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Treading Water in Neurath's Ship: Quine, Davidson, Rorty
Christopher Norris
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 1998,
Abstract: This article examines what I take to be some of the wrong turns and false dilemmas that analytic philosophy has run into since Quine's well-known attack on the two 'last dogmas' of old-style Logical Empiricism. In particular it traces the consequences of Quine's argument for a thoroughly naturalized epistemology, one that would view philosophy of science as 'all the philosophy we need', and that defines 'philosophy of science' in narrowly physicalist terms. I contend that this amounts to a third residual dogma of empiricism and that its effect has been chiefly to restrict the range of post-Quinean debate by setting an agenda which preemptively excludes all interest in the wider (i.e., critical and normative) dimensions of philosophic enquiry. Its influence can be seen in various responses to Quine, among them those of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty, both of whom adopt a similar, reductively physicalist approach to issues of meaning, knowledge and truth. Where Davidson takes issue with other Quinean doctrines such as framework-relativism and radical meaning-variance, Rorty pushes those doctrines right through to a wholesale relativist (or 'textualist') position according to which interpretation is completely unconstrained by the mere fact of a causal 'correspondence' between beliefs and reality. What they both share — and what thus lays Davidson open to a revisionist reading in Rorty's favoured style — is this Quine-derived notion that beliefs can be explained in terms of a reflex stimulus-response psychology that finds no room for normative issues of epistemological warrant or justification. For it will then seem plausible for Rorty to claim that any 'beliefs' acquired by such a rudimentary mechanism are compatible with pretty much any higher-level theory or description that one cares to place upon them. My article goes on to criticize Rorty's most extreme statement of the case — in his essay 'Texts and Lumps' — and (more constructively) to suggest some ways forward from this post-empiricist predicament.
A filosofia americana: conversa es com Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre e Kuhn, de Giovanna Borradori
Glenn W. Erickson
Princípios : Revista de Filosofia , 2005,
Abstract: Resenha do livro "A filosofia americana: conversa es com Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre e Kuhn", de Giovanna Borradori. Tradu o de álvaro Lorencini. S o Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2003, 223 páginas
Davison on Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
Otávio Bueno
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2005,
Abstract: In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our be-liefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoher-ent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a co-herence theory has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonian skepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy.
Μουσικ Ιδιαιτερ τητε των Ατ μων με Σ νδρομο Williams  [PDF]
/?μητρα Κ?νιαρη
Approaches : Music Therapy & Special Music Education , 2009,
Abstract: Τα τομα με σ νδρομο Williams (ΣW) συχν εκφρ ζουν ιδια τερο ενδιαφ ρον για τη μουσικ , κυρ ω τη μουσικ ακρ αση και τη μουσικ δημιουργ α ( κφραση και αυτοσχεδιασμ ). Μπορε να εμφαν σουν απ λυτη ακο και να αναπτ ξουν μ α ιδια τερη εκφραστικ και συναισθηματικ σχ ση με τη μουσικ . Η εκμ θηση, μω , αν γνωση παρτιτο ρα και η αναλυτικ επεξεργασ α δομικ ν στοιχε ων τη μουσικ ε ναι λειτουργ ε στι οπο ε παρουσι ζουν δυσκολ ε . Σ γχρονε νευρο-απεικονιστικ μελ τε επιχειρο ν να προσεγγ σουν τι δομικ και λειτουργικ ιδιαιτερ τητε του εγκεφ λου των ατ μων με ΣW κατ την επεξεργασ α τη μουσικ πληροφορ α . Σε αυτ το ρθρο παρουσι ζονται (α) οι γνωστικ και νευρο-βιολογικ ιδιαιτερ τητε των ατ μων με ΣW στη σχ ση του με τη μουσικ και (β) ο ρ λο που μπορε να διαδραματ σει στη γενικ τερη εκπα δευσ του η αν πτυξη μ α εκπαιδευτικ προσ γγιση η οπο α θα στοχε ει στην ξεδ πλωση και χρ ση πτυχ ν των ιδια τερων μουσικ ν του ικανοτ των.
