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International Journal of Science and Engineering , 2012, DOI: 10.12777/ijse.v3i1.3399
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International Journal of Science and Engineering , 2011, DOI: 10.12777/ijse.v2i1.1278
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International Journal of Waste Resources , 2012, DOI: 10.12777/ijwr.v2i2.33
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The Test of Consciousness: The Crisis of Signification in the IDF
Nadir Tsur
Military and Strategic Affairs , 2010,
Abstract: Conclusions drawn by the IDF from the post-Second Lebanon War debrie ngs and investigations about the language and validity of the documents on doctrine, the applicability of operative plans and their assimilation, and the clarity of commands and their rationale, all point to a crisis of signi cation. This crisis, which has dogged the security establishment as well as its civilian and military foundations, began its slow growth in the early 1990s. Many sectors within the public were tired of war and of internal struggles, especially in the security-political arena. New approaches adopted in the art of war were not always properly adjusted to Israel’s reality, with concessions to post-modern, global ideas imparting a transition to peace-seeking militarism or re ecting new de nitions of old military goals. The two intra-military dimensions of the crisis of signi cation that engulfed the IDF were not approved by the top command structure and emanated without prior warning from command and control bodies, with the exception of the State Comptroller. They stemmed in part from the failure to formulate a concept of the use of force and combat doctrines that would provide a response to the new complex reality facing Israel and give clear, goal-oriented meaning to the understanding of the enemy and its methods.
Force Deployment Planning in the IDF General Staff
Gabi Siboni
Military and Strategic Affairs , 2011,
Abstract: IDF General Staff planning processes relate to two primary areas: force buildup and force deployment. The fundamentals of military doctrine of any army, and particularly the IDF, necessitate full synchronization between the two, and the element that underlies all planning processes is what is needed for force deployment. Upon the establishment of the IDF, these processes were assigned to a single framework: the General Staff Branch. However, more than sixty years later, planning in the General Staff today has been decentralized among various bodies in a way that complicates effective processes. Of the signi cant dif culties posed by this situation, three should be singled out. The rst is the weakness of planning for force deployment, which ostensibly is the responsibility of the IDF Operations Branch.The second dif culty concerns weak planning for force buildup, which must be based on force deployment needs. The third dif culty is the absence of synchronization in the planning processes. This article seeks to examine operational planning within the IDF command in three ways. The rst avenue of approach describes the evolution of operational planning and its implementation in the IDF over the years; the second analyzes the principles of operational planning and the limitations of the current situation in the IDF; and the third presents a possible model that could obviate some of the anomalies that exist today in the IDF. The scope of this article dictates a focus on the General Staff’s operational planning for force deployment. The limitations involved in planning processes related to force buildup should be discussed in a separate framework.
The Challenges of Warfare Facing the IDF in Densely Populated Areas
Gabi Siboni
Military and Strategic Affairs , 2012,
Abstract: Current assessments are that fighting in densely populated areas will be one of the main types of combat the IDF will face in the foreseeable future. This essay will focus on three points: one, the change in threats facing the State of Israel; two, the main characteristics of the military response necessitated by the change in the threat; and three, some components of the necessary method of action in such confrontations.
Regionalization of Rainfall Intensity-Duration-Frequency (IDF) Curves in Botswana  [PDF]
Berhanu F. Alemaw, Ron T. Chaoka
Journal of Water Resource and Protection (JWARP) , 2016, DOI: 10.4236/jwarp.2016.812088
Abstract: A regional analysis of design storms, defined as the expected rainfall intensity for given storm duration and return period, is conducted to determine storm Rainfall Intensity-Duration-Frequency (IDF) relationships. The ultimate purpose was to determine IDF curves for homogeneous regions identified in Botswana. Three homogeneous regions were identified based on topographic and rainfall characteristics which were constructed with the K-Means Clustering algorithm. Using the mean annual rainfall and the 24 hr annual maximum rainfall as an indicator of rainfall intensity for each homogeneous region, IDF curves and maps of rainfall intensities of 1 to 24 hr and above durations were produced. The Gamma and Lognormal probability distribution functions were able to provide estimates of rainfall depths for low and medium return periods (up to 100 years) in any location in each homogeneous region of Botswana.
Responding to the Need for International Legitimacy: Strengthening the IDF Strike Force
Yuval Bazak
Military and Strategic Affairs , 2011,
Abstract: The takeover of the Turkish ship MV Mavi Marmara, which prompted massive condemnation of Israel, demonstrated clearly the widening gap between how the IDF operates and how its actions are viewed by international public opinion. The IDF appears to have operated in accordance with international law in the face of explicit provocation intended to help a known terrorist organization under the guise of providing it with humanitarian assistance. The justi cation for the action was obvious, as was the manner in which the IDF acted, both in terms of the mode of action and in terms of the operational level, including the conduct of the ghters whose lives were in danger once they boarded the ship. Therefore, the world’s harsh condemnation of Israel was nothing short of hypocrisy. This essay analyzes the main changes that have occurred in the strategic arena, especially the rising in uence of the delegitimization campaign on the deployment of military force. The essay claims that in light of these changes the IDF must formulate a comprehensive strategy to coordinate force buildup and force deployment, and thereby allow an effective confrontation with the complex challenges facing the nation.
Climatic study of the exponent “n” in IDF curves: application for the Iberian Peninsula  [PDF]
R. Moncho,F. Belda,V. Caselles
Tethys : Journal of Mediterranean Meteorology & Climatology , 2009,
Abstract: The analysis of maximum precipitation is usually carried out by using IDF curves (Intensity-Duration-Frequency), which in turn could be expressed as MAI curves (Maximum Average Intensities). An index “n” has been developed in this work, defined from the exponent obtained when adjusting IDF climatic curves to MAI curves. That index provides information about how maximum precipitation is achieved in a certain climatic area, according to the relative temporal distribution of maximum intensities. From the climatic analysis of index “n”, large areas could be distinguished in the Iberian Peninsula, characterized by rain maxima of a stormier origin (peninsular inland), and areas characterized by rain maxima of a more frontal origin (southwest, Atlantic coast and Mediterranean coast). Additionally, these areas could be more specifically divided according to the persistence of maximum precipitation.
Think Before You Act: On the IDF Withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000
Giora Eiland
Military and Strategic Affairs , 2011,
Abstract: The main questions discussed in the IDF before the 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon were whether the ghting with Hizbollah could be conducted differently, and whether the existing situation was tolerable. The IDF was of the opinion that the situation was tolerable, and that it would be possible to continue in the same manner for a long term. In fact, there was no genuine, thorough discussion of what alternatives the State of Israel had at its disposal.This article presents several facts and conclusions stemming from the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. It also discusses two other events that occurred after the withdrawal: the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and a relatively small yet important event, the departure of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005. All these events are connected to one another.
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