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The Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance
Niculae Feleaga
Theoretical and Applied Economics , 2006,
Abstract: The years between 1990-2000 represented the rising power period for the institutional investors, especially within the developed countries. In the Anglo-Saxon environment, such a growth significantly modified the structure of companies’ shareholder frameworks. The development and the institutionalization of the stock exchange market determined the companies’ bonds to be more concentrated within the hands of the financial institutions, which have a superior economic expertise, rather than do the natural persons when saving. In order to diminish the informational lack of symmetry, between the company’s leaders and its shareholders, and for influencing the leaders in managing the enterprise – with the purpose of maximizing value – some institutional investors tried to implement an external control system. Therefore, they formulated new corporate governance procedures. The development of the institutional investors is part of a reform movement targeted towards the macro-financial environment. That is why, two important elements deserve to be mentioned: the households’ financial patrimonies and the structure of the financing frameworks. The institutional investors are essentially the mutual funds, the insurance companies and the pension funds, and therefore they manage considerable amounts of capital (in thousands of billions of dollars) within the assembly of OCDE countries.
Research on the Relationship between Institutional Investors, the Influence of Corporate Internal Governance and Corporate Philanthropy

- , 2017,
Abstract: 通过对中国A股上市公司2004-2013年慈善捐赠数据的实证分析,发现企业内部治理与慈善捐赠呈现负相关关系,即内部治理良好的公司并不会倾向于多捐赠;而外部机构投资者持股比例与企业慈善捐赠呈现正相关关系,即机构投资者持股比例越高,企业慈善捐赠支出水平越高;并且外部机构投资者持股能在一定程度上参与公司内部治理,从而对企业慈善捐赠产生修正作用,即机构投资者持股比例越大,越能改善内部治理差的公司多捐赠的现象,而对内部治理较好公司的捐赠影响不大。
The negative correlation between corporate internal governance and philanthropy is revealed based on China's A share listed companies charity data from 2004 to 2013, which means that the corporates that have good internal governance do not tend to donate more; however, there is a positive correlation between shareholding percentage of external institutional investors and corporate philanthropy, in other words, the higher shareholding percentage of institutional investors, the more expenditure of corporate philanthropy will be; furthermore, shareholding of external institutional investors can participate in company internal governance to some extent, which have certain effect on corporate philanthropy, that is to say, higher shareholding percentage of institutional investors can discourage corporates which have poor internal governance, to denote more; whereas, this has little effect for corporates which have good internal governance.
Investors’ Reaction to the Implementation of Corporate Governance Mechanisms  [PDF]
Nousheen Tariq Bhutta, Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah
Open Journal of Accounting (OJAcct) , 2014, DOI: 10.4236/ojacct.2014.31002
Abstract: The study investigates the impact of corporate governance on investor reaction. This is the first study till date that addresses this gap in literature. The design of the study comprises of corporate governance, investor reaction. Data was taken from 125 non-financial sector of Pakistani companies listed at KSE for the period of 2005-2010. Data was extracted from balance sheet analysis (SBP report), KSE website and annual reports of companies. Correlation (individual and composite) and linear regression tests were applied to validate the outcomes. The results confirm that there is no impact of corporate governance on investor reaction and relationship between them is negative. This implies the inefficiency of financial market where noise trades create sentiment.
Corporate Governance, Institutional Environment, Behavioral Corporate Finance and Inefficient Investment  [PDF]
Qi-An Luo, Hong-Fei Ye
Journal of Service Science and Management (JSSM) , 2015, DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2015.83046
Abstract: This paper is the literature review of extensive literature about how inefficient investment is influenced. It discusses in three factors: corporate governance, institutional environment and behavioral corporate finance. Academics concern how the conflicts of shareholders and creditors, shareholders and managers, controlling shareholders and minority shareholders cause inefficient investment through the game. However, an enterprise is not isolated, it operates in various connections with external institutional environment. Academics interest in how formal institution such as legal environment, financial system, government intervention and informal institution like political connection impact inefficient investment. Besides, human behaviors have certain social and individual psychology background, then the crossover study of corporate finance and psychology gradually becomes a cutting-edge issue. The paper concludes the effects of investor psychology on inefficient investment by classifying psychological bias derived from investment decisions, investment execution and investment performance feedback.
Institutional Voids and Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Understanding  [cached]
Umar Burki
International Journal of Business and Management , 2012, DOI: 10.5539/ijbm.v7n10p99
Abstract: Asian business firms and their fundamental business institutions are primarily embedded in socio-cultural features. This institutional void argument outlines the indispensable role of informal Asian business institutions in managing corporate governance. Under this argument, the study draws attention to the development of business groups and networks in Asia and elucidates why Asian business groups and networks are important elements regarding practical and operational dimensions of the Asian corporate sector. These uniqueness Asian business characteristics are expound in relation to salient assumptions of different theories to understand and provide practical knowledge about corporate governance choices made by Asian family firms.
