Abstract:
We discuss a modification of the Evolutionary Minority Game (EMG) in which agents are placed in the nodes of a regular or a random graph. A neighborhood for each agent can thus be defined and a modification of the usual relaxation dynamics can be made in which each agent updates her decision scheme depending upon the options made in her neighborhood. We report numerical results for the topologies of a ring, a torus and a random graph changing the size of the neighborhood. We find the surprising result that in the EMG a better coordination (a lower frustration) can be achieved if all agents base their actions on local information disregarding the global trend in the self-segregation process.

Abstract:
We study a modification of the Evolutionary Minority Game (EMG) in which agents are placed in the nodes of a regular or a random graph. A neighborhood for each agent can thus be defined and a modification of the usual relaxation dynamics can be made in which each agent updates her decision scheme depending upon the options made in her immediate neighborhood. We name this model the Local Evolutionary Minority Game (LEMG). We report numerical results for the topologies of a ring, a torus and a random graph changing the size of the neighborhood. We focus our discussion in a one dimensional system and perform a detailed comparison of the results obtained from the random relaxation dynamics of the LEMG and from a linear chain of interacting spin-like variables at a finite temperature. We provide a physical interpretation of the surprising result that in the LEMG a better coordination (a lower frustration) is achieved if agents base their actions on local information. We show how the LEMG can be regarded as a model that gradually interpolates between a fully ordered, antiferromagnetic system and a fully disordered system that can be assimilated to a spin glass.

Abstract:
In this paper, we introduce a framework to study local interactions due to the presence of herding behavior in a minority game. The idea behind this approach is to consider that some of the agents who play the game believe that some of their neighbors are more informed than themselves. Thus, in this way, these agents imitate their most informed neighbors. The notion of neighborhood here is given by a regular network, a random network or a small world network. We show that under herding behavior the cooperation between the agents is less efficient than that one which arises in the standard minority game. On the other hand, depending on the topology of the network, we show that that the well known curve volatility versus memory, which caracterizes the minority game, is a monotone decreasing curve.

Abstract:
To study the interplay between global market choice and local peer pressure, we construct a minority-game-like econophysical model. In this so-called networked minority game model, every selfish player uses both the historical minority choice of the population and the historical choice of one's neighbors in an unbiased manner to make decision. Results of numerical simulation show that the level of cooperation in the networked minority game differs remarkably from the original minority game as well as the prediction of the crowd-anticrowd theory. We argue that the deviation from the crowd-anticrowd theory is due to the negligence of the effect of a four point correlation function in the effective Hamiltonian of the system.

Abstract:
We partially modify the rules of the Minority Game (MG) by introducing some degree of local information in the game, which is only available for some agents, called the interacting agents. Our work shows that, for small values of the new parameter of the model (the fraction of interacting agents), there is an improvement of the use of the resources with respect to the MG, while as this number grows the response of the system changes, and ends up behaving worst than the usual MG.

Abstract:
In the standard minority game, each agent in the minority group receives the same payoff regardless of the size of the minority group. Of great interest for real social and biological systems are cases in which the payoffs to members of the minority group depend on the size of the minority group. This latter includes the fixed sum game. We find, remarkably, that the phase structure and general scaling behavior of the standard minority game persists when the payoff function depends on the size of the minority group. there is still a phase transition at the same value of z, the ratio of the dimension of the strategy space to the number of agents playing the game. We explain the persistence of the phase structure and argue that it is due to the absence of temporal cooperation in the dynamics of the minority game. We also discuss the behavior of average agent wealth and the wealth distribution in these variable payoff games.

Abstract:
Minority game is a model of heterogeneous players who think inductively. In this game, each player chooses one out of two alternatives every turn and those who end up in the minority side wins. It is instructive to extend the minority game by allowing players to choose one out of many alternatives. Nevertheless, such an extension is not straight-forward due to the difficulties in finding a set of reasonable, unbiased and computationally feasible strategies. Here, we propose a variation of the minority game where every player has more than two options. Results of numerical simulations agree with the expectation that our multiple choices minority game exhibits similar behavior as the original two-choice minority game.

Abstract:
This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning model proposed in this literature seems to differ markedly from the learning models commonly used in economics. We relate the learning model from the minority game literature to standard game-theoretic learning models, and show that in fact it shares many features with these models. However, the predictions of the learning model differ considerably from the predictions of most other learning models. We discuss the main predictions of the learning model proposed in the minority game literature, and compare these to experimental findings on congestion games.

Abstract:
We analyze the minority game for patients, and the results known from the minority game are applied to the patient problem consulted at the department of pediatric cardiology. We find numerically the standard deviation and the global efficiency, similar to the El Farol bar problem. After the score equation and the scaled utility are introduced, the dynamical behavior of our model is discussed for particular strategies. Our result presented will be compared with the well-known minority games.

Abstract:
It is known that the memory is relevant in the symmetric phase of the minority game. In our previous work we have successfully explained the quasi-periodic behavior of the game in the symmetric phase with the help of the probability theory. Based on this explanation, we are able to determine how the memory affects the variance of the system in this paper. By using some particular types of fake history such as periodic type and random type, we determine how efficient the memory has been used in the standard game. Furthermore, the analysis on the effective memory strongly supports the result we proposed previously that there are three distinct phases in the minority game.