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 Physics , 2004, DOI: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.05.023 Abstract: The eavesdropping scheme proposed by W\'{o}jcik [Phys. Rev. Lett. {\bf 90},157901(2003)] on the ping-pong protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. {\bf 89}, 187902(2002)] is improved by constituting a new set of attack operations. The improved scheme has a zero eavesdropping-induced channel loss and produces perfect anticorrelation. Therefore, the eavesdropper Eve can safely attack all the transmitted bits and the eavesdropping information gain can always exceed the legitimate user's information gain in the whole domain of the quantum channel transmission efficiency $\eta$, i.e., [0,100%]. This means that the ping-pong protocol can be completely eavesdropped in its original version. But the improvement of the ping-pong protocol security produced by W\'{o}jcik is also suitable for our eavesdropping attack.
 Antoni Wojcik Physics , 2002, DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.157901 Abstract: The proposed eavesdropping scheme reveals that the quantum communication protocol recently presented by Bostrom and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] is not secure as far as quantum channel losses are taken into account.
 中国物理 B , 2007, Abstract: We introduce an attack scheme for eavesdropping freely the ping-pong quantum communication protocol proposed by Bostr\"{o} m and Felbinger Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] in a noise channel. The vicious eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts and measures the travel photon transmitted between the sender and the receiver. Then she replaces the quantum signal with a multi-photon signal in the same state, and measures the returned photons with the measuring basis, with which Eve prepares the fake signal except for one photon. This attack increases neither the quantum channel losses nor the error rate in the sampling instances for eavesdropping check. It works for eavesdropping the secret message transmitted with the ping-pong protocol. Finally, we propose a way for improving the security of the ping-pong protocol.
 Physics , 2005, DOI: 10.1088/1009-1963/16/2/001 Abstract: We introduce an attack scheme for eavesdropping the ping-pong quantum communication protocol proposed by Bostr$\ddot{o}$m and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. \textbf{89}, 187902 (2002)] freely in a noise channel. The vicious eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts and measures the travel photon transmitted between the sender and the receiver. Then she replaces the quantum signal with a multi-photon signal in a same state, and measures the photons return with the measuring basis with which Eve prepares the fake signal except for one photon. This attack increase neither the quantum channel losses nor the error rate in the sampling instances for eavesdropping check. It works for eavesdropping the secret message transmitted with the ping-pong protocol. Finally, we propose a way for improving the security of the ping-pong protocol.
 Zhanjun Zhang Physics , 2004, Abstract: The wrong mutual information, quantum bit error rate and secure transmission efficiency in Wojcik's eavesdropping scheme [PRL90(03)157901]on ping-pong protocol have been pointed out and corrected.
 Physics , 2003, DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.69.054301 Abstract: We present a quantum communication protocol which keeps all the properties of the ping-pong protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] but improves the capacity doubly as the ping-pong protocol. Alice and Bob can use the variable measurement basises in control mode to detect Eve's eavesdropping attack. In message mode, Alice can use one unitary operations to encode two bits information. Bob only needs to perform a Bell type measurement to decode Alice's information. A classical message authentification method can protect this protocol against the eavesdropping hiding in the quantum channel losses and the denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
 Zhan-jun Zhang Physics , 2006, Abstract: The security proof of the ping-pong protocol is wrong.
 Qing-yu Cai Physics , 2005, DOI: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.10.050 Abstract: The crucial issue of quantum communication protocol is its security. In this paper, we show that all the deterministic and direct two-way quantum communication protocols, sometimes called ping-pong (PP) protocols, are insecure when an eavesdropper uses the invisible photon to eavesdrop on the communication. With our invisible photon eavesdropping (IPE) scheme, the eavesdropper can obtain full information of the communication with zero risk of being detected. We show that this IPE scheme can be implemented experimentally with current technology. Finally, a possible improvement of PP communication protocols security is proposed. PACS:03.67.Hk
 Physics , 2007, Abstract: Communication security with quantum key distribution has been one of the important features of quantum information theory. A novel concept of secured direct communication has been the next step forward without the need to establish any shared secret key. The present paper is based on the ping-pong protocol with three particle GHZ state as the initial state where the receiver can simultaneously receive information from two parties. Possible eavesdropping on the travelling particle has been examined.
 Physics , 2007, DOI: 10.1016/j.physleta.2008.03.048 Abstract: We briefly review the security of the ping-pong protocol in light of several attack scenarios suggested by various authors since the proposal of the protocol. We refute one recent attack on an ideal quantum channel, and show that a recent claim of falseness of our original security proof is erroneous.
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