Anguita Oyarzún,Christian;
Revista chilena de derecho , 2011, DOI: 10.4067/S0718-34372011000100002
Abstract: in this paper the author examines the approach of institutional shareholders to corporate governance in the united kingdom, in particular the issue of preventive governance according to the combined code of united kingdom. corporate governance has been developed to solve the agency dilemma that exists in modern corporations. plenty of legislation has been issued around the world to prevent the scandals of the past; however business needs flexible principles for reasons of efficiency. an important role is played by institutional shareholders. the main thesis of this paper is that preventive governance is the best way to solve the agency dilemma and institutional shareholders have learned the importance of it.
Corporate Governance: Insider Information, the Bane of Financial Melt-Down?
DE Amadasu
African Research Review , 2011,
Abstract: Words are not enough to express the global financial melt-down. Is it foreclosure , bad debt, bank failure, tentacles, stock market crash, share nose-diving, investors havoc or suicide or death- trap, government inability, business failure, mortgage failure, Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac phenomenon, bait and switch game, etc; the insider knowledge or information, the scapegoat? This is the problem investigated in this study. Therefore, the hypothesis is that the insider knowledge of the manager does not cause the global financial melt-down. The method is analytical using desk research. The finding is that the insider information possessed by the manager informed the manipulation of firms, securities, risky business, terms, prices, etc, for their benefit to the detriment of investors and therefore caused the financial melt-down. Finally, the major recommendation is that corporate governance needs reforms for tighter control and application of full oversight functions on investment bankers.
Gavrea Corina,Stegerean Roxana
Annals of the University of Oradea : Economic Science , 2011,
Abstract: Corporate governance is a key element of today’s economic reality being more and more present in many countries around the world. This paper has two main objectives. The first one is to offer more insight into the concept of corporate governance by a thorough literature review and by presenting and analyzing a framework of corporate governance. The second objective of this paper is to investigate the corporate governance situation in three developing economies (Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary). The World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development published a series of reports on corporate governance. The present study uses data from these reports in order to illustrate how these developing economies are dealing with corporate governance. Based on ROSC Reports a corporate governance score was calculated. As this score shows, there is room for improvement for all three developing economies. This study is important because it shows the differences in corporate governance among developing economies and the need to study these nations at the individual country level. Corporate governance has many benefits for developing economies. It helps developing economies to register sustainable growth rates, to increases investors’ confidence in the national economy, and to increase the ability of capital markets to mobilize savings.
Corporate Governance and its Implication in Bangladesh
1Mohammad Shamsuddoha,2Mohammed Shahedul Quader,3 Hossain Shahid Shohrowardhy
Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences , 2012,
Abstract: Bangladesh is one of the third world countries having many opportunities in corporate sector. Today, Business has to some dynamism with their products otherwise consumer will not attract of their product. E -business, e-commerce, and e marketing have been promoted as the rescuer of the business world and a catalyst to twenty-first century performance in the global marketplace. Now we have new word corporate Governance in the Bangladesh context. This paper presents the meaning, scope, importance and the implementation of corporate governance practices in Bangladesh. It also examines the internal mechanisms like the board of directors, their independence, the challenges faced by institutional investors, the role of internal and external communication mechanisms, whistle blowers and the legal protection needed for them to ensure corporate governance practices. Successful corporate governance depends largely of trade-off among the various conflicting interest groups like Government, Society, Inventors, Creditors, and Employees of the organization. The basic governance issues related to the effectiveness and accountability of board of directors. This paper further examines the external mechanisms through like corporate forums, media analysts, structural reforms and governance ratings to incorporate corporate governance codes into corporations. In addition, the researchers try to recommend regarding governance that can help a lot for developing corporate sectors in Bangladesh.
Nada Vignjevi? ?or?evi?,Borislav Radevi?,Predrag Jovanovi?
Socioeconomica : Scientific Journal for Theory and Practice of Socio-economic Development , 2013, DOI: 10.12803/sjseco.234013
Abstract: Models of privatization in transition countries provide different operational efficiency and the quality of corporate governance. Although, at the end of the eighties, it was thought that each privatization method contributes to better corporate governance by providing property owners. Fifteen years of experience in transition countries and practice different models of privatization have shown that this is not the case. Two dominant approach to privatization was the public offering of stock, which resulted in dispersed ownership structures, and the sale of assets, which is usually associated with the sale of the majority share of an investor or a consortium of investors. In transition countries, the choice of privatization method was connect and influenced the level of investor protection and the development of a formal corporate governance. Countries with weaker legal protection of investors, mostly used method of selling assets as a privatization method. However, some countries, and when the initial level of legal protection of investors was low, implemented voucher privatization as the primary method of sale.
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