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Economic Regulation of Airports and its Consequences on Efficiency  [cached]
Cícero Melo Filho
Revista de Literatura dos Transportes , 2009,
Abstract: The economic regulation of infrastructure services stems from the need to correct the market failures that arise with the lack of competition - a characteristic of monopoly markets. This situation leads operators to provide poor service at high prices, with a quality that is wanting. Thus, the presence of regulation is essential to correct such distortions. This paper investigates the effects of different forms of price regulation in airports. The analysis takes into account the interaction between the profits of grant and price regulation. The results show that while ROR regulation may lead to excess investment in capacity, price cap regulation is prone to induce under-investment. The extent of under-investment is found to be lower under the dual till price cap than under the single till price cap. In particular, the total factor productivity is greater under the dual till price cap than under the single till price cap or the single till ROR. The analysis supports the argument made by several economists that the dual regulation till would be better than the single till in terms of economic efficiency, especially for larger and more widely used airports.[Paper in Portuguese]
Economic regulation of airports and its consequences on efficiency [paper in Portuguese]  [cached]
Cícero Rodrigues de Melo Filho
Journal of Transport Literature , 2009,
Abstract: The economic regulation of infrastructure services stems from the need to correct the market failures that arise with the lack of competition - a characteristic of monopoly markets. This situation leads operators to provide poor service at high prices, with a quality that is wanting. Thus, the presence of regulation is essential to correct such distortions. This paper investigates the effects of different forms of price regulation in airports. The analysis takes into account the interaction between the profits of grant and price regulation. The results show that while ROR regulation may lead to excess investment in capacity, price cap regulation is prone to induce under-investment. The extent of under-investment is found to be lower under the dual till price cap than under the single till price cap. In particular, the total factor productivity is greater under the dual till price cap than under the single till price cap or the single till ROR. The analysis supports the argument made by several economists that the dual regulation till would be better than the single till in terms of economic efficiency, especially for larger and more widely used airports.
Welfare Analysis Base on Price-Cap Regulation on Successive Monopolistic Upstream and Downstream Firms
基于价格上限管制下上下游垄断企业的福利分析

LIU Wei,TANG Xiao-wo,MA Yong-kai,
刘伟
,唐小我,马永开

系统工程理论与实践 , 2005,
Abstract: Based on the low social welfare problem of successive monopolistic upstream and downstream firms, the authors analyzed the profits of these firms, consumer surplus and social welfare while these firms were under price-cap regulation respectively. Meanwhile, the authors compared the social welfare under regulated with the unregulated social welfare and incorporated social welfare. At last, the authors draw some conclusions.
Regulation of Telecom in Developing Countries: Outcomes, Incentives and Commitment Regulation of Telecom in Developing Countries: Outcomes, Incentives and Commitment
Ahmed Galal,Bharat Nauriyal
Revista de Análisis Económico (RAE) , 1995,
Abstract: In response to the recent wave of privatization and regulation of monopolies in developing countries, this paper evaluates the impact of different regulatory schemes on private sector behavior in the telecommunications sector in seven countries. It shows that regulation is most effective (as evidenced by reasonable private sector returns. high private investment and improved productivity) where the government/regulators reduce the firm's information advantage. induce the firm (through pricing) to operate efficiently. and institute safeguarding mechanisms to protect the firm against expropriation of assets or quasi-rents. Conversely, where the government/regulators fail to resolve the information. incentives and commitment problems. private sector returns are relatively high and investment and productivity are relatively low. In response to the recent wave of privatization and regulation of monopolies in developing countries, this paper evaluates the impact of different regulatory schemes on private sector behavior in the telecommunications sector in seven countries. It shows that regulation is most effective (as evidenced by reasonable private sector returns. high private investment and improved productivity) where the government/regulators reduce the firm's information advantage. induce the firm (through pricing) to operate efficiently. and institute safeguarding mechanisms to protect the firm against expropriation of assets or quasi-rents. Conversely, where the government/regulators fail to resolve the information. incentives and commitment problems. private sector returns are relatively high and investment and productivity are relatively low.
