Search Results: 1 - 10 of 100 matches for " "
All listed articles are free for downloading (OA Articles)
Page 1 /100
Display every page Item
Mind Is Reality: Buddhism Is Not a Pessimistic Religion  [PDF]
Yan Shi
Open Journal of Social Sciences (JSS) , 2016, DOI: 10.4236/jss.2016.410003
Abstract: The main body of this essay was divided into two parts, with the first one—to controvert the misunderstanding that “Buddhism is a pessimistic religion” and to point out that Buddhism was neither pessimistic nor optimistic but realistic, and the second one—to focus on the topic of nature of mind and to give reasons why Buddhism, especially Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism, said that “Mind is reality”.
Application of IQA Method to Discuss Augmented Reality Learner’s Mind Map  [PDF]
Kao Hsuan Jan
Psychology (PSYCH) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/psych.2018.98120
Abstract: The study has discussed the thought of inner mind of Augmented Reality learners by interactive qualitative research methods. The participants were juniors and seniors in college who have set a special topic in Augmented Reality Design. The study found that: 1) The concept of the learning mind presented by Augmented Reality learner is consistent with the main driver project and the output concept of the main outcome. It is obvious that the plan and result of Augmented Reality learning are the main conceptual factor. 2) The junior learners present linear mental thoughts during the learning process and have accumulated the required knowledge concept skills step by step. 3) The senior learners have accumulated a certain amount of learning experience, and thus they present an interactive cycling mental model of learning. 4) The logical editing ability of animation technique and interactive design plays an important interactive factor in the learner’s Mental Model. Logical editing ensures student’s ideas are accessible and fun to design. It also explains the learner’s psychological thoughts through a mental model and guides learner’s perception and behavior to solve problems.
Distinguishing WV Quine and Donald Davidson
James Pearson
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy , 2011, DOI: 10.4148/jhap.v1i1.1293
Abstract: Given W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s extensive agreement about much of the philosophy of language and mind, and the obvious methodological parallels between Quine’s radical translation and Davidson’s radical interpretation, many—including Quine and Davidson—are puzzled by their occasional disagreements. I argue for the importance of attending to these disagreements, not just because doing so deepens our understanding of these influential thinkers, but because they are in fact the shadows thrown from two distinct conceptions of philosophical inquiry: Quine’s “naturalism” and what I call Davidson’s “humanism.” The clash between Quine and Davidson thus provides valuable insight into the history of analytic naturalism and its malcontents.
Davidson, Dualism, and Truth  [cached]
Nathaniel Goldberg
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy , 2012, DOI: 10.4148/jhap.v1i7.1590
Abstract: Happy accidents happen even in philosophy. Sometimes our arguments yield insights despite missing their target, though when they do others can often spot it more easily. Consider the work of Donald Davidson. Few did more to explore connections among mind, language, and world. Now that we have critical distance from his views, however, we can see that Davidson’s accomplishments are not quite what they seem. First, while Davidson attacked the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, he in fact illustrated a way to hold it. Second, while Davidson used the principle of charity to argue against the dualism, his argument in effect treats the principle as constitutive of a conceptual scheme. And third, while Davidson asserted that he cannot define what truth ultimately is—and while I do not disagree—his work nonetheless allows us to saymore about truth than Davidson himself does. I aim to establish these three claims. Doing so enriches our understanding of issues central to the history of philosophy concerning how, if at all, to divvy up the mental or linguistic contribution, and the worldly contribution, to knowledge. As we see below, Davidson was right in taking his work to be one stage of a dialectic begun by Immanuel Kant.1 He was just wrong about what that stage is. Reconsidering Davidson’s views also moves the current debate forward, as they reveal a previously unrecognized yet intuitive notion of truth—even if Davidson himself remained largely unaware of it. We begin however with scheme/content dualism and Davidson’s argument against it.
The concept of degrees of uncertainty in Keynes, Shackle, and Davidson  [PDF]
Marco Crocco
Nova Economia , 2002,
Abstract: The aim of this piece is to discuss in what extent one can find - in the works of Shackle and Davidson - an understanding of uncertainty capable of both comprehend the concept of probable knowledge and admit the existence of degrees of 'true uncertainty'. Sharing the opinion of other scholars (Runde, 1990; Dow, 1995, and Dequech, 1997), we think that it is possible to find this definition of uncertainty in Keynes's works, and so make a point to the understanding of uncertainty as a concept feasible to be graded. Moreover, we claim that this concept is not incompatible with the understanding of the social reality as a nonergodic process. To sustain this claim, we will discuss Davidson's and Shackle's views and show that in their writings there are some elements that support our main point.
