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 Quantitative Biology , 2003, DOI: 10.1088/1742-5468/2004/09/P09001 Abstract: We study selection acting on phenotype in a collection of agents playing local games lacking Nash equilibria. After each cycle one of the agents losing most games is replaced by a new agent with new random strategy and game partner. The network generated can be considered critical in the sense that the lifetimes of the agents is power law distributed. The longest surviving agents are those with the lowest absolute score per time step. The emergent ecology is characterized by a broad range of behaviors. Nevertheless, the agents tend to be similar to their opponents in terms of performance.
 Ruchira S. Datta Mathematics , 2003, Abstract: Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some three-person game, and also to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an $N$-person game in which each player has two pure strategies. From the Nash-Tognoli Theorem it follows that every compact differentiable manifold can be encoded as the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some game. Moreover, there exist isolated Nash equilibria of arbitrary topological degree.
 Mathematics , 2010, Abstract: This document consists of two parts: the second part was submitted earlier as a new proof of Nash's theorem, and the first part is a note explaining a problem found in that proof. We are indebted to Sergiu Hart and Eran Shmaya for their careful study which led to their simultaneous discovery of this error. So far the error has not been fixed, but many of the results and techniques of the paper remain valid, so we will continue to make it available online. Abstract for the original paper: We give a novel proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in all finite games without using fixed point theorems or path following arguments. Our approach relies on a new notion intermediate between Nash and correlated equilibria called exchangeable equilibria, which are correlated equilibria with certain symmetry and factorization properties. We prove these exist by a duality argument, using Hart and Schmeidler's proof of correlated equilibrium existence as a first step. In an appropriate limit exchangeable equilibria converge to the convex hull of Nash equilibria, proving that these exist as well. Exchangeable equilibria are defined in terms of symmetries of the game, so this method automatically proves the stronger statement that a symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. The case without symmetries follows by a symmetrization argument.
 Raimundas Vidunas Mathematics , 2014, Abstract: The maximal number of totally mixed Nash equilibria in games of several players equals the number of block derangements, as proved by McKelvey and McLennan.On the other hand, counting the derangements is a well studied problem. The numbers are identified as linearization coefficients for Laguerre polynomials. MacMahon derived a generating function for them as an application of his master theorem. This article relates the algebraic, combinatorial and game-theoretic problems that were not connected before. New recurrence relations, hypergeometric formulas and asymptotics for the derangement counts are derived. An upper bound for the total number of all Nash equilibria is given.
 Computer Science , 2007, Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al. \cite{kls} as a way to represent all Nash equilibria of a graphical game. In \cite{egg}, it was shown that the best response policy has polynomial size as long as the underlying graph is a path. In this paper, we show that if the underlying graph is a bounded-degree tree and the best response policy has polynomial size then there is an efficient algorithm which constructs a Nash equilibrium that guarantees certain payoffs to all participants. Another attractive solution concept is a Nash equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare. We show that, while exactly computing the latter is infeasible (we prove that solving this problem may involve algebraic numbers of an arbitrarily high degree), there exists an FPTAS for finding such an equilibrium as long as the best response policy has polynomial size. These two algorithms can be combined to produce Nash equilibria that satisfy various fairness criteria.
 Alexander Kuznetsov Mathematics , 2005, Abstract: We introduce a notion of Homological Projective Duality for smooth algebraic varieties in dual projective spaces, a homological extension of the classical projective duality. If algebraic varieties $X$ and $Y$ in dual projective spaces are Homologically Projectively Dual, then we prove that the orthogonal linear sections of $X$ and $Y$ admit semiorthogonal decompositions with an equivalent nontrivial component. In particular, it follows that triangulated categories of singularities of these sections are equivalent. We also investigate Homological Projective Duality for projectivizations of vector bundles.
 Computer Science , 2010, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_4 Abstract: Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better payoff by feigning a different utility function and thereby manipulating the Fisher market equilibrium, we formulate the {\em Fisher market game} in which buyers strategize by posing different utility functions. We show that existence of a {\em conflict-free allocation} is a necessary condition for the Nash equilibria (NE) and also sufficient for the symmetric NE in this game. There are many NE with very different payoffs, and the Fisher equilibrium payoff is captured at a symmetric NE. We provide a complete polyhedral characterization of all the NE for the two-buyer market game. Surprisingly, all the NE of this game turn out to be symmetric and the corresponding payoffs constitute a piecewise linear concave curve. We also study the correlated equilibria of this game and show that third-party mediation does not help to achieve a better payoff than NE payoffs.
 Physics , 2007, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85081-6_56 Abstract: In this paper we review our earlier work on quantum computing and the Nash Equilibrium, in particular, tracing the history of the discovery of new Nash Equilibria and then reviewing the ways in which quantum computing may be expected to generate new classes of Nash equilibria. We then extend this work through a substantive analysis of examples provided by Meyer, Flitney, Iqbal and Weigert and Cheon and Tsutsui with respect to quantized games, quantum game strategies and the extension of Nash Equilibrium to solvable games in Hilbert space. Finally, we review earlier work by Sato, Taiji and Ikegami on non-linear computation and computational classes by way of reference to coherence, decoherence and quantum computating systems.
 Steven E. Landsburg Mathematics , 2011, Abstract: For any two-by-two game $\G$, we define a new two-player game $\G^Q$. The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game $\G$ communicating via quantum technology according to a certain standard protocol originally introduced by Eisert and Wilkins [EW]. In the game $\G^Q$, each players' strategy set consists of the set of all probability distributions on the 3-sphere $S^3$. Nash equilibria in this game can be difficult to compute. Our main theorems classify all possible equilibria in $\G^Q$ for a Zariski-dense set of games $\G$ that we call {\it generic games}. First, we show that up to a suitable definition of equivalence, any strategy that arises in equilibrium is supported on at most four points; then we show that those four points must lie in one of a small number of geometric configurations. One easy consequence is that for zero-sum games, the payoff to either player in a mixed strategy quantum equilibrium must equal the average of that player's four possible payoffs.
 Computer Science , 2002, Abstract: Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that 1) demonstrates NP-hardness of determining whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties exist, and 2) demonstrates the #P-hardness of counting Nash equilibria (or connected sets of Nash equilibria). We also show that 3) determining whether a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists is NP-hard, and that 4) determining whether a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a stochastic (Markov) game is PSPACE-hard even if the game is invisible (this remains NP-hard if the game is finite). All of our hardness results hold even if there are only two players and the game is symmetric. Keywords: Nash equilibrium; game theory; computational complexity; noncooperative game theory; normal form game; stochastic game; Markov game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; multiagent systems.
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