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Trzeci dogmat empiryzmu wyja niony, czyli co Donald davidson mia na my li, ale jasno tego nie powiedzia (THE THIRD DOGMA OF EMPIRICISM REVEALED)  [PDF]
Roman P. Godlewski
Analiza i Egzystencja , 2007,
Abstract: The article is focused on the idea rejected by Davidson in his 'On the very Idea of the Conceptual Scheme'. The idea is described as dualism of conceptual scheme and content or as the third dogma of empiricism. In the article it is explained as thesis that every language stays in a relation to the world. The author claims that this interpretation is the closest to Davidson's suggestions that refutation of the dualism lets to avoid relativism and save the objective concept of truth and to his understanding of truth as logically simple - not a relation camouflaged. The presented interpretation best deals with difficulties that other do not. Davidson did not refute the third dogma, so the article gives two arguments. The first is based on the thesis that the world is not an object of any kind; the second - on the thesis that the world is not any object at all, because the word 'world' is an onomatoid.
Lindbeck’s Scheme-Content Distinction: A Critique of the Dualism Between Orders of Language  [cached]
Adonis Vidu
Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies , 2004,
Abstract: There are several tensions present in George Lindbeck’s postliberal theology. One of these is between realist intuitions and a non-epistemic account of truth, on the one hand, and a social-constructivist non-realism with regard to theological statements. Theology is relegated to the status of second-order discourse, while first order language comprises the practices, rituals, vocabulary of a religion. I am challenging this intermediary status of religion with the help of Donald Davidson’s critique of the dualism between scheme and content. Since there isn’t much to be made of the notion of epistemic intermediaries (either as ‘content’ or as ‘scheme’) it does not make sense to continue to speak either in terms of realism or of non-realism. This clears the way for treating theology as cognitive.
Lindbeckís Scheme-Content Distinction: A Critique of the Dualism Between Orders of Language  [cached]
Adonis Vidu
Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies , 2004,
Abstract: There are several tensions present in George Lindbeckís postliberal theology. One of these is between realist intuitions and a non-epistemic account of truth, on the one hand, and a social- constructivist non-realism with regard to theological statements. Theology is relegated to the status of second-order discourse, while first order language comprises the practices, rituals, vocabulary of a religion. I am challenging this intermediary status of religion with the help of Donald Davidsonís critique of the dualism between scheme and content. Since there isnít much to be made of the notion of epistemic intermediaries (either as contentí or as schemeí) it does not make sense to continue to speak either in terms of realism or of non-realism. This clears the way for treating theology as cognitive.
On the dualism in psychology
MóNICA MARíA NOVOA GóMEZ
Universitas Psychologica , 2002,
Abstract: In the sciences dedicated to study the human beings, a dualism framework has been a constant and thedebate has been abundant both in philosophy of the science and in psychology itself (Moore, 2001;Ribes, 1990; Skinner, 1975, Skinner, 1969; Kantor, 1969, Ryle, 1949). The history of the psychologicaland philosophical thought about body-mind relation since Descartes is the history of the uncountableintents to escape from what Vesey (1965) nominated as the dead Cartesian point, to refer to thescientists conclusion on the human impossibility to understand how the body and mind are united. Inthe best way, finally there has been a return to the unavoidable common sense conception of its mutualinteraction. This article discusses the legitimacy of the dualist postulates and present AEC contributionsrelated to.
Searle's "Dualism Revisited"  [PDF]
Henry P. Stapp
Physics , 2008,
Abstract: A recent article in which John Searle claims to refute dualism is examined from a scientific perspective.
Legal dualism of local government in Russia
Maria S. Semenova,Natalya V. Lebedeva
European Researcher , 2011,
Abstract: The article justifies the statement about the legal dualism of local government in modern Russia.
Davidson's Criticism of the Proximal Theory of Meaning
Dirk Greimann
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2005,
Abstract: According to the proximal theory of meaning, which is to be found in Quine’s early writings, meaning is determined completely by the correla-tion of sentences with sensory stimulations. Davidson tried to show that this theory is untenable because it leads to a radical form of skepticism. The present paper aims to show, first, that Davidson’s criticism is not sound, and, second, that nonetheless the proximal theory is untenable because it has a very similar and equally unacceptable consequence: it implies that the truth-value of ordinary sentences like ‘Snow is white’ is completely determined by the properties of the speaker, not by the prop-erties of the objects to which these sentences refer.
Distinguishing WV Quine and Donald Davidson
James Pearson
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy , 2011, DOI: 10.4148/jhap.v1i1.1293
Abstract: Given W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s extensive agreement about much of the philosophy of language and mind, and the obvious methodological parallels between Quine’s radical translation and Davidson’s radical interpretation, many—including Quine and Davidson—are puzzled by their occasional disagreements. I argue for the importance of attending to these disagreements, not just because doing so deepens our understanding of these influential thinkers, but because they are in fact the shadows thrown from two distinct conceptions of philosophical inquiry: Quine’s “naturalism” and what I call Davidson’s “humanism.” The clash between Quine and Davidson thus provides valuable insight into the history of analytic naturalism and its malcontents.
Spotlight 6: Davidson Seamount
David Clague,Lonny Lundsten,James Hein,Jennifer Paduan
Oceanography , 2010,
Abstract: Davidson Seamount is located about 80 km off the central California coast in the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary. It is one of the better-explored seamounts in the world, having been sampled and observed during 32 dives by the remotely operated vehicle (ROV) Tiburon. These dives mapped the bottom substrate and biological communities, and collected over 280 rock samples and nearly as many benthic animals.
Davidson on Turing: Rationality Misunderstood?
John-Michael Kuczynski
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2005,
Abstract: Alan Turing advocated a kind of functionalism: A machine M is a thinker provided that it responds in certain ways to certain inputs. Davidson argues that Turing’s functionalism is inconsistent with a cer-tain kind of epistemic externalism, and is therefore false. In Davidson’s view, concepts consist of causal liasons of a certain kind between subject and object. Turing’s machine doesn’t have the right kinds of causal li-asons to its environment. Therefore it doesn’t have concepts. Therefore it doesn’t think. I argue that this reasoning is entirely fallacious. It is true that, in some cases, a causal liason between subject and object is part of one’s concept of that object. Consequently, to grasp certain propositions, one must have certain kids of causal ties to one’s environment. But this means that we must rethink some old views on what rationality is. It does not mean, pace Davidson, that a precondition for being rational is being causally embedded in one’s environment in a certain way. If Tur-ing’s machine isn’t capable of thinking (I leave it open whether it is or is not), that has nothing to do with its lacking certain kinds of causal con-nections to the environment. The larger significance of our discussion is this: rationality consists either in one’s ability to see the bearing of purely existential propositions on one another or rationality is simply not to be understood as the ability see the bearing that propositions have on one another.
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