PRAGMATISMO Y FLORECIMIENTO HUMANO: PUTNAM Y RORTY
Rosales Rodríguez,Amán;
Estudios de Filosofía , 2005,
Abstract: in this paper an answer is given to the question: "what does 'human flourishing' mean in the current 'neopragmatist' perspective?". the exposition is based on the ideas of h. putnam and r. rorty, who propose two similar and yet different approaches to the question. the consideration of these two philosophical variants show that contemporary pragmatism is not a undifferentiated block of opinions, and that it a mistake to associate the ideas of both putnam and rorty with a pernicious relativism or a radical skepticism. some comments on the current function of philosophy according to both authors close the article.
Davidson's Criticism of the Proximal Theory of Meaning
Dirk Greimann
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2005,
Abstract: According to the proximal theory of meaning, which is to be found in Quine’s early writings, meaning is determined completely by the correla-tion of sentences with sensory stimulations. Davidson tried to show that this theory is untenable because it leads to a radical form of skepticism. The present paper aims to show, first, that Davidson’s criticism is not sound, and, second, that nonetheless the proximal theory is untenable because it has a very similar and equally unacceptable consequence: it implies that the truth-value of ordinary sentences like ‘Snow is white’ is completely determined by the properties of the speaker, not by the prop-erties of the objects to which these sentences refer.
Skepticism: The Central Issues
Timo Kajamies,Krister Talvinen
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2004,
Abstract: Review: LADESMAN, Charles. Skepticism: The Central Issues.
Semantyczne za o enia sceptycyzmu kartezjańskiego (Semantic Presuppositions of Cartesian Skepticism)  [PDF]
Krzysztof Pos?ajko
Analiza i Egzystencja , 2010,
Abstract: The paper purports to show that in order to formulate the hypothesis that all our beliefs are collectively false – which is taken to be the core of Cartesian skepticism – one must accept the presumption that semantic properties of subject`s beliefs locally supervene on “internal” properties of said subject. In order to show that the responses to skepticism from semantic externalism, i.e. those formulated by Putnam and Davidson, are analyzed. It is argued that even though these arguments are controversial they indicate that Cartesian skeptic must assume that subject beliefs` semantic properties can remain the same in different surroundings, which is exactly what the supervenience thesis amounts to. Finally, it is pointed out that the skepticism introduced by Kripke in his discussion of rule-following is indeed more radical than traditional, Cartesian one, as the former denies the very thesis that the latter must assume.
Rorty and Normativity
Alexander Kremer
Human Affairs , 2007, DOI: 10.2478/v10023-007-0007-8
Abstract: The paper summarizes some of the main ideas in Rorty's philosophy and indicates the views he holds on normativity. As a neopragmatic thinker, Rorty wants as little normativity as possible, but this does not mean that he rejects all types of normativity.
Epistemologia pragmatyczna Michaela Williamsa (PRAGMATIST EPISTEMOLOGY BY MICHAEL WILLIAMS)
Renata Ziemińska
Analiza i Egzystencja , 2007,
Abstract: The article presents three main elements of Williams' epistemology: the concept of knowledge, the problem of skepticism and the concept of truth. Williams takes knowledge not as pure descriptive but partly normative concept (to know is to be engaged and entitled). He rejects the demonstrative conception of knowledge (knowledge is infallible) and prefers the fallibilist conception of knowledge (knowledge is uncertain and fallible). Williams is good at bringing skeptical presuppositions to light: the demonstrative conception of knowledge and the conception of justification with Prior Grounding Requirement, epistemological realism and priority for internal knowledge. He rightly observes that when we change that presuppositions (skeptic's context), knowledge does exist. However, Williams-fallibilist is close to a skeptic: they both agree that our beliefs are uncertain. The difference is only whether some of our beliefs deserve to be called knowledge. The most important worries concern Williams' concept of truth (deflationary pragmatism). According to Williams truth has no nature and it is not a goal of inquiry. However, if truth is not a goal, we can hardly understand the previous discussion with skepticism and the defense of rationality.
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