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Dyskusja Davidson - Quine na temat znaczenia i wiedzy. Krótki przewodnik ( THE DAVIDSON - QUINE DISPUTE ON MEANING AND KNOWLEDGE: A CONCISE GUIDE)  [PDF]
Tomá? Marvan
Analiza i Egzystencja , 2008,
Abstract: The paper addresses the 'distal/proximal' debate between Donald Davidson and W. V. O. Quine on the nature of meaning and knowledge. It is argued that Davidson's misgivings, though interesting, are not devastating for Quine's version of empiricism, which is not readily translatable into traditional philosophical categories.
Treading Water in Neurath's Ship: Quine, Davidson, Rorty
Christopher Norris
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 1998,
Abstract: This article examines what I take to be some of the wrong turns and false dilemmas that analytic philosophy has run into since Quine's well-known attack on the two 'last dogmas' of old-style Logical Empiricism. In particular it traces the consequences of Quine's argument for a thoroughly naturalized epistemology, one that would view philosophy of science as 'all the philosophy we need', and that defines 'philosophy of science' in narrowly physicalist terms. I contend that this amounts to a third residual dogma of empiricism and that its effect has been chiefly to restrict the range of post-Quinean debate by setting an agenda which preemptively excludes all interest in the wider (i.e., critical and normative) dimensions of philosophic enquiry. Its influence can be seen in various responses to Quine, among them those of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty, both of whom adopt a similar, reductively physicalist approach to issues of meaning, knowledge and truth. Where Davidson takes issue with other Quinean doctrines such as framework-relativism and radical meaning-variance, Rorty pushes those doctrines right through to a wholesale relativist (or 'textualist') position according to which interpretation is completely unconstrained by the mere fact of a causal 'correspondence' between beliefs and reality. What they both share — and what thus lays Davidson open to a revisionist reading in Rorty's favoured style — is this Quine-derived notion that beliefs can be explained in terms of a reflex stimulus-response psychology that finds no room for normative issues of epistemological warrant or justification. For it will then seem plausible for Rorty to claim that any 'beliefs' acquired by such a rudimentary mechanism are compatible with pretty much any higher-level theory or description that one cares to place upon them. My article goes on to criticize Rorty's most extreme statement of the case — in his essay 'Texts and Lumps' — and (more constructively) to suggest some ways forward from this post-empiricist predicament.
QUINE E DAVIDSON: ESTIMULA O DISTAL OU PROXIMAL?  [cached]
Araceli Velloso
Philósophos : Revista de Filosofia , 2008, DOI: 10.5216/phi.v10i2.3257
Abstract: Nesse artigo pretendo desenvolver um ponto bastante central de uma famosa discordancia entre Quine e Davidson, uma disputa conheci-da na literatura como “a quest o proximal x distal”. Em poucas palavras, enquanto Quine adota uma posi o proximal, segundo a qual devemos localizar o conteúdo empírico das senten as de observa o já nas termina- es neuronais dos falantes, Davidson prefere uma localiza o distal para esse conteúdo, pressupondo assim a existência de objetos no mundo. Essa discuss o é de suma relevancia para a compreens o do debate em torno do “terceiro dogma do empirismo”, proposto por Davidson e recusado por Quine, bem como para a compreens o da posi o semantica de Quine como um todo.
Verdade, interpreta o e objetividade em Donald Davidson  [PDF]
Arruda, José Maria
Veritas , 2005,
Abstract: Donald Davidson foi um dos filósofos mais influentes da tradi o analítica da segunda metade do século. A unidade de sua obra é constituída pelo papel central que reflex o sobre como podemos interpretar os proferimentos de um outro falante desempenha para a comprens o da natureza do significado. Davidson adota o ponto de vista metodológico de um intérprete que n o pode pressupor nada sobre o significado das palavras de um falante e que n o possui nenhum conhecimento detalhado de suas atitudes proposicionais. Neste artigo, eu apresento inicialmente a estrutura e os pressupostos da filosofia da linguagem de Davidson; passo depois a uma discuss o sobre a importancia do princípio de caridade para seu projeto interpretativo e, por fim, procuro apontar as diferen as do projeto de Davidson com a hermenêutica filosófica. Donald Davidson was one of the most influential philosophers in the analytic tradition in the last half of the twenthy century. The unity of his work lies in the central role that the reflection on how we are able to interpret the speech of another plays in undestanding the nature of meaning. Davidson adopts the standpoint of the interpreter of the speech of another whose evidence does not, at the outset, pressupose anything about what the speaker’s words mean or any datailed knowledge of his propositional attitudes. This is the position of the radical interpreter. In this paper, I begin with an account of the assumptions and structure of Davidson’s philosophy of language; after this I discuss the philosophical importance of the principle of charity for the theory of radical interpretation and, at the end, I compare Davidson’s interpretative project to the philosophical hermeneutic.
