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Interval Values for Multicriteria Cooperative Games  [PDF]
Graziano Pieri,Lucia Pusillo
AUCO Czech Economic Review , 2010,
Abstract: In this paper we consider multicriteria interval games. The importance of multiobjectives follows from applications to real world. We consider interval valued games and extend some classical solutions for cooperative games to this new class in multicriteria situations.
Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization  [PDF]
Sylvain Béal,Subhadip Chakrabarti,Amandine Ghintran,Philippe Solal
Games , 2010, DOI: 10.3390/g1030338
Abstract: We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.
Learning Cooperative Games  [PDF]
Maria-Florina Balcan,Ariel D. Procaccia,Yair Zick
Computer Science , 2015,
Abstract: This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given $m$ random samples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative game; can we predict the values of unseen coalitions? We study the PAC learnability of several well-known classes of cooperative games, such as network flow games, threshold task games, and induced subgraph games. We also establish a novel connection between PAC learnability and core stability: for games that are efficiently learnable, it is possible to find payoff divisions that are likely to be stable using a polynomial number of samples.
On two solution concepts in a class of multicriteria games  [PDF]
Justo Puerto,Federico Perea
Mathematics , 2014,
Abstract: In this paper we compare two solution concepts for general multicriteria zero-sum matrix games: minimax and Pareto-optimal security payoff vectors. We characterize the two criteria based on properties similar to the ones that have been used in the corresponding counterparts in the single criterion case, although they need to be complemented with two new consistency properties. Whereas in standard single criterion games minimax and optimal security payffs coincide, whenever we have multiple criteria these two solution concepts differ. We provide explanations for the common roots of these two concepts and highlight the intrinsic differences between them.
Cooperative Product Games  [PDF]
David Rosales
Computer Science , 2014,
Abstract: I introduce cooperative product games (CPGs), a cooperative game where every player has a weight, and the value of a coalition is the product of the weights of the players in the coalition. I only look at games where the weights are at least $2$. I show that no player in such a game can be a dummy. I show that the game is convex, and therefore always has a non-empty core. I provide a simple method for finding a payoff vector in the core.
Synchronous Cooperative Parrondo's Games  [PDF]
Zoran Mihailovic,Milan Rajkovic
Physics , 2003,
Abstract: Inspired by asynchronous cooperative Parrondo's games we introduce two new types of games in which all players simultaneously play game A or game B or a combination of these two games. These two types of games differ in the way a combination of games A and B is played. In the first type of synchronous games, all players simultaneously play the same game (either A or B), while in the second type players simultaneously play the game of their choice, i.e. A or B. We show that for these games, as in the case of asynchronous games, occurrence of the paradox depends on the number of players. An analytical result and an algorithm are derived for the probability distribution of these games.
Solving Cooperative Reliability Games  [PDF]
Yoram Bachrach,Reshef Meir,Michal Feldman,Moshe Tennenholtz
Computer Science , 2012,
Abstract: Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the reliability extension, each agent only "survives" with a certain probability, and a coalition's value is the probability that its surviving members would be a winning coalition in the base game. We study prominent solution concepts in such games, showing how to approximate the Shapley value and how to compute the core in games with few agent types. We also show that applying the reliability extension may stabilize the game, making the core non-empty even when the base game has an empty core.
On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games  [PDF]
Ehud Lehrer,Marco Scarsini
Computer Science , 2012,
Abstract: We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and thereby to give rise to a new environment. A coalition that considers a deviation needs to take the consequences into account because from the deviation point on, the game is no longer played with the original set of players. The deviating coalition becomes the new grand coalition which, in turn, induces a new dynamic game. The stage games of the new dynamical game depend on all previous allocation including those that have materialized from the deviating time on. We define three types of core solutions: fair core, stable core and credible core. We characterize the first two in case where the instantaneous game depends on the last allocation (rather than on the whole history of allocations) and the third in the general case. The analysis and the results resembles to a great extent the theory of non-cooperative dynamic games.
Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions  [PDF]
Georgios Chalkiadakis,Edith Elkind,Evangelos Markakis,Maria Polukarov,Nicholas Robert Jennings
Computer Science , 2014, DOI: 10.1613/jair.3075
Abstract: In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions--or overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games. We then explore the issue of stability in this setting. In particular, we introduce a notion of the core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional (non-overlapping) scenario. Then, under some quite general conditions, we characterize the elements of the core, and show that any element of the core maximizes the social welfare. We also introduce a concept of balancedness for overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures that can be extended to elements of the core. Finally, we generalize the notion of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we introduce two alternative notions of stability in OCF that allow a wider range of deviations, and explore the relationships among the corresponding definitions of the core, as well as the classic (non-overlapping) core and the Aubin core. We illustrate the general properties of the three cores, and also study them from a computational perspective, thus obtaining additional insights into their fundamental structure.
The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games  [PDF]
Qizhi Fang,Bo Li,Xiaohan Shan,Xiaoming Sun
Computer Science , 2015,
Abstract: Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network.
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