What do neural nets and quantum theory tell us about mind and reality?  [PDF]
Paul J. Werbos
Quantitative Biology , 2003,
Abstract: This paper proposes an approach to framing and answering fundamental questions about consciousness. It argues that many of the more theoretical debates about consciousness, such as debates about "when does it begin?", are misplaced and meaningless, in part because "consciousness" as a word has many valid and interesting definitions, and in part because consciousness qua mind or intelligence (the main focus here)is a matter of degree or level, not a binary variable. It proposes that new mathematical work related to functional neural network designs -- designs so functional that they can be used in engineering -- is essential to a functional understanding of intelligence as such, and outlines some key mathematics as of 1999, citing earlier work for more details. Quantum theory is relevant, but not in the simple ways proposed in more popular philosophies.
Spotlight 6: Davidson Seamount
David Clague,Lonny Lundsten,James Hein,Jennifer Paduan
Oceanography , 2010,
Abstract: Davidson Seamount is located about 80 km off the central California coast in the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary. It is one of the better-explored seamounts in the world, having been sampled and observed during 32 dives by the remotely operated vehicle (ROV) Tiburon. These dives mapped the bottom substrate and biological communities, and collected over 280 rock samples and nearly as many benthic animals.
Davidson on Turing: Rationality Misunderstood?
John-Michael Kuczynski
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2005,
Abstract: Alan Turing advocated a kind of functionalism: A machine M is a thinker provided that it responds in certain ways to certain inputs. Davidson argues that Turing’s functionalism is inconsistent with a cer-tain kind of epistemic externalism, and is therefore false. In Davidson’s view, concepts consist of causal liasons of a certain kind between subject and object. Turing’s machine doesn’t have the right kinds of causal li-asons to its environment. Therefore it doesn’t have concepts. Therefore it doesn’t think. I argue that this reasoning is entirely fallacious. It is true that, in some cases, a causal liason between subject and object is part of one’s concept of that object. Consequently, to grasp certain propositions, one must have certain kids of causal ties to one’s environment. But this means that we must rethink some old views on what rationality is. It does not mean, pace Davidson, that a precondition for being rational is being causally embedded in one’s environment in a certain way. If Tur-ing’s machine isn’t capable of thinking (I leave it open whether it is or is not), that has nothing to do with its lacking certain kinds of causal con-nections to the environment. The larger significance of our discussion is this: rationality consists either in one’s ability to see the bearing of purely existential propositions on one another or rationality is simply not to be understood as the ability see the bearing that propositions have on one another.
Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology  [PDF]
Duncan Pritchard,Christopher Ranalli
Humanities , 2013, DOI: 10.3390/h2030351
Abstract: We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem which generates metaepistemological ramifications for anti-skeptical theories. In particular, we argue that, contra Williams, Rorty’s view that Davidson was offering a theoretical diagnosis of radical skepticism can be consistently maintained with his transcendental approach.
On the correction equation of the Jacobi-Davidson method  [PDF]
Gang Wu,Hong-kui Pang
Mathematics , 2015,
Abstract: The Jacobi-Davidson method is one of the most popular approaches for iteratively computing a few eigenvalues and their associated eigenvectors of a large matrix. The key of this method is to expand the search subspace via solving the Jacobi-Davidson correction equation, whose coefficient matrix is singular. It is believed long by scholars that the Jacobi-Davidson correction equation is a consistent linear system. In this work, we point out that the correction equation may have a unique solution or have no solution at all, and we derive a computable necessary and sufficient condition for cheaply judging the existence and uniqueness of solution of the correction equation. Furthermore, we consider the difficulty of stagnation that bothers the Jacobi-Davidson method, and verify that if the Jacobi-Davidson method stagnates, then the corresponding Ritz value is a defective eigenvalue of the projection matrix. We provide a computable necessary and sufficient condition for expanding the search subspace successfully. The properties of the Jacobi-Davidson method with preconditioning and some alternative Jacobi-Davidson correction equations are also discussed.
Page 1 /100
Display every page Item

Copyright © 2008-2017 Open Access Library. All rights reserved.