A filosofia americana: conversa es com Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre e Kuhn, de Giovanna Borradori
Glenn W. Erickson
Princípios : Revista de Filosofia , 2005,
Abstract: Resenha do livro "A filosofia americana: conversa es com Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre e Kuhn", de Giovanna Borradori. Tradu o de álvaro Lorencini. S o Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2003, 223 páginas
Intersubjektiv interpretasjon. Donald Davidson, triangulering og forfattereren rolle
Jan Sj?vik
Nordlit : Tidsskrift i litteratur og kultur , 2004,
Abstract: Forfatteren har ikke nytt noen s rlig respekt de siste femti rene. Allerede i 1946 slo W. K. Wimsatt og Monroe C. Beardsley fast at forfatterintensjonen ikke hadde noe si for det litter re verkets mening, og i 1968 kunngjorde Roland Barthes at forfatteren var d d. Dette m man imidlertid ha lov til tvile p . Her vil jeg f rst kort dr fte hva slags motiv Barthes og andre kan ha hatt for kvitte seg med forfatteren som en faktor i tolkningsprosessen. S vil jeg foresl at det kan v re nyttig igjen la forfatteren delta i den samtalen vi f rer for komme fram til meningen i en litter r tekst. Her kommer Donald Davidsons trianguleringsbegrep til spille hovedrollen, s rlig slik det legges fram i hans essay "Three Varieties of Knowledge." S vil jeg kort analysere to scener fra henholdsvis Arne Garborgs romaner Bondestudentar (1883) og Mannfolk (1886), for pr ve vise at en tolkning kan bli en mer n yaktig beskrivelse av leseprosessen, og f lgelig mer objektiv, dersom vi tar forfatteren med p r d. Til slutt vil jeg vise at en slik intersubjektiv m te tolke litter re tekster p er et attraktivt alternativ til en litteraturkritikk som baserer seg p skeptisisme overfor verden eller andre sinn.
Intersubjektiv interpretasjon. Donald Davidson, triangulering og forfattereren rolle  [cached]
Jan Sj?vik
Nordlit : Tidsskrift i litteratur og kultur , 2004,
Abstract: Forfatteren har ikke nytt noen s rlig respekt de siste femti rene. Allerede i 1946 slo W. K. Wimsatt og Monroe C. Beardsley fast at forfatterintensjonen ikke hadde noe si for det litter re verkets mening, og i 1968 kunngjorde Roland Barthes at forfatteren var d d. Dette m man imidlertid ha lov til tvile p . Her vil jeg f rst kort dr fte hva slags motiv Barthes og andre kan ha hatt for kvitte seg med forfatteren som en faktor i tolkningsprosessen. S vil jeg foresl at det kan v re nyttig igjen la forfatteren delta i den samtalen vi f rer for komme fram til meningen i en litter r tekst. Her kommer Donald Davidsons trianguleringsbegrep til spille hovedrollen, s rlig slik det legges fram i hans essay "Three Varieties of Knowledge." S vil jeg kort analysere to scener fra henholdsvis Arne Garborgs romaner Bondestudentar (1883) og Mannfolk (1886), for pr ve vise at en tolkning kan bli en mer n yaktig beskrivelse av leseprosessen, og f lgelig mer objektiv, dersom vi tar forfatteren med p r d. Til slutt vil jeg vise at en slik intersubjektiv m te tolke litter re tekster p er et attraktivt alternativ til en litteraturkritikk som baserer seg p skeptisisme overfor verden eller andre sinn.
Donald Davidson (1917- 2003)  [PDF]
Carlos Caorsi
Signos filosóficos , 2004,
Abstract:
Davidson, Dualism, and Truth  [cached]
Nathaniel Goldberg
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy , 2012, DOI: 10.4148/jhap.v1i7.1590
Abstract: Happy accidents happen even in philosophy. Sometimes our arguments yield insights despite missing their target, though when they do others can often spot it more easily. Consider the work of Donald Davidson. Few did more to explore connections among mind, language, and world. Now that we have critical distance from his views, however, we can see that Davidson’s accomplishments are not quite what they seem. First, while Davidson attacked the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, he in fact illustrated a way to hold it. Second, while Davidson used the principle of charity to argue against the dualism, his argument in effect treats the principle as constitutive of a conceptual scheme. And third, while Davidson asserted that he cannot define what truth ultimately is—and while I do not disagree—his work nonetheless allows us to saymore about truth than Davidson himself does. I aim to establish these three claims. Doing so enriches our understanding of issues central to the history of philosophy concerning how, if at all, to divvy up the mental or linguistic contribution, and the worldly contribution, to knowledge. As we see below, Davidson was right in taking his work to be one stage of a dialectic begun by Immanuel Kant.1 He was just wrong about what that stage is. Reconsidering Davidson’s views also moves the current debate forward, as they reveal a previously unrecognized yet intuitive notion of truth—even if Davidson himself remained largely unaware of it. We begin however with scheme/content dualism and Davidson’s argument against it.
Trzeci dogmat empiryzmu wyja niony, czyli co Donald davidson mia na my li, ale jasno tego nie powiedzia (THE THIRD DOGMA OF EMPIRICISM REVEALED)  [PDF]
Roman P. Godlewski
Analiza i Egzystencja , 2007,
Abstract: The article is focused on the idea rejected by Davidson in his 'On the very Idea of the Conceptual Scheme'. The idea is described as dualism of conceptual scheme and content or as the third dogma of empiricism. In the article it is explained as thesis that every language stays in a relation to the world. The author claims that this interpretation is the closest to Davidson's suggestions that refutation of the dualism lets to avoid relativism and save the objective concept of truth and to his understanding of truth as logically simple - not a relation camouflaged. The presented interpretation best deals with difficulties that other do not. Davidson did not refute the third dogma, so the article gives two arguments. The first is based on the thesis that the world is not an object of any kind; the second - on the thesis that the world is not any object at all, because the word 'world' is an onomatoid.
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