Executive Equity Incentives, Overconfidence and Corporate Inefficient Investment  [PDF]
Sisi Xiong
Open Journal of Business and Management (OJBM) , 2019, DOI: 10.4236/ojbm.2019.71015
Abstract:
In the past research on equity incentives, the influence of incentive system on individual psychological factors was often neglected. From the perspective of behavioral company finance, this paper takes executives from 2010 to 2016 China A-share listed companies as research samples to research framework for overconfidence, executive equity incentives, and corporate inefficient in-vestment. The results of the study show that equity incentives can alleviate the underinvestment behavior of executives by influencing executives’ over-confidence, and executive overconfidence is partly a sub-mediating effect. However, for over-invested enterprises, the indirect effect of executive over-confidence generated by equity incentives on corporate over-investment is a deterioration, and the direct effect of equity incentives is opposite to the indirect effect. So executives’ overconfidence in equity incentives, in the ex-cessive investment of enterprises, plays a special mediating effect—the cover effect.
The Effectiveness of Investment Incentives in Certain Foreign Companies Operating in the Czech Republic
Cedidlova Miroslava
Journal of Competitiveness , 2013,
Abstract: Since opening its borders, the Czech Republic has tried to attract foreign investors in order to become more competitive. A system of investment incentives was created and has been adapted to meet changing conditions. As in many countries, there are positive and negative opinions on the existence of investment incentives. Many agencies are trying to determine whether they are effective or not. The aim of this article is to find out if the investment incentives provided in the Czech Republic have been effective not only for companies but for the government as a provider as well. To do so, it provides a case study of firms that received investment incentives, charting the firm’s development and profitability.
Antimonopoly regulation method based on perfect price discrimination  [PDF]
Vadim Borokhov
Mathematics , 2015,
Abstract: We propose a method of antimonopoly regulation in a day-ahead power market with locational marginal pricing which forms economic incentives for a producer, operating a portfolio of generating units, to submit an offer indicating its true cost and faithful values of technical parameters, entering generating units constraints. The uncertainty faced by regulator when applying the method affects neither nodal output/consumption volumes nor locational marginal prices but manifests itself in overall uplift or downlift for the market, which may be allocated among the other market players in a way preserving the price signals produced by the market.
Gold Mining Investment Incentives in Tanzania: Current Issues and the Possible Remedies  [cached]
Yuduo Lu,Kung’unde G. Marco
International Journal of Business and Management , 2010, DOI: 10.5539/ijbm.v5n2p99
Abstract: In recent years Tanzania has seen a rapid growth of its gold mining sector, the trend which has made the country the third largest gold producer in Africa. This growth is attributed much to the favorable investment climate created by the government for Multinational mining companies through the provision of various tax incentives and the ongoing discovery of new mining locations. Although tax incentives are attributed much for the promising trend of the mining sector, but, there is a controversy linking the granted incentives and the actual benefits the country realizes. The provided tax incentives seem to be way too generous causing the country to lose substantial amount of much-needed tax revenues. The practices of the incoming mining companies and local tax authorities are largely blamed for the ongoing trend.
ОСОБЛИВОСТ ДЕРЖАВНОГО РЕГУЛЮВАННЯ НВЕСТИЦ ЙНО Д ЯЛЬНОСТ FEATURES OF STATE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES ОСОБЕННОСТИ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЯ ИНВЕСТИЦИОННОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ
А.С. ПАЗЕНОК
Strategy of Ukraine : Economics, Sociology, Law , 2011,
Abstract: У статт розглядаються методи зд йснення та особливост державного регулювання нвестиц йно д яльност з метою створення сприятливого нвестиц йного кл матy. In this article have been analyzed features and methods of implementation of state regulation of investment activity in a market economy. В статье рассматриваются методы осуществления и особенности государственного регулирования инвестиционной деятельности в условиях рыночной экономики.
Optimal Investment and Premium Policies under Risk Shifting and Solvency Regulation  [PDF]
Damir Filipovi?,Robert Kremslehner,Alexander Muermann
Quantitative Finance , 2011,
Abstract: Limited liability creates a conflict of interests between policyholders and shareholders of insurance companies. It provides shareholders with incentives to increase the risk of the insurer's assets and liabilities which, in turn, might reduce the value policyholders attach to and premiums they are willing to pay for insurance coverage. We characterize Pareto optimal investment and premium policies in this context and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence and uniqueness. We then identify investment and premium policies under the risk shifting problem if shareholders cannot credibly commit to an investment strategy before policies are sold and premiums are paid. Last, we analyze the effect of solvency regulation, such as Solvency II or the Swiss Solvency Test, on the agency cost of the risk shifting problem and calibrate our model to a non-life insurer average portfolio.
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