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Negative externalities and sustainability of energy sector  [PDF]
Ciegis R.,Pusinaite R.
Baltic Region , 2010, DOI: 10.5922/2079-8555-2010-1-11
Abstract: The article evaluates negative externalities of the electricity industry and possibilities for the sustainable development. The concept of negative externalities of the electricity industry and evaluation and internalization of the negative externalities are reviewed from the viewpoint of principles of environmental economics and sustainable development.
Human Capital Externalities and Growth
Arteaga Cabrales,Carolina;
Ensayos sobre POLíTICA ECONóMICA , 2011,
Abstract: this paper provides evidence of positive externalities in human capital that help to explain divergences in development worldwide. we estimate the supply and demand for human capital using a five-year panel involving 60 countries, covering the period 1980-2000, and found that there exists positive externalities in human capital accumulation close to one. this translates into increasing returns to scale and increasing marginal returns in human capital.
Information geometries and Microeconomic Theories  [PDF]
Richard Nock,Brice Magdalou,Nicolas Sanz,Eric Briys,Fred Celimene,Frank Nielsen
Mathematics , 2009,
Abstract: More than thirty years ago, Charnes, Cooper and Schinnar (1976) established an enlightening contact between economic production functions (EPFs) -- a cornerstone of neoclassical economics -- and information theory, showing how a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas production function encodes homogeneous functions. As expected by Charnes \textit{et al.}, the contact turns out to be much broader: we show how information geometry as pioneered by Amari and others underpins static and dynamic descriptions of microeconomic cornerstones. We show that the most popular EPFs are fundamentally grounded in a very weak axiomatization of economic transition costs between inputs. The strength of this characterization is surprising, as it geometrically bonds altogether a wealth of collateral economic notions -- advocating for applications in various economic fields --: among all, it characterizes (i) Marshallian and Hicksian demands and their geometric duality, (ii) Slutsky-type properties for the transformation paths, (iii) Roy-type properties for their elementary variations.
Competitive markets with externalities
Mitsunori Noguchi,William R. Zame
Theoretical Economics , 2006,
Abstract: This paper presents a general model of a competitive market with consumption externalities, and establishes the existence of equilibrium in the model, under assumptions comparable to those in classical models. The model allows production and indivisible goods. Examples illustrate the generality and applicability of the results.
Matching Games with Additive Externalities  [PDF]
Simina Branzei,Tomasz P. Michalak,Talal Rahwan,Kate Larson,Nicholas R. Jennings
Computer Science , 2012,
Abstract: Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents make. Such an influence is called an externality. Whereas fully expressive representations of externalities in matchings require exponential space, in this paper we propose a compact model of externalities, in which the influence of a match on each agent is computed additively. In this framework, we analyze many-to-many and one-to-one matchings under neutral, optimistic, and pessimistic behaviour, and provide both computational hardness results and polynomial-time algorithms for computing stable outcomes.
Inter-Group and Intra-Group Externalities of Two-Sided Markets in Electronic Commerce  [PDF]
Lixiang Li, Yueting Chai, Yi Liu
Journal of Service Science and Management (JSSM) , 2011, DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2011.41008
Abstract: The e-marketplaces, which play an important role in facilitating transactions and aggregating information in electronic commerce, show positive inter-group externalities where one group’s benefit from receiving a service depends on the number of the intermediary services consumed by the other group, and negative intra-group externalities where the surplus is destroyed because members within the group compete with each other. In this paper, with a different approach from the emerging two-sided markets theory and the traditional microeconomic theory, we analyze a monopolistic e-marketplace owned by a third-party firm by substituting the size of consumers with the number of intermediary services. Moreover, we pay close attention to solving the following problems: 1) When these inter- and intra-group externalities exist, are both the demand curves and the pricing strategies of intermediary services different from those of traditional goods? 2) How to price intermediary services to maximize profit in the e-marketplaces? 3) How do these network externalities affect the management strategy of platforms? Finally, we exemplify such analytical results as pricing strategies of platforms with managerial practice of electronic commerce.
Credit, Externalities, and Nonoptimality of the Friedman Rule  [PDF]
Keiichiro Kobayashi, Masaru Inaba, Kengo Nutahara
Theoretical Economics Letters (TEL) , 2012, DOI: 10.4236/tel.2012.22036
Abstract: We construct a cash-credit model with positive externalities in the production of credit goods. It is shown that under suitable conditions, the Friedman rule is not optimal and there exists an optimal nominal interest rate that maximizes the social welfare and output. This is because increasing the nominal interest rate improves sectoral misallocations caused by externalities in our economy.
Sequential Auctions and Externalities  [PDF]
Renato Paes Leme,Vasilis Syrgkanis,Eva Tardos
Computer Science , 2011,
Abstract: In many settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not necessarily implemented simultaneously. Future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players in each auction, introducing externalities. Motivated by this consideration, we study a setting of a market of buyers and sellers, where each seller holds one item, bidders have combinatorial valuations and sellers hold item auctions sequentially. Our results are qualitatively different from those of simultaneous auctions, proving that simultaneity is a crucial aspect of previous work. We prove that if sellers hold sequential first price auctions then for unit-demand bidders (matching market) every subgame perfect equilibrium achieves at least half of the optimal social welfare, while for submodular bidders or when second price auctions are used, the social welfare can be arbitrarily worse than the optimal. We also show that a first price sequential auction for buying or selling a base of a matroid is always efficient, and implements the VCG outcome. An important tool in our analysis is studying first and second price auctions with externalities (bidders have valuations for each possible winner outcome), which can be of independent interest. We show that a Pure Nash Equilibrium always exists in a first price auction with externalities.
Microeconomic Analysis of Export Credit Program  [PDF]
N. Tungalag, R. Enkhbat, Ch. Undram, Ch. Ankhbayar
iBusiness (IB) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/ib.2018.104010
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study theoretical aspects of export credit insurance in the framework of microeconomics and analyze the economic impacts of an export credit program on trade flows within a framework of a microeconomic analysis. A multi-country trade model has been developed based on optimization methods and algorithm. For our theoretical analysis, we consider a multi-country trade model when one of countries imports an export good from other countries.
Internalising the Externalities of Public Transport in Botswana
C Mupimpila
Botswana Journal of Economics , 2008,
Abstract: In this paper, the externalities generated by public transport and the economics of road pricing are analysed. A case study of Botswana shows the imbalance between the supply and demand for road space as the underlying cause of traffic congestion. Empirically, the determinants of private motor vehicle ownership in Botswana are: credit to the private sector, the exchange rate, and road space. An optimal solution to the problem of traffic congestion in the country requires internalisation of the externalities generated by public transport. Without efforts to internalise the externalities of public transport, private car ownership becomes attractive but worsens traffic congestion and the costs of congestion. Road pricing is one way to internalise the externalities of public transport. This is the approach used by Singapore and other countries. The paper shows how aspects of the scheme can be used in Botswana.
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