a simultaneously move game occurs, whereas if the labor-managed firms decide to choose output in different periods, a sequential move game arises. The paper demonstrates that there is no equilibrium where the labor-managed firms choose output in the same period.
Scientific Annals of the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi : Economic Sciences Series , 2009,
Abstract: Some economies inside the diverse group of middle-income countries (MIC) have shown an active behavior in exports of technology-intensive goods that is strictly better than the group average. Among the factors explaining such a behavior we find the national technological capabilities that affect the dynamism of their productive and trade structure generating competitiveness gains. Another element is the potential impact that foreign direct investments (FDI) flows generate in those economies since foreign owned firms have contributed to the industrialization and modernization of their productive systems. In this paper we show a descriptive analysis of those competitive factors through the Global Competitiveness Index from the World Economic Forum and the Enterprise Surveys form the World Bank, with the aim of highlighting the relative importance of them and the differences across middle-income economies.
Financing Strategies of New Technology-Based Firms: A Comparison of Women-and Men-Owned Firms
Robb,Alicia M; Coleman,Susan;
Journal of technology management & innovation , 2010, DOI: 10.4067/S0718-27242010000100003
Abstract: in this article we used data from the kauffman firm survey to compare the financing strategies of women-and men-owned new technology-based firms. our findings reveal that women raised dramatically less financial capital than men in the startup year and in the subsequent four years of operation. we also found that women used a significantly higher level of external debt and a significantly lower level of external equity during the startup year. although our findings do not allow us to definitively rule out the possibility of discrimination, particularly in the market for external equity, our results indicate that women may have different motivations and expectations for their firms. these, in turn, may determine some of their financing choices.
Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile Regression  [PDF]
Grasseni, Mara
The European Journal of Comparative Economics , 2010,
Abstract: This paper investigates the performance differences across and within foreign-owned firms and domestic multinationals in Italy. Used for the empirical analysis are non-parametric tests based on the concept of first order stochastic dominance and quantile regression technique. The firm-level analysis distinguishes between foreign-owned firms of different nationalities and domestic MNEs according to the location of their FDI, and it focuses not only on productivity but also on differences in average wages, capital intensity, and financial and non-financial indicators, namely ROS, ROI and debt leverage. Overall, the results provide evidence of remarkable heterogeneity across and within multinationals. In particular, it seems not possible to identify a clear foreign advantage at least in terms of productivity, because foreign-owned firms do not outperform domestic multinationals. Interesting results are obtained when focusing on ROS and ROI, where the profitability gaps change as one moves from the bottom to the top of the conditional distribution. Domestic multinationals investing only in developed countries present higher ROS and ROI compared with the subgroups of foreign-owned firms, but only at the lower quantiles, while at the upper quantiles the advantage seems to favour foreign firms. Finally, in regard to domestic multinationals, there is strong evidence that those active only in less developed countries persistently exhibit the worst performances
Pre Managed Earnings Benchmarks and Earnings Management of Australian Firms
Lan Sun,Subhrendu Rath
Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal , 2012,
Abstract: This study investigates benchmark beating behaviour and circumstances under which managers inflate earnings to beat earnings benchmarks. We show that two benchmarks, positive earnings and positive earnings change, are associated with earnings manipulation. Using a sample ofAustralian firms from 2000 to 2006, we find that when the underlying earnings are negative or below prior year’s earnings, firms are more likely to use discretionary accruals to inflate earnings to beat benchmarks.
Socially-Optimal Locations of Duopoly Firms with Non-Uniform Consumer Densities  [PDF]
Kieron J. Meagher, Ernie G. S. Teo, Taojun Xie
Theoretical Economics Letters (TEL) , 2014, DOI: 10.4236/tel.2014.46055

Advances in the theoretical literature have extended the Hotelling model of spatial competition from a uniform distribution of consumers to the family of log-concave distributions. While a closed form has been found for the equilibrium locations for symmetric log-concave distributions, the literature contains no closed form solution for the socially optimal locations. We provide a closed form solution for the socially optimal locations: one mean-deviation away from the median. We also derive a formula for the excess differentiation ratio which complements the bounds previously derived in the literature, and establish the invariance of this ratio to a form of mean preserving spread. The equilibrium duopoly locations of several types of commonly used distributions were discussed in [1]. This paper provides the closed form solutions for the socially optimal locations to the same set of distributions. We calculate welfare improvements arising from regulation of firm location and show how these vary with the distribution of consumers. While regulating firm locations is sufficient to optimize welfare for symmetric distributions, additional price regulation is required to ensure social optimality for asymmetric distributions. These results are significant for urban policy over firm/store locations.

Quantum Model of Bertrand Duopoly  [PDF]
Salman Khan,M. Ramzan,M. K. Khan
Quantitative Finance , 2010, DOI: 10.1088/0256-307X/27/8/080302
Abstract: We present the quantum model of Bertrand duopoly and study the entanglement behavior on the profit functions of the firms. Using the concept of optimal response of each firm to the price of the opponent, we found only one Nash equilibirum point for maximally entangled initial state. The very presence of quantum entanglement in the initial state gives payoffs higher to the firms than the classical payoffs at the Nash equilibrium. As a result the dilemma like situation in the classical game is resolved.
Adjustment Processes in Cournot Duopoly
Journal of Game Theory , 2012, DOI: 10.5923/j.jgt.20120103.01
Abstract: Interesting explanation of an adjustment process in a Cournot duopoly game is shown in Varian[1]’s textbook, where players adjust their strategies sequentially. It is generally assumed that players adjust simultaneously. We investigate a game that determines whether to adjust or not. First, Nash principle is assumed and as the solution whether sequential or simultaneous is derived. The result depends on the initial state of the output of both firms. In some regions firms adjust simultaneously, and in other regions sequentially. The game under maximin principle is also examined and we compare the results with that of the Nash game.
Family-Owned Firms and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market  [PDF]
Caifen Zhang, Russell B. Gregory-Allen
Theoretical Economics Letters (TEL) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/tel.2018.87086
Abstract: We examine stock return performance of Chinese family-firms vs. Nonfamily-firms, and the impact on family-firm returns of firm size, having a founder as CEO, and levels of family ownership. We model returns with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama-French 3-factor model, and a new 5-factor model we modified from Miralles-Marcelo, Miralles-Quirós, which adds factors for debt and illiquidity. In previous studies, though the prevalence is for family-firm outperformance, the results have been mixed. Using CAPM or the Fama-French 3-factor model, we find that family-firms outperform nonfamily-firms, but with the 5-factor model that outperformance vanishes, and this is robust to controlling for the GFC. For the founder CEO, firm size and family ownership considerations, again previous research has been mixed. With CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor models, we find that founder CEOs outperform nonfounder, large firms outperform small firms, and higher family ownership outperforms lower ownership. However, with the 5-factor model, only size remains as having significant impact. This study helps to reconcile conflicting results in previous research.
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