Abstract:
The well-known Impossibility Theorem of Arrow asserts that any Generalized Social Welfare Function (GSWF) with at least three alternatives, which satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a dictatorship, is necessarily non-transitive. In 2002, Kalai asked whether one can obtain the following quantitative version of the theorem: For any $\epsilon>0$, there exists $\delta=\delta(\epsilon)$ such that if a GSWF on three alternatives satisfies the IIA condition and its probability of non-transitive outcome is at most $\delta$, then the GSWF is at most $\epsilon$-far from being a dictatorship or from breaching the Unanimity condition. In 2009, Mossel proved such quantitative version, with $\delta(\epsilon)=\exp(-C/\epsilon^{21})$, and generalized it to GSWFs with $k$ alternatives, for all $k \geq 3$. In this paper we show that the quantitative version holds with $\delta(\epsilon)=C \cdot \epsilon^3$, and that this result is tight up to logarithmic factors. Furthermore, our result (like Mossel's) generalizes to GSWFs with $k$ alternatives. Our proof is based on the works of Kalai and Mossel, but uses also an additional ingredient: a combination of the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality with a reverse hypercontractive inequality due to Borell, applied to find simultaneously upper bounds and lower bounds on the "noise correlation" between Boolean functions on the discrete cube.

Abstract:
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that any constitution which satisfies Transitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity is a dictatorship. Wilson derived properties of constitutions satisfying Transitivity and IIA for unrestricted domains where ties are allowed. In this paper we consider the case where only strict preferences are allowed. In this case we derive a new short proof of Arrow theorem and further obtain a new and complete characterization of all functions satisfying Transitivity and IIA.

Abstract:
This paper presents some aspects related to the issues of aggregating economic indicators. Departing from the research of Gh. Paun (1983) we will prove a theorem which states that under certain, natural assumptions, it is impossible to obtain an optimum aggregation. Unlike the original work of Paun, in this paper we are giving a rather simple proof of this theorem.

Abstract:
The impossibility proof on unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is critically reviewed. Different ways of obtaining secure protocols are indicated.

Abstract:
Let ${\mathcal A}$ be a nonempty real central arrangement of hyperplanes and ${\rm \bf Ch}$ be the set of chambers of ${\mathcal A}$. Each hyperplane $H$ defines a half-space $H^{+} $ and the other half-space $H^{-}$. Let $B = \{+, -\}$. For $H\in {\mathcal A}$, define a map $\epsilon_{H}^{+} : {\rm \bf Ch} \to B$ by $\epsilon_{H}^{+} (C)=+ \text{(if} C\subseteq H^{+}) \text{and} \epsilon_{H}^{+} (C)= - \text{(if} C\subseteq H^{-}).$ Define $\epsilon_{H}^{-}=-\epsilon_{H}^{+}.$ Let ${\rm \bf Ch}^{m} = {\rm \bf Ch}\times{\rm \bf Ch}\times...\times{\rm \bf Ch} (m\text{times}).$ Then the maps $\epsilon_{H}^{\pm}$ induce the maps $\epsilon_{H}^{\pm} : {\rm \bf Ch}^{m} \to B^{m} $. We will study the admissible maps $\Phi : {\rm \bf Ch}^{m} \to {\rm \bf Ch}$ which are compatible with every $\epsilon_{H}^{\pm}$. Suppose $|{\mathcal A}|\geq 3$ and $m\geq 2$. Then we will show that ${\mathcal A}$ is indecomposable if and only if every admissible map is a projection to a omponent. When ${\mathcal A}$ is a braid arrangement, which is indecomposable, this result is equivalent to Arrow's impossibility theorem in economics. We also determine the set of admissible maps explicitly for every nonempty real central arrangement.

Abstract:
I present arguments indicating the impossibility of spontaneously rotating quantum timecrystals, as recently proposed by Frank Wilczek [arXiv:1202.2539]. In particular, I prove a No-Go Theorem, rigorously ruling out the possibility of spontaneous ground-state (or thermal equilibrium) rotation for a broad class of systems.

Abstract:
In the 1950s L. Schwartz proved his famous impossibility result: for every k in N there does not exist a differential algebra (A,+,*,D) in which the distributions can be embedded, where D is a linear operator that extends the distributional derivative and satisfies the Leibnitz rule (namely D(u*v)=Du*v+u*Dv) and * is an extension of the pointwise product on the continuous functions. In this paper we prove that, by changing the requests, it is possible to avoid the impossibility result of Schwartz. Namely we prove that it is possible to construct an algebra of functions (A,+,*,D) such that (1) the distributions can be embedded in A in such a way that the restriction of the product to the C^{1} functions agrees with the pointwise product, namely for every f,g in C^{1} we have {\Phi}(fg)={\Phi}(f)*{\Phi}(g), and (2) there exists a linear operator D:A\rightarrow A that extends the distributional derivative and satisfies a weak form of the Leibnitz rule. The algebra that we construct is an algebra of restricted ultrafunction, which are generalized functions defined on a subset {\Sigma} of a non-archimedean field K (with {\Sigma}\subseteq R\subseteq K) and with values in K. To study the restricted ultrafunctions we will use some techniques of nonstandard analysis.

Abstract:
A common use of crowd sourcing is to obtain labels for a dataset. Several algorithms have been proposed to identify uninformative members of the crowd so that their labels can be disregarded and the cost of paying them avoided. One common motivation of these algorithms is to try and do without any initial set of trusted labeled data. We analyse this class of algorithms as mechanisms in a game-theoretic setting to understand the incentives they create for workers. We find an impossibility result that without any ground truth, and when workers have access to commonly shared 'prejudices' upon which they agree but are not informative of true labels, there is always equilibria where all agents report the prejudice. A small amount amount of gold standard data is found to be sufficient to rule out these equilibria.

Abstract:
Protein Folding is concerned with the reasons and mechanism behind a protein's tertiary structure. The thermodynamic hypothesis of Anfinsen postulates an universal energy function (UEF) characterizing the tertiary structure, defined consistently across proteins, in terms of their aminoacid sequence. We consider the approach of examining multiple protein structure descriptors in the PDB (Protein Data Bank), and infer individual preferences, biases favoring particular classes of aminoacid interactions in each of them, later aggregating these individual preferences into a global preference. This 2-step process would ideally expose intrinsic biases on classes of aminoacid interactions in the UEF itself. The intuition is that any intrinsic biases in the UEF are expressed within each protein in a specific manner consistent with its specific aminoacid sequence, size, and fold (consistently with Anfinsen's thermodynamic hypothesis), making a 1-step, holistic aggregation less desirable. Our intention is to illustrate how some impossibility results from voting theory would apply in this setting, being possibly applicable to other protein folding problems as well. We consider concepts and results from voting theory and unveil methodological difficulties for the approach mentioned above. With our observations, we intend to highlight how key theoretical barriers, already exposed by economists, can be relevant for the development of new methods, new algorithms, for problems related to protein folding.

Abstract:
Not any geometry can be axiomatized. The paradoxical Godel's theorem starts from the supposition that any geometry can be axiomatized and goes to the result, that not any geometry can be axiomatized. One considers example of two close geometries (Riemannian geometry and $\sigma $-Riemannian one), which are constructed by different methods and distinguish in some details. The Riemannian geometry reminds such a geometry, which is only a part of the full geometry. Such a possibility is covered by the Godel's theorem.