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Analyzing Incentives for Protocol Compliance in Complex Domains: A Case Study of Introduction-Based Routing  [PDF]
Michael P. Wellman,Tae Hyung Kim,Quang Duong
Computer Science , 2013,
Abstract: Formal analyses of incentives for compliance with network protocols often appeal to game-theoretic models and concepts. Applications of game-theoretic analysis to network security have generally been limited to highly stylized models, where simplified environments enable tractable study of key strategic variables. We propose a simulation-based approach to game-theoretic analysis of protocol compliance, for scenarios with large populations of agents and large policy spaces. We define a general procedure for systematically exploring a structured policy space, directed expressly to resolve the qualitative classification of equilibrium behavior as compliant or non-compliant. The techniques are illustrated and exercised through an extensive case study analyzing compliance incentives for introduction-based routing. We find that the benefits of complying with the protocol are particularly strong for nodes subject to attack, and the overall compliance level achieved in equilibrium, while not universal, is sufficient to support the desired security goals of the protocol.
The Value of Private Patient Information in the Physician-Patient Relationship: A Game-Theoretic Account  [PDF]
Kris De Jaegher
Computational and Mathematical Methods in Medicine , 2012, DOI: 10.1155/2012/847396
Abstract: This paper presents a game-theoretical model of the physician-patient relationship. There is a conflict of interests between physician and patient, in that the physician prefers the patient to always obtain a particular treatment, even if the patient would not consider this treatment in his interest. The patient obtains imperfect cues of whether or not he needs the treatment. The effect of an increase in the quality of the patient’s private information is studied, in the form of an improvement in the quality of his cues. It is shown that when the patient’s information improves in this sense, he may either become better off or worse off. The precise circumstances under which either result is obtained are derived. 1. Introduction All across developed countries, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, cash-strapped governments are currently seeking ways to cut their budgets. Given the rising costs of health care, this seems a good area for cutting the budget, as suspicion may arise that physicians prescribe unnecessary treatments. A good way to cut the budget would then seem to provide patients with more information so that they can better assess their health status, and in such a way that they avoid unnecessary treatment. In fact, one would then hope that the drastically increased opportunities for patients to obtain information through the Internet (see [1]), would increasingly pose a constraint on physician’s ability to overprescribe without any necessity to intervene. The purpose of this paper is to show, using a simple game-theoretic model, that such increased patient information does not necessarily decrease health care expenditure and may actually make patients worse off. The question on whether or not the hypothesis that physicians overprescribe treatment (known as the supplier-induced demand hypothesis [2]) is confirmed has attracted a huge literature in health economics). While the discussion continues on whether supplier-induced demand exists and whether it can be observed continues, the literature clearly shows that physicians respond to incentives [3]. The natural conclusion is then that conflicts of interest will arise between physician and patient, and that the physician will not always prescribe treatments which a hypothetical patient with the same information as the physician would consider in his own interest. The question we seek to address is whether better patient information can counter the conflict of interest between physician and patient. We analyze this question using a simple game-theoretic model of the
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems  [PDF]
Chiranjeeb Buragohain,Divyakant Agrawal,Subhash Suri
Computer Science , 2003,
Abstract: Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.
A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing over Peer-to-Peer Networks  [PDF]
Jaeok Park,Mihaela van der Schaar
Computer Science , 2009, DOI: 10.1109/JSTSP.2010.2048609
Abstract: User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but the free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P networks, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an incentive scheme and then use different game formulations derived from the basic model to examine five incentive schemes: cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this paper show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative peers do not share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme allows peers to consume more content than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers by introducing an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention; and 4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to describing the solutions of different formulations, we discuss enforcement and informational requirements to implement each solution, aiming to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes for P2P networks.
A Game-Theoretic Study on Non-Monetary Incentives in Data Analytics Projects with Privacy Implications  [PDF]
Michela Chessa,Jens Grossklags,Patrick Loiseau
Computer Science , 2015,
Abstract: The amount of personal information contributed by individuals to digital repositories such as social network sites has grown substantially. The existence of this data offers unprecedented opportunities for data analytics research in various domains of societal importance including medicine and public policy. The results of these analyses can be considered a public good which benefits data contributors as well as individuals who are not making their data available. At the same time, the release of personal information carries perceived and actual privacy risks to the contributors. Our research addresses this problem area. In our work, we study a game-theoretic model in which individuals take control over participation in data analytics projects in two ways: 1) individuals can contribute data at a self-chosen level of precision, and 2) individuals can decide whether they want to contribute at all (or not). From the analyst's perspective, we investigate to which degree the research analyst has flexibility to set requirements for data precision, so that individuals are still willing to contribute to the project, and the quality of the estimation improves. We study this tradeoff scenario for populations of homogeneous and heterogeneous individuals, and determine Nash equilibria that reflect the optimal level of participation and precision of contributions. We further prove that the analyst can substantially increase the accuracy of the analysis by imposing a lower bound on the precision of the data that users can reveal.
The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation  [PDF]
Isamu Okada?,Hitoshi Yamamoto?,Fujio Toriumi?,Tatsuya Sasaki
PLOS Computational Biology , 2015, DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004232
Abstract: Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players’ incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.
The use of restraints in psychiatric patients
MYH Moosa, FY Jeenah
South African Journal of Psychiatry , 2009,
Abstract: Restraints are usually used for the protection of patients and others when medication and verbal therapies are insufficient to control potentially violent patients. Many fear the abuse of restraints as well as their psychological, physical and emotional consequences. In South Africa, according to the Mental Health Care Act No. 17 of 2002, the use of restraints is permissible but subject to certain regulations. Restraint may not be used any longer than is necessary to prevent serious bodily harm to the patient or others. When restraint has the desired effect of settling the patient’s behaviour to the point where control is regained, its further imposition is illegal. Restraints may be classified into three main categories: (i) environmental restraints; (ii) physical restraints; and (iii) chemical restraints. There is much debate over what types of restraint are superior. There may be differences in cost, risk of serious staff injury, requirements of staff time for monitoring and implementation, and impacts on staff and patient attitudes. It is hoped that the use of environmental and physical restraint will be rendered obsolete by advances in the field of psychiatry such psychopharmacology and the therapeutic milieu. In order to reach this goal more research needs to be done on restraint practices across a wide range of psychiatric treatment settings.
A Study of Truck Platooning Incentives Using a Congestion Game  [PDF]
Farhad Farokhi,Karl H. Johansson
Mathematics , 2013,
Abstract: We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to use the road, the average velocity of the flow at that time, and the dynamic congestion tax that they pay for using the road. In addition to these terms, the trucks have an incentive for using the road at the same time as their peers because they have platooning capabilities, which allow them to save fuel. The dynamics and equilibria of this game-theoretic model for the interaction between car traffic and truck platooning incentives are investigated. We use traffic data from Stockholm to validate parts of the modeling assumptions and extract reasonable parameters for the simulations. We use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. We perform a comprehensive simulation study to understand the influence of various factors, such as the drivers' value of time and the percentage of the trucks that are equipped with platooning devices, on the properties of the Nash equilibrium.
Modeling and Analyzing Wavelet based Watermarking System using Game Theoretic Optimization Technique
Shweta,Akash Tayal,Ankita Lathey
International Journal of Computer Science Issues , 2011,
Abstract: This paper deals with establishing an economically viable and robust multilevel Game theoretic watermarking security system for the digital community; based on CPU time utilization with respect to channel capacity and system complexity. The coefficients of watermark are embedded into the host image at selected transformation level, which in turn extracted by inverse transformation at the decoder to develop the game matrix, which is iteratively searched for the optimized stable state for the system using permissible threshold. The rational thinking of maximizing the payoff of the watermarker (encoder) with respect to the attacker (noise) can be merged with the model deriving winning strategies to gain optimality. The data is rationally analyzed and tested to describe the behavior of the method for varying system parameter values and to gain performance optimization on different gray images with added Gaussian, salt and pepper, JPEG compression noises. Signal to noise ratio and correlation coefficients are used as criteria for testing the method.
A Reexamination of “The Hidden Return to Incentives”  [PDF]
Jing Davis, Steven Schwartz, Richard Young
Theoretical Economics Letters (TEL) , 2017, DOI: 10.4236/tel.2017.75101
Abstract: Prior literature has observed a “hidden return to incentives” where principals receive more cooperation from agents when formal incentives are available but not used than when not available. Previous experiments are replicated using a gift-exchange rather than a trust game. Hidden returns to incentives are not observed, and in fact the results show the opposite. Suggestions for future research are